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ABSTRACT		 The	trend	of	establishing	charter	schools	across	the	United	States	has	been	accomplished	by	authorization	statutes	labelling	them	as	public	schools.	They	are	supported	by	public	tax	dollars	but	private	entities	are	obtaining	charters	and	in	some	cases	hiring	for-profit	companies	to	operate	the	schools.	Private	boards	of	directors	replace	a	locally	elected	school	board	to	direct	the	operation	of	these	schools.	As	teachers	find	traditional	public	schools	closing	and	charter	schools	entering	the	market	where	closures	have	occurred	they	must	choose	between	moving	to	a	district	still	hiring	fully	certified	teachers	or	entering	employment	with	charter	organizations.	In	making	that	change	teachers	must	consider	whether	the	terms	of	their	employment	have	changed	and	understand	the	nature	of	their	new	relationship	with	school	leadership.	
	 As	public	employees,	teachers	were	protected	by	constitutional	provisions	extending	that	protection	to	the	states	through	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	That	amendment	is	what	incorporates	much	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	and	prohibits	deprivation	of	those	rights	by	state	action.	As	charter	schools	become	a	larger	employer	of	teachers	the	question	arises	whether	these	schools	are	also	subject	to	those	constitutional	provisions	in	the	same	way	a	public	school	district	is	when	employing	teachers.	The	state	action	doctrine,	developed	in	Fourteenth	Amendment	jurisprudence,	controls	whether	those	charter	school	employers	must	observe	constitutional	limitations	or	the	employees	have	lost	those	protections	by	becoming	charter	employees.	The	question	can	only	be	answered	by	tracking	the	development	and	status	of	the	state	action	doctrine	through	the	decisions	of	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court.	
	 iii	
	 The	state	action	doctrine	has	been	famously	labeled	a	“conceptual	disaster	area”1	and	has	eluded	consistent	interpretation	for	more	than	a	century.	Because	the	law	is	often	developed	in	a	syllogistic	pattern	supported	by	building	on	previous	holdings	and	remaining	consistent	in	interpretation	of	fact	situations	most	commentators	have	searched	for	some	consistency	in	the	holdings	of	the	Court	by	connecting	words	that	appear	in	multiple	decisions.	That	method	has	failed	to	provide	a	truly	consistent	interpretation	of	state	action	and	leads	mostly	to	the	“torchless	search	for	a	way	out	of	a	camp	echoing	cave”2	as	described	by	Professor	Black	sixty	years	ago.	This	study	takes	a	different	approach	to	the	decisions	to	make	sense	of	the	changing	interpretation	of	the	doctrine	through	time.	
	 Reading	the	cases	with	an	eye	to	the	members	of	the	Court	and	the	prevalent	political	issues	of	the	day	reveals	first	a	steady	expansion	of	the	doctrine	and	then	a	contraction	that	follows	the	patterns	of	those	political	issues	and	pressures	felt	by	the	Court	from	time	to	time.	This	method	uncovers	an	arc	of	decisions	that	follow	that	expansion	and	contraction	through	time	and	develop	an	understanding	of	how	new	cases	might	be	decided.	Because	the	Court	has	not	dealt	with	this	issue	that	projection	will	assist	any	litigants	attempting	to	claim	constitutional	protection	to	shape	their	cases	to	provide	the	best	chance	of	success.		 	
																																								 																				
1	CHARLES	L.	BLACK,	JR.,	Foreword:	"State	Action,"	Equal	Protection,	and	California's	Proposition	14,	81	
HARVARD	LAW	REVIEW	69,	95	(1967).	
2	Id.	
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Chapter	1	
The	Issue	of	Charter	Schools’	Publicity	
Introduction		 Charter	schools	have	become	a	substantial	force	in	education	in	the	United	States	in	the	twenty-first	century.	The	first	charter	school	law	was	enacted	in	Minnesota	in	1991	and	the	first	charters	issued	soon	thereafter	in	1992.	Since	then	42	states	and	the	District	of	Columbia	have	enacted	charter	school	laws	with	only	Kentucky,	Montana,	Nebraska,	North	Dakota,	South	Dakota,	Vermont,	Washington	and	West	Virginia	without	a	public	charter	school	law.	According	to	the	National	Alliance	for	Public	Charter	Schools	there	were	1542	charter	school	operating	in	the	1999-2000	school	year.	By	2006-2007	that	number	had	grown	to	3999	and	in	2014-2015	there	were	a	reported	6630	charter	schools	operating.3	Charter	schools	now	constitute	more	than	6%	of	all	public	schools.	By	comparison	during	that	same	period	private	schools	shrank	in	enrollment	from	12%	to	10%	of	all	students	while	charters	grew	from	.7%	to	4.6%,	more	than	accounting	for	the	loss	in	private	school	enrollment.4	There	is	little	doubt	that	the	charter	school	movement	is	growing	in	influence	and	is	building	a	large	following	in	states	around	the	country.		 When	charters	are	discussed	as	a	response	to	a	perceived	need	to	make	radical	change	in	schools	one	feature	is	prominent	in	the	discussion.	In	the	forty-three	states	
																																								 																				
3	National	Alliance	for	Public	Charter	Schools,	Charter	School	Data	Dashboard,	
http://dashboard2.publiccharters.org/National/	(last	visited,	April	5,	2016).	
4	Institute	of	Education	Sciences,	National	Center	for	Education	Statistics,	The	Condition	of	Education,	
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cga.asp	(May	2015).	
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with	charter	school	statutes,	all	label	them	as	“public	schools”	while	exempting	them	from	selected	legal	and	structural	obligations	of	traditional	public	schools.	It	is	clear	from	the	selected	exemptions	that	advocates	of	charter	schools	have	problematized	teachers	and	specifically	teacher	unions.	The	National	Alliance	for	Public	Charter	Schools,	the	largest	association	supporting	charter	schools,	has	created	a	Model	Law	for	states	to	enact	charter	school	legislation.5	The	Alliance	grades	states	by	their	conformity	to	their	model	including	the	recommendation	that	states	exempt	charter	schools	from	collective	bargaining	agreements	in	existence	at	least.6	It	also	suggests	exemption	from	all	state	laws	and	regulations	except	those	that	deal	with	health	and	safety,	civil	rights,	student	accountability,	criminal	background	checks	for	employees,	open	meetings,	freedom	of	information	laws	and	accounting	requirements.	Teacher	certification	is	suggested	to	merely	meet	the	minimum	requirements	of	the	former	No	Child	Left	Behind	law	which	allowed	for	alternative	certification	as	a	rather	open	option.7	Each	of	those	is	open	to	state	adoption	and	interpretation	but	the	Alliance	rankings	of	the	states’	laws	indicate	that	most	have	adopted	some	limitation	on	collective	bargaining	for	charters.8	
																																								 																				
5	A	New	Model	Law	For	Supporting	The	Growth	of	High-Quality	Public	Charter	Schools		(National	
Alliance	for	Public	Charter	Schools		2009).	
6	TODD	ZIEBARTH,	NATIONAL	ALLIANCE	FOR	PUBLIC	CHARTER	SCHOOLS,	MEASURING	UP	TO	THE	MODEL:	A	RANKING	
OF	STATE	CHARTER	SCHOOL	LAWS	(2016).	
7	A	New	Model	Law	For	Supporting	The	Growth	of	High-Quality	Public	Charter	Schools,	supra	n.4	
(2009).	
8	ZIEBARTH.	2016.	
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Although	state	charter	laws	vary	across	the	states	what	remains	constant	is	the	enforceability	of	rights	protected	by	the	Constitution.	Those	rights,	with	one	exception9,	are	protected	from	infringement	only	by	the	state	or	federal	government.	Private	individuals	and	corporations	are	not	constrained	by	the	Constitution	from	infringing	on	those	rights	unless	they	are	specifically	treated	in	a	statutory	scheme.	Public	employers	are	actors	of	the	state	and	thus	fall	within	the	constraints	prohibiting	the	infringement	of	rights	of	individuals	set	out	in	the	Constitution.	Despite	the	label	of	charter	schools	as	public	in	the	several	statutory	schemes	there	remains	a	question	whether	they	are	public	for	the	purposes	of	the	Constitution.	This	study	will	address	that	question.	Green	and	Mead10	have	reviewed	the	several	state	laws	establishing	charters	quite	exhaustively	revealing	some	of	the	legal	questions	that	vary	in	creation	and	operation	of	charters	under	similar	but	different	state	statutory	schemes.	All	those	schemes	identify	charters	as	“public	schools”	but	statutory	labels	seldom	carry	the	day	when	the	exact	legal	nature	of	an	institution	is	in	question	in	the	Court.	Courts	require	reasoned	analysis	based	upon	precedent	and	foundational	law	to	precisely	define	the	status	of	institutions	as	public	or	private.	Often	the	lines	are	not	clearly	drawn	and	require	a	close	analysis	of	fact	situations	to	unfold	a	complete	picture	of	the	status	of	a	given	new	institution	such	as	charter	schools.	Because	charter	schools	are	a	significant	departure	from	the	traditional	public	school	system	that	has	existed	in	this	country	since	at	least	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	their	status	is	still	at	issue.	
																																								 																				
9	The	Thirteenth	Amendment	abolishing	slavery	applies	to	individuals	and	states.	
10PRESTON	C.	GREEN,	III	&	JULIE	F.	MEAD,	CHARTER	SCHOOLS	AND	THE	LAW:	ESTABLISHING	NEW	RELATIONSHIPS			
(Christopher-Gordon		2004).	
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	 What	will	be	referred	to	as	traditional	public	schools	in	this	study	will	be	the	public-school	system	that	existed	in	the	United	States	starting	in	the	late	nineteenth	century	until	the	arrival	of	the	charter	school	movement.	Public	schools	were	a	stable	institution	until	policymakers	and	politicians	began	to	depict	them	as	failing	beginning	with	the	now	well-known	A	Nation	at	Risk.11	This	narrative	of	failure	led	to	a	movement	away	from	the	stable	format	that	existed	from	the	post-Civil	War	era	until	the	late	twentieth	century	into	what	is	a	new	format.	The	rhetoric	surrounding	these	changes	has	been	that	these	new	formats	are	innovative	and	creative	while	remaining	public	schools	has	come	under	scrutiny12	and	raises	serious	questions	about	the	substance	of	that	rhetoric.	
Statement	of	the	issue	 		 Teachers	serve	a	central	role	in	student	learning	and	their	status	in	charters	will	be	largely	defined	by	the	determination	of	the	Court	whether	they	are	public	employees	or	private	employees.	Lesser	rights	could	discourage	qualified	candidates	from	teaching	in	charter	schools	while	lesser	qualified	teachers	might	find	employment	there	after	being	limited	from	traditional	public	schools.	One	study	reports	that	less	qualified	teachers	are	a	greater	percentage	of	the	teaching	workforce	in	non-white,	low	performing	schools,	particularly	in	urban	areas.13	More	qualified	teachers	also	tend	to	
																																								 																				
11	NATIONAL	COMMISSION	ON	EXCELLENCE	IN	EDUCATION,	UNITED	STATES	DEPARTMENT	OF	EDUCATION,	A	NATION	
AT	RISK:	THE	IMPERATIVE	FOR	EDUCATIONAL	REFORM	(1983).	
12	See	CHRIS	LUBIENSKI,	Redefining	"Public"	Education:	charter	schools,	common	schools,	and	the	
rhetoric	of	reform,	103	TEACHERS	COLLEGE	RECORD	634(2001).	
13	HAMILTON	LANKFORD,	et	al.,	Teacher	Sorting	and	the	Plight	of	Urban	Schools,	24	EDUCATIONAL	
EVALUATION	AND	POLICY	ANALYSIS	37(2002).	
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quit	or	transfer	out	of	poor	urban	schools	leaving	a	less	prepared	teaching	staff	in	those	schools.14	The	requirement	for	teachers	to	be	“highly	qualified”	as	very	loosely	defined	in	the	No	Child	Left	Behind	law	that	serves	as	the	qualification	floor	for	the	model	charter	law	has	not	been	shown	to	be	associated	with	larger	student	gains	in	learning.15	Teacher	quality	is	a	significant	factor	for	student	achievement	and	first	year	teachers	are	generally	significantly	less	effective	than	teachers	with	three	or	more	years	of	experience.16	Teacher	turnover	has	significant	and	negative	effect	on	student	achievement	particularly	in	schools	with	greater	numbers	of	low-performing	and	Black	students.17	If	charters	fail	to	recruit	and	retain	high	quality	teachers	there	will	be	a	negative	impact	on	student	learning	for	their	many	students.	When	serving	in	traditional	public	schools,	teachers,	like	students,	do	not	“shed	their	constitutional	rights	to	freedom	of	speech	or	expression	at	the	schoolhouse	gate.”18	Equal	process	and	due	process	rights	also	fall	within	those	not	lost	by	teachers	upon	entering	into	employment	as	a	public	school	employee.	What	is	the	effect	if	teachers	in	what	is	offered	as	a	public	school	in	the	form	of	a	charter	school	are	no	longer	so	protected?	How	will	that	impact	the	decision	of	individuals	drawn	to	teach	
																																								 																				
14	Id.	at	47.	
15	KRISTIE	J.	R.		PHILLIPS,	What	does	"Highly	Qualified"	Mean	for	Student	Achievement?	Evaluating	the	
Relationships	Between	Teacher	Quality	Indicators	and	At-Risk	Students'	Mathematics	and	Reading	
Achievement	Gains	in	First	Grade,	110	THE	ELEMENTARY	SCHOOL	JOURNAL	464(2010).	
16	STEVEN	G.	RIVKIN,	et	al.,	Teachers,	Shools,	and	Academic	Achievement,	73	ECONOMETRICA	417(2005).	
17	MATTHEW	RONFELDT,	et	al.,	How	Teacher	Turnover	Harms	Student	Achievement,	50	AMERICAN	
EDUCATIONAL	RESEARCH	JOURNAL	4(2012).	
18	Tinker	v.	Des	Moines,	393	U.S.	503	(1969).	
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but	concerned	about	the	instability	of	an	employment	market	without	those	protected	rights?	Those	are	questions	we	are	not	able	to	answer	at	this	point	but	we	can	look	ahead	to	see	what	path	the	Supreme	Court	is	likely	to	follow	in	deciding	the	status	of	charter	schools	as	either	public	or	private	institutions	defining	the	protected	rights	of	the	teachers,	if	any.		 Often,	in	arguing	the	strengths	of	charter	schools	the	issue	of	tenure	is	raised	as	a	part	of	teacher	unionization.	The	fact	is	that	teachers	had	tenure	laws	well	before	there	were	teacher	unions.	As	early	as	1909	teachers	had	tenure	protection	to	avoid	firings	for	specious	reasons.19	It	is	argued	that	somehow	teachers	are	given	such	special	treatment	that	their	stability	disrupts	quality	education	in	schools.	However,	teachers	have	been	shown	to	be	less	stable	in	their	employment	that	private	workers	despite	tenure	and	due	process	protections.	Because	charter	schools	are	often	exempted	from	the	restrictions	of	tenure	laws	or	allowed	to	apply	for	exemption	in	seeking	a	charter20	the	sole	remaining	protection	existing	is	the	due	process	clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	If	charter	schools	are	found	to	be	public	employers	that	protection	remains.	If	they	are	not,	there	is	nothing	to	protect	teachers	from	firings	for	any	reason,	including	political	or	even	personal	reasons.	The	stability	of	employment	for	teachers	in	schools	becomes	very	tenuous	under	such	a	scenario.	There	are	no	comparable	data	from	the	private	sector,	because	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	groups	layoffs	with	firings.	In	2012,	companies	with	over	a	thousand	employees,	the	closest	private	
																																								 																				
19	DANA	GOLDSTEIN,	THE	TEACHER	WARS:	A	HISTORY	OF	AMERICA'S	MOST	EMBATTLED	PROFESSION			(Anchor	
Books		2014).	
20	GREEN	&	MEAD,		92-94.	2004.	
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counterpart	to	large	urban	school	systems,	lost	only	about	2	percent	of	their	workforce	from	firings,	resignations,	and	layoffs	combined	while	the	data	for	teachers	show	approximately	a	2%	rate	of	dismissal	for	cause	among	both	tenured	and	non-tenured	teachers	combined.21	In	short,	teachers	are	more,	not	less,	likely	than	many	other	workers	to	get	fired.	Without	a	requirement	to	show	cause	for	dismissal	there	can	be	little	doubt	that	the	termination	rate	would	grow	higher.		 Teacher	stability	is	an	important	element	of	quality	schools.	Experienced	teachers	are	shown	to	produce	better	results.22	Teachers	who	are	in	their	first	few	years	of	teaching	are	not	as	effective	as	they	will	become	with	experience.23	Given	the	centrality	of	teacher	quality	to	student	learning	it	is	essential	to	maintain	a	well-prepared	and	experienced	teacher	workforce	to	maintain	high	quality	schools	where	student	learning	flourishes.	That	is	not	to	say	that	teacher	stability	guarantees	quality	teaching	but	there	is	certainly	evidence	that	high	teacher	turnover	and	low	experience	levels	have	produced	poor	results.24		 All	charter	laws	begin	with	the	declaration	that	the	charter	schools	they	create	are	“public”	schools.	At	least	in	part	it	is	to	assure	the	tax	paying	public	that	they	are	supporting	a	public	institution.	Attempts	to	provide	tax	money	to	private	schools	were	
																																								 																				
21	DANA	GOLDSTEIN,	THE	TEACHER	WARS:	A	HISTORY	OF	AMERICA'S	MOST	EMBATTLED	PROFESSION			(Anchor	
Books		2015).	
22	RIVKIN,	et	al.,	ECONOMETRICA,	(2005).	
23	JOHN	P.	PAPAY	&	MATTHEW	A.	KRAFT,	Productivity	returns	to	experience	in	the	teacher	labor	market:	
Methodological	challenges	and	new	evidence	on	long-term	career	improvement,	130	JOURNAL	OF	
PUBLIC	ECONOMICS	105(2015).	
24	RONFELDT,	et	al.,	AMERICAN	EDUCATIONAL	RESEARCH	JOURNAL,	(2012).	
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either	not	politically	successful	or	ran	afoul	of	legal	barriers	to	the	use	of	public	funds	for	private	purposes	but	the	statutory	label	of	charters	as	public	is	not	controlling	legally	for	a	determination	of	whether	constitutional	or	even	Civil	Rights	protections	exist.	Those	protections	exist	only	to	limit	action	by	actors	on	behalf	of	the	public	–	commonly	called	state	actors.	Private	action	is	not	so	limited.	The	significant	question	raised	in	this	study	is	whether	charter	schools	are	public	employers	for	the	purposes	of	personnel	actions.	The	Supreme	Court	has	not	ruled	directly	on	the	issue	but	the	State	Action	Doctrine	has	been	developed	quite	extensively	and	the	patterns	can	provide	indications	of	how	the	question	will	be	answered.			 In	practice,	the	efficacy	of	charter	schools	remains	a	highly	contested	issue	with	wide	variations	in	standards	to	measure	that	efficacy	and	the	variance	in	student	populations	and	communities.	The	questions	about	efficacy	require	an	analysis	of	many	different	settings	and	communities	and	will	require	different	answers	to	be	complete.	One	feature	of	charter	schools	can	be	examined	on	a	nation-wide	basis.	The	nature	of	the	publicness	of	charter	schools	is,	in	a	central	way,	a	matter	of	law	and	legal	interpretation.	The	supreme	law	of	the	land	for	all	states	in	found	in	the	Constitution,	the	source	of	the	basic	rights	enjoyed	by	all	persons	in	the	United	States.	Whether	those	rights	are	protected	by	the	Constitution	is	dependent	on	whether	the	individual	or	institution	infringing	on	them	is	a	private	or	a	state	actor.	That	distinction	applied	to	charter	schools	remains	an	open	question	but	one	that	will	define	the	nature	of	teachers’	status	as	employees	of	those	schools.		 In	the	late	nineteenth	century,	public	schools	developed	into	the	means	by	which	a	wide	group	of	citizens	could	find	a	pathway	to	employment	opportunities	outside	of	
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the	old	traditional	agrarian	society.	Industrial	development	and	increasing	technology	called	for	better-trained	workers	who	could	read,	communicate	well,	and	understand	the	machinery	and	business	aspects	of	a	rising	commercial	economy.	It	was	the	public	school	that	brought	a	community	together	through	an	elected	group	of	local	people	forming	and	shaping	policy	for	all	local	students	to	learn	common	curriculum,	community	values	and	an	understanding	of	citizenship	in	the	young	democracy.	Often,	the	schools	were	the	identity	of	the	community.	Of	course,	we	know	that	these	schools	were	far	from	their	ideal	of	inclusion	of	all	students.	That	goal	was	not	even	approached	until	the	mid-twentieth	century	and	remains	a	challenge	today.	Private	schools	had	long	existed	and	remained	to	serve	limited	groups	who	could	afford	it	or	who	had	a	religious	connection	to	preserve	but	the	distinction	was	clear:	Public	schools	used	common	public	tax	funds	and	private	schools	used	tuition	or	other	private	funding	to	operate.	The	concept	of	public	schools	then	was	driven	by	a	set	of	principles	outlined	masterfully	by	Goldin	and	Katz25	and	identified	by	them	as	“virtues”	that	developed	as	schooling	emerged	during	the	post-Civil	War	era	as	the	country	reunited	and	schools	became	a	focus	of	towns	and	communities	across	the	land.	Those	virtues	were:	public	funding,	public	provision,	separation	of	church	and	state,	a	decentralized	system	of	independent	districts,	a	forgiving	open	structure,	and	coeducational	schools	based	on	gender	neutrality.		The	concept	of	what	was	a	public	school	included	all	six	of	those	principles	and	each	was	essential	to	the	idea	for	various	reasons.	
																																								 																				
25	CLAUDIA	GOLDIN	&	LAWRENCE	F.	KATZ,	THE	RACE	BETWEEN	EDUCATION	AND	TECHNOLOGY			(Harvard	
University	Press		2008).	
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The	movement	to	change	the	institution	of	education	began	as	a	movement	to	expand	public	funding	into	schools	not	operated	under	public	administration	or	elected	school	boards.	It	began	with	an	attempt	to	use	public	funds	to	support	private	and	even	religious	schools	to	help	them	meet	specific	needs	required	to	continue	to	serve	their	students.	That	movement	to	sustain	those	schools	soon	created	a	narrative	of	a	“market”	economy	within	education.26	That	approach	meant	that	schools	should	compete	like	businesses	and	the	best	would	survive	while	the	worst	would	fail.	Using	that	philosophy,	the	concept	of	voucher	funding	was	developed	using	public	school	funds	and	providing	parents	with	a	level	of	personal	funding	to	carry	to	any	school	–	public	or	private	–	to	enroll	their	student	in	a	school	the	parent	thought	best	suited	their	needs.	Legal	challenges	made	those	vouchers	more	problematic	and	in	most	settings	they	were	not	used	widely	and	privileged	those	who	already	were	using	private	schools	for	their	children.	Charter	schools	alter	the	characteristics	of	public	schools	as	identified	by	Goldin	and	Katz	in	several	ways.	They	maintain	public	funding	through	shifting	funds	away	from	traditional	public	schools	into	charter	schools	but	it	is	still	public	money.	The	question	of	whether	it	is	publicly	provided	is	debated	but	it	is	clear	that	private	companies	and	organizations	without	elected	boards	or	officials	are	operating	schools	–	sometimes	at	a	profit.27	Church	and	state	separation	may	or	may	not	be	maintained	and	
																																								 																				
26	JOHN	E.	CHUBB	&	TERRY	M.	MOE,	POLITICS	MARKETS	AND	AMERICA'S	SCHOOLS			(The	Brookings	Institute		
1990).	
27	SARAH	M.	STITZLEIN,	For-Profit	Charter	Schools	and	Threats	to	the	Publicness	of	Public	Schools,	44	
PHILOSOPHICAL	STUDIES	IN	EDUCATION	88(2013).	
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the	question	of	whether	it	must	be	relies	on	the	same	constitutional	principles	that	are	the	subject	of	this	paper.	Although	some	charter	schools	are	locally	owned	and	operated	there	are	many	companies	who	own	several	schools	across	the	country	and	thus	are	not	decentralized	or	locally	controlled.	The	story	of	New	Orleans	schools	following	Katrina	documents	perhaps	the	most	egregious	example	of	this	disruption	of	local	voice	in	schools.28	The	forgiving	open	structure	is	also	subject	to	some	doubt	and	just	how	open	charter	schools	are	varies	from	place	to	place.	Gender	neutrality	is	most	often	intact	but	is	not	a	given	in	charter	schools.	Those	virtues,	as	labelled	by	Goldin	and	Katz,	relate	to	the	student	experience	and	local	community	control.	What	is	omitted	from	the	analysis	is	the	teacher	and	the	employment	relationship	to	the	school.	In	a	traditional	public	school	that	relationship	is	well-defined	and	the	requirements	to	qualify	as	a	teacher	are	set	to	ensure	that	teachers	who	enter	a	classroom	have	received	a	base	level	of	education	in	the	art	of	teaching	and	in	their	subject	matter.	The	various	states	have	somewhat	different	laws	controlling	that	relationship	but	central	to	all	is	the	fact	that	the	jobs	are	public	employment	–	that	is,	the	teachers	are	public	employees.	The	significance	of	that	fact	is	that	teachers	maintain	a	list	of	constitutional	rights	that	no	state	or	school	district	can	violate.	Private	employers	are	not	held	to	such	a	standard	in	dealing	with	their	employees.	If	charter	schools	are	not	public	employers	there	is	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	relationship	leaving	teachers	without	the	rights	they	enjoy	as	public	employees.	
																																								 																				
28	KRISTEN	L.	BURAS,	CHARTER	SCHOOLS,	RACE,	AND	URBAN	SPACE:	WHERE	MARKET	MEETS	GRASSROOTS	
RESISTANCE			(Routledge		2015).	
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The	analysis	in	this	study	is	appropriately	labeled	formalist	because	it	examines	the	legal	aspect	of	the	nature	of	charter	schools	but	that	is	not	where	the	analysis	ends.	Formalism	implies	a	study	that	ignores	function	–	what	is	actually	occurring	in	these	spaces	–	and	this	study	does	not	ignore	that	perspective	on	charter	schools.	The	Court,	looking	at	the	state	action	doctrine,	examines	the	relationship	between	the	actors	and	the	state	through	a	lens	of	what	occurred	in	the	specific	factual	situation	giving	rise	to	a	claim.	The	study	is	a	detailed	look	at	the	peculiar	facts	of	the	dispute	and	that	is	truly	a	functionalist	perspective	on	the	charter	school	as	a	state	or	private	actor.	For	that	reason,	this	study	straddles	formalist	and	functionalist	perspectives	on	the	nature	of	charter	schools.29	Another	dichotomy	in	the	policy	discussions	over	charter	schools	is	identified	as	an	“instrumentalist”	versus	an	“institutionalist”	approach.30	That	analysis,	however,	is	focused	on	a	broader	operational	view	of	the	purpose	of	schools	as	public	education	or	public	schools.	The	distinction	between	the	two	is	centered	on	the	concept	on	the	one	hand	that	public	schools	are	operated,	owned	and	governed	by	public	bodies	(institutionalist)	while	public	education	is	a	service	that	can	be	provided	by	private	entities	as	well	as	public	ones	(instrumentalist).	This	study	does	not	engage	in	that	policy	debate	directly	but	seeks	to	identify	one	aspect	of	public	control	of	schooling	via	legal	status	of	those	entities	operating	schools	not	in	direct	public	control	and	
																																								 																				
29	For	a	greater	discussion	of	the	“formalist/functionalist”	distinction	see,	GARY	MIRON	&	CHRISTOPHER	
NELSON,	WHAT'S	PUBLIC	ABOUT	CHARTER	SCHOOLS?:	LESSONS	LEARNED	ABOUT	CHOICE	AND	ACCOUNTABILITY	14-
16		(Corwin	Press		2002).	
30	CHRISTOPHER	LUBIENSKI,	Instrumentalist	Perspectives	on	the	`Public'	in	Public	Education:	Incentives	and	
Purposes,	17	EDUCATIONAL	POLICY	478(2003).	
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governance.	The	distinction	between	the	institutionalist	ideal	of	government	owned	and	operated	schools	and	the	instrumentalist	ideal	that	function,	however	limited	in	definition,	prevails	over	form	is,	in	part,	driven	by	the	rules	under	which	each	must	operate.	The	rights	and	liberties	protected	by	the	Constitution	certainly	apply	to	public	schools	owned	and	operated	by	government	entities.	This	study	seeks	to	understand	if	those	rights	are	protected	for	those	employed	by	non-governmental	entities	that	operate	schools	in	the	public	name	in	the	form	of	charters.	The	rights	enumerated	in	the	Bill	of	Rights	as	included	for	the	states	in	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	include	free	speech,	the	right	to	due	process	before	the	taking	of	property,	and	equal	protection	of	the	laws.	Simply	the	removal	of	due	process	from	that	equation	means	that	teachers	are	all	employees	at	will	and	can	be	fired	without	reason	or	cause.	That	places	the	corporate	or	private	operators	of	a	charter	school	in	a	position	to	absolutely	control	what	happens	in	the	classroom	or	who	is	teaching	the	students.	A	teacher’s	political	record	of	voting	in	primaries	of	a	certain	party	could	be	used	as	grounds	for	removal	from	the	classroom.	A	lesson	on	evolution	could	also	serve	as	a	reason	for	termination.	Without	the	controls	of	constitutional	support	for	basic	rights	the	basic	relationship	between	teacher,	school,	and	community	is	altered	in	serious	ways.	The	purpose	of	this	study	is	to	examine	the	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	to	determine	whether	charter	schools	are	–	for	the	purposes	of	constitutional	rights	–	public	schools.	Although	the	statutes	creating	charter	schools	in	the	various	states	declare	them	to	be	public,	the	Supreme	Court	has	never	allowed	a	mere	legislative	label	to	control	the	nature	of	an	institution.	The	Court	has	produced	a	
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long	line	of	cases	discussing	what	factors	must	be	considered	to	determine	who	or	what	organizations	are	subject	to	the	limitations	of	the	Constitution	preventing	infringement	of	those	rights.	By	deciding	who	is	subject	to	those	limitations	the	court	has	decided	who	is	a	state	actor	and	who	is	not.	The	State	Action	Doctrine	will	define	whether	charter	school	teachers	are	public	employees	or	merely	private	employees	lacking	in	constitutional	protection.	To	understand	the	nature	of	charter	schools’	publicness	then	requires	an	understanding	of	state	action	analysis	in	the	Supreme	Court.	The	development	of	the	State	Action	Doctrine	began	with	the	early	courts	defining	to	whom	the	Constitution	applied.	The	initial	states	were	not	interested	in	a	strong	central	government	and	the	Constitution	was	drafted	to	identify	those	specific	areas	of	control	by	the	central,	or	federal,	authority	and	those	that	remained	in	the	control	of	the	states.	Rather	than	create	two	lists	of	areas,	the	Constitution	simply	identified	the	limited	areas	in	which	federal	control	was	supreme.	Those	included	national	defense,	immigration,	trade	among	and	between	the	states	and	other	powers	necessary	to	maintain	a	single	country	from	the	many	states.	The	addition	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	to	the	Constitution	introduced	a	series	of	statements	of	individual	rights,	some	of	which	were	deemed	to	be	natural,	or	pre-existing	rights	while	others	were	specifically	directed	at	Congressional	power	by	stating	that	“Congress	shall	make	no	law.	.	.	.”31	The	Tenth	Amendment	provided	the	clear	statement	that	those	powers	not	set	out	in	the	Constitution	as	federal	powers	were	
																																								 																				
31	U.S.	CONST.		amend.	I.	
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specifically	reserved	for	the	states	and	the	people.32	Initial	decisions	of	the	Court	deferred	to	the	states	and	limited	the	application	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	solely	to	the	federal	government	and	its	activities.	States	and	individuals	remained	unfettered	in	their	actions	based	on	the	assumption	that	the	people	were	the	state.	Later,	following	the	Civil	War,	the	question	of	how	racial	discrimination	would	be	addressed	arose	leading	to	the	first	Civil	Rights	Act	and	the	passage	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	extending	the	protection	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	to	the	states.	No	longer	could	a	state	deny	individuals	rights	guaranteed	in	the	Constitution	but	individual	behavior	remained	a	matter	unencumbered	by	the	Constitutional	mandates.	Problems	arose	as	state	officials	found	ways	to	distance	themselves	from	action	by	allowing	others	to	carry	out	discrimination	and	violations	of	the	rights	guaranteed	by	the	Constitution.	The	Court	responded	by	exposing	the	arrangements	and	building	the	concept	that	state	action	could	include	the	acts	of	private	individuals	and	organizations	when	their	acts	were	“fairly	attributable	to	the	state.”33	Thus,	State	Action	became	more	broadly	defined	to	include	a	broader	array	of	those	barred	from	infringing	on	constitutional	rights.	It	is	this	body	of	law	that	will	determine	whether	charter	schools	are	public	or	private	as	employers	for	the	purposes	of	the	Constitution.	This	study	will	examine	that	body	of	law	for	indications	of	how	it	will	be	decided	when	cases	arrive	before	the	Court	as	they	surely	will.	The	paper	will	
																																								 																				
32	U.S.	CONST.		amend.	X.	
33	Lugar	v.	Edmondson	Oil	Co.,	Inc.,	457	U.S.	922	(1982).	
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conclude	with	some	of	the	possible	implications	of	the	Court’s	decisions	on	this	topic	and	what	it	might	mean	for	education	as	a	public	institution.	There	have	been	some	studies	of	the	question	of	charter	schools	and	their	standing	as	state	actors.	Most	are	in	the	form	of	comments	or	notes	in	law	reviews	and	address	specific	cases	without	a	broad	overview.34	Some	have	looked	at	the	issue	quite	broadly	and	painted	it	all	as	a	single	issue	concluding	that	charters	are	state	actors35	or	are	not	state	actors36	without	differentiation	of	the	circumstances	that	exist	between	student	rights	and	employee	rights	or	any	rights	to	be	examined.	One	study	has	decided	based	on	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	decisions	that	charter	school	employees	will	not	be	constitutionally	protected	while	students	and	parents	will	be.37	One	study	looks	at	the	issue	on	behalf	of	students	of	color	and	concludes	that	they	are	not	protected	by	the	Constitution	in	charter	schools.38	At	least	one	study	asks	the	question	but	offers	no	answers.39	A	few	studies	advocate	for	a	change	in	the	state	action	doctrine	or	argue	that	
																																								 																				
34	KEVIN	S.	HUFFMAN,	Note:	Charter	Schools,	Equal	Protection	Litigation,	and	the	New	School	Reform	
Movement,	73	NEW	YORK	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	1290(1998);BRADLEY	T.	FRENCH,	Charter	Schools:	Are	
For-Profit	Companies	Contracting	for	State	Actor	Status?,	83	UNIVERSITY	OF	DETROIT	MERCY	LAW	REVIEW	
251(2006).	
35	HUFFMAN,	NEW	YORK	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW,	(1998);ROBERT	J.	MARTIN,	Charting	the	Court	Challenges	
to	Charter	Schools,	109	PENN	ST.	L.	REV.	43(2004).	
36	FRENCH,	UNIVERSITY	OF	DETROIT	MERCY	LAW	REVIEW,	(2006).	
37	MAREN	HULDEN,	Charting	a	Course	to	State	Action:	Charter	Schools	and	§	1983,	111	COLUMBIA	LAW	
REVIEW	1244(2011).	
38	PRESTON	C.	GREEN,	III,	et	al.,	Charter	Schools,	Students	of	Color	and	the	State	Action	Doctrine:	Are	the	
Rights	of	Students	of	Color	Sufficiently	Protected?,	18	WASHINGTON	&	LEE	JOURNAL	OF	CIVIL	RIGHTS	AND	
SOCIAL	JUSTICE	253(2012).	
39	KARLA	A.	TUREKIAN,	Traversing	the	Minefields	of	Education	Reform:	The	Legality	of	Charter	Schools,	29	
CONNECTICUT	LAW	REVIEW	1365(1997).	
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the	state	action	doctrine	fails	to	provide	an	appropriate	rule	regarding	charter	schools	and	others.40	No	thorough	examination	of	the	question	of	the	state	actor	status	of	charter	schools	relating	to	teachers	as	employees	was	found.	For	that	reason,	this	study	is	proposed	to	address	the	need	to	understand	how	teachers	in	charter	schools	are	likely	to	be	treated	under	the	state	action	doctrine	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States.	
Research	questions	The	questions	this	study	seeks	to	answer	are:	Are	charter	schools	state	actors	for	Fourteenth	Amendment	purposes?	Are	charter	schools	public	employers	as	are	traditional	public	schools?	Do	teachers	working	for	charter	schools	enjoy	the	same	constitutional	employment	rights	as	public	school	teachers?	By	examining	the	judicial	decisions	that	have	shaped	the	State	Action	Doctrine	this	study	hopes	to	arrive	at	an	expectation	of	how	the	Supreme	Court	will	classify	charter	schools	in	their	relationships	to	teachers	and	other	employees.		 Each	of	these	questions	requires	as	a	starting	point	a	thorough	understanding	of	the	history	and	development	of	the	state	action	doctrine	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States.	Writers	and	even	the	Court	itself	have	identified	several	tests.	The	Court	has	used	terms	similar	in	nature	to	describe	the	different	analyses	in	different	cases	but	
																																								 																				
40	CATHERINE		LOTEMPIO,	It’s	Time	To	Try	Something	New:	Why	Old	Precedent	Does	Not	Suit	Charter	
Schools	in	the	Search	for	State	Actor	Status,	47	WAKE	FOREST	LAW	REVIEW	435(2012);BROOKES	BROWN,	A	
Conceptual	Disaster	Zone	Indeed:	The	Incoherence	of	the	State	and	the	Need	for	State	Action	
Doctrine(s),	75	MARYLAND	LAW	REVIEW	328(2015);MARK	TUSHNET,	State	Action,	Social	Welfare	Rights,	
and	the	Judicial	Role:	Some	Comparative	Observations,	3	CHICAGO	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	
435(2002).	
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the	law	is,	by	several	writers’	evaluation,	a	bit	less	than	crystal	clear	in	this	area.	One	approach	to	this	analysis	is	to	extract	the	points	of	difference	that	are	essential	to	understanding	the	Court’s	position	and	to	categorize	them	in	a	way	that	is	useful	for	the	questions	this	study	will	address.		 Once	those	categories	are	developed	it	will	be	necessary	to	examine	the	facts	and	circumstances	surrounding	each	sort	of	analysis	including	the	relationship	of	the	private/public	interests	involved,	the	behavior	involved,	and	the	rights	being	transgressed.	The	Court	has	made	a	point	of	limiting	certain	holdings	to	very	specific	fact	situations	and	to	understand	how	a	similar	fact	situation	might	be	handled	those	details	must	be	identified.	I	propose	two	different	approaches	to	the	development	of	the	categories	to	attempt	a	sort	of	triangulation	of	the	analyses	to	compare	their	results.	
My	hypothesis	going	into	this	study		 My	expectation	in	this	study	is	that	the	Court’s	earlier	decisions	will	likely	lead	to	the	determination	that	charter	schools,	as	employers,	will	not	be	held	to	be	public,	or	state	actors.	Of	course,	the	Court	is	capable	of	shifts	and	changes	in	how	it	handles	any	fact	situation	by	distinguishing	it	from	earlier	decisions	and	given	the	uncertain	nature	of	the	state	action	doctrine	there	is	little	way	to	predict	with	certainty	the	course	the	Court	will	take	on	this	issue.	
Delimitations	of	the	study	It	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	study	to	evaluate	the	performance	or	appropriateness	of	charter	schools.	Previous	writers	have	provided	policy	
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recommendations	either	praising	or	condemning	charters.41	Others	have	studied	the	results	of	charters	for	student	achievement42,	community	growth	and	recovery43,	and	many	other	issues	and	perspectives	surrounding	their	existence	and	operation.	All	of	those	questions	are	worthy	of	continuing	study	and	discussion	to	inform	policy	moving	forward.	What	has	been	less	examined	is	what	the	precise	legal	nature	of	a	charter	school	as	a	public	institution	is	within	the	U.S.	Constitution.	It	is	limited	to	a	single	legal	determination	of	the	nature	of	the	charter	school	as	a	state	actor	but	that	finding	will	be	based	on	the	actual	operation	and	actions	of	the	charter	schools	in	question.		 This	study	is	also	limited	to	questions	of	the	relationship	between	charter	schools	and	their	teachers	as	employees.	The	law	relating	to	student	rights	is	also	quite	important	and	perhaps	even	more	unsettled	than	that	of	teachers	but	it	does	involve	another	set	of	analyses	not	included	in	this	study.	The	study	is	also	limited	to	Supreme	Court	cases	with	exceptions	for	Circuit	Court	cases	that	have	been	decided	after	the	last	relevant	Supreme	Court	case.	Those	Circuit	Court	cases	are	used	only	to	see	what	the	jurists	on	those	panels	expect	the	Supreme	Court	would	do	but	they	have	no	precedential	value	for	any	future	Supreme	Court	case.	They	are	included	solely	to	see	what	others	have	written	on	the	topic.	The	Supreme	Court	cases	are	the	law	and	where	there	are	gaps	in	that	law,	as	there	are	in	this	study,	those	must	be	filled	by	the	
																																								 																				
41			CHUBB	&	MOE.	1990;MIRON	&	NELSON.	2002;DIANE	RAVITCH,	REIGN	OF	ERROR:	THE	HOAX	OF	THE	
PRIVATIZATION	MOVEMENT	AND	THE	DANGER	TO	AMERICA’S	PUBLIC	SCHOOLS	(Vintage	Books		2014);SARAH	M.	
STITZLEIN,	For-Profit	Charter	Schools	and	Threats	to	the	Publicness	of	Public	Schools,	44	PHILOSOPHICAL	
STUDIES	IN	EDUCATION	88(2013).	
42	THE	CHARTER	SCHOOL	EXPERIMENT:	EXPECTATIONS,	EVIDENCE,	AND	IMPLICATIONS			(Christopher	A.	Lubienski	
&	Peter	C.	Weitzel	eds.,	Harvard	Education	Press		2010).	
43	BURAS.	2015.	
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reasoning	and	analysis	of	the	Supreme	Court.	No	state	law	is	analyzed	in	this	study	as	that	would	involve	a	substantial	increase	in	the	breadth	of	the	study	and	an	excellent	study	of	the	state	laws	of	charter	schools	exists.44	As	Justice	Brennan	noted,	“Americans	regard	the	public	schools	as	a	most	vital	civic	institution	for	the	preservation	of	a	democratic	system	of	government.	It	is	therefore	understandable	that	the	constitutional	prohibitions	encounter	their	severest	test	when	they	are	sought	to	be	applied	in	the	school	classroom.”45	As	will	be	seen	throughout	this	study	that	test	in	state	action	and	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	has	revealed	just	how	difficult	and	knotty	an	area	of	the	law	can	become	even	for	the	finest	judicial	minds	in	the	country.	
	 	
																																								 																				
44	GREEN	&	MEAD.	2004.	
45	School	District	of	Abington	Township	v.	Schempp,	374	U.S.	203	(1963).	
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Chapter	2	Review	of	the	literature		 The	primary	sources	for	this	study	are	the	text	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	the	Constitution46	and	the	opinions	of	the	Supreme	Court	supplemented	by	the	most	recent	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	opinions	that	have	shaped	and	established	the	state	action	doctrine	applicable	to	that.	The	requirement	for	action	“under	color	of	state	law”	in	the	Civil	Rights	Act47	run	parallel	and	are	essentially	identical48	so	the	cases	discussing	one	are	instructive	for	the	other.	It	is	those	opinions	that	constitute	the	data	for	analysis	to	answer	the	questions	this	study	posits.	There	are	also	secondary	sources	that	can	assist	in	the	analysis	of	the	opinions	of	the	Court	but	they	are	assistive	and	not	dispositive	of	the	questions.	Those	will	be	discussed	in	a	separate	section	of	this	chapter.	For	purposes	of	clarity	the	opinions	of	the	Court	will	be	addressed	in	chronological	order	for	this	review	to	better	see	the	development	over	time	of	the	doctrine.		The	later	analysis49	will	approach	the	question	from	two	distinct	perspectives.	First,	the	traditional	analysis	of	facts	and	details	in	the	various	categories	of	tests	identified	by	the	Court	will	be	the	traditional	approach	to	state	action	case	analysis.	The	second	perspective	will	be	driven	by	the	theoretical	base	taken	from	Professor	Black’s	
																																								 																				
46	U.S.	CONST.		amend.	XIV	§	1.	
47		42	U.S.C.	§	1983	(2016).	
48	United	States	v.	Price,	383	U.S.	787	(1966).	
49	See	chapter	4,	infra.	
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work50	and	expanded	upon	by	Peller	and	Tushnet51	that	develops	the	argument	that	the	doctrine	involves	the	balancing	and	distribution	of	certain	individual	rights	rather	than	a	factual,	case-by-case	analysis	in	the	traditional	analysis.	
Primary	sources	This	study	of	the	publicness	of	charter	schools	in	the	United	States	of	America	uses	as	its	baseline	means	for	analysis	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	decisions	that	have	shaped	the	state	action	doctrine	as	it	applies	to	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	of	the	U.S.	Constitution.52	That	doctrine	has	grown	from	the	post-Civil	War	era	and	continues	to	develop	into	the	new	era	of	privatization	of	traditionally	governmental	functions.	Made	necessary	by	the	passage	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	in	1868	applying	Equal	Protection	and	Due	Process	to	the	states,	the	State	Action	Doctrine	began	to	expand	the	reach	of	the	prohibition	on	infringing	the	constitutional	rights	of	individuals	beyond	strictly	governmental	action	to	avoid	results	that	allowed	private	individuals	to	take	on	governmental	functions	to	circumvent	the	bar	of	governmental	discrimination.	The	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	has	a	long	history	of	defining	state	actors	in	many	settings	although	it	has	not	yet	ruled	in	a	true	charter	school	case.	The	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	those	decisions	are	the	basis	for	this	section	of	the	literature	review.	
																																								 																				
50	CHARLES	L.		BLACK,	JR.,	A	NEW	BIRTH	OF	FREEDOM:	HUMAN	RIGHTS,	NAMED	&	UNNAMED			(Yale	University	
Press		1997).	
51	GARY	PELLER	&	MARK	TUSHNET,	State	Action	and	a	New	Birth	of	Freedom,	92	GEORGETOWN	LAW	JOURNAL	
779(2004).	
52	Id.	
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The	Fourteenth	Amendment		 To	understand	the	State	Action	Doctrine	one	must	first	understand	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	how	it	changed	the	legal	landscape	in	the	late	nineteenth	century.	The	Constitution	was	developed	to	unify	the	various	states	and	to	assign	very	specific	and	limited	powers	to	the	unified	whole.	To	“establish	justice,	insure	domestic	tranquility,	provide	for	the	common	defence,	promote	the	general	welfare,	and	secure	the	blessings	of	liberty”53		was	not	just	a	list	of	possibilities	but	was	a	limitation	upon	the	central	government	as	interpreted	by	the	Supreme	Court.	Chief	Justice	Waite	described	it	as	a	government	of	the	people	with	greater	power	than	that	of	the	states	but	much	more	limited	in	scope.54	It	is	the	limitations	that	truly	form	the	basis	for	the	state	action	doctrine.		 Because	the	Constitution	lacked	a	statement	of	the	basic	rights	to	be	expected	in	this	new	country	the	first	ten	amendments	were	adopted	stating	the	now	well-known	rights	of	free	speech,	free	assembly,	freedom	of	religion	and	the	principles	of	due	process	and	equal	protection,	among	others,	in	what	has	become	known	as	the	Bill	of	Rights.55	As	a	limit	on	the	power	of	the	federal	government,	however,	the	Constitution	prohibited	that	government	from	abridging	those	individual	rights	and	left	up	to	the	States	and	the	people	whether	to	enforce	and	protect	those	rights	on	a	state-by-state	
																																								 																				
53	U.S.	CONST.		pmbl.	
54	United	States	v.	Cruikshank,	92	U.S.	542	(1876).	
55	U.S.	CONST.		amend.	I-X.	
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basis.	Early	cases	refused	to	apply	the	obligation	to	protect	those	rights	as	a	limit	on	the	action	of	individuals	or	the	states.56		 The	end	of	the	Civil	War	saw	the	creation	of	much	legislation	designed	to	reform	what	was	perceived	as	the	errors	of	the	Confederacy	and	to	displace	race	as	a	means	of	discriminating	against	individuals.	These	acts	were	supported	by	the	passage	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	applying	the	Bill	of	Rights	to	the	States.	The	text	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	includes	the	following:	No	State	shall	make	or	enforce	any	law	which	shall	abridge	the	privileges	or	immunities	of	citizens	of	the	United	States;	nor	shall	any	State	deprive	any	person	of	life,	liberty,	or	property,	without	due	process	of	law;	nor	deny	to	any	person	within	its	jurisdiction	the	equal	protection	of	the	laws.57		For	the	first	time	the	states	were	included	in	the	prohibition	of	abridgement	of	rights	and	the	requirements	of	due	process	and	equal	protection	of	the	laws.	Two	major	areas	of	inquiry	arose	with	that	expansion	of	the	reach	of	the	Constitution	beyond	the	federal	government.	The	first,	based	upon	the	limitation	of	the	States,	is	the	question	arose	“Who	is	the	state?”	and	what	actors	can	be	considered	acting	on	behalf	of	the	state.	The	second	is	the	question	of	what	rights	are	protected	by	the	amendment.	Three	areas	are	listed	–	privileges	and	immunities,	due	process,	an	equal	protection	–	yet	there	is	no	clarity	what	is	included	in	those	enumerated	rights.	These	issues	were	left	to	the	Court	to	develop	a	definition	of	state	action	when	it	deprives	someone	of	the	constitutional	rights	and	just	what	rights	are	included.	The	cases	that	follow	trace	the	development	of	those	definitions	to	the	present	day	chronologically	within	each	category	to	
																																								 																				
56	United	States	v.	Cruikshank,	92	U.S.	542	(1876).	
57	U.S.	CONST.	amend.	XIV.	
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demonstrate	the	path	the	Court	has	taken	to	create	the	modern	state	action	doctrine	and	what	it	preserves.	
What	rights	are	incorporated?		 The	cases	involved	in	defining	the	rights	protected	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	are	many	of	the	same	early	cases	that	defined	the	state	action	issue.	The	issues	of	what	was	incorporated	is	one	that	is	largely	settled	and	developed	much	faster	than	the	definition	of	a	state	actor	but	it	is	important	to	understand	what	rights	are	protected	from	state	action	to	see	the	significance	of	this	doctrine	to	the	issue	of	whether	charter	schools	are	truly	public	–	or	in	this	analysis,	state	actors	–	and	thus	what	rights	charter	schools	are	held	or	not	held	to	protect.	The	language	of	the	amendment	is	not	entirely	clear	but	the	cases	have	since	made	this	issue	well	defined.		 Early	in	the	history	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	litigation	of	what	rights	are	incorporated	the	Court	made	a	rather	sweeping	decision	in	what	is	known	as	the	Slaughter	House	Cases.58	That	decision	virtually	eliminated	the	use	of	the	privileges	and	immunities	clause	to	limit	state	action.	The	limited	reach	of	the	entire	Fourteenth	Amendment	was	a	result	of	the	Court’s	dictum	that	those	amendments	were	only	adopted	to	protect	former	slaves.	Because	the	case	before	the	Court	did	not	relate	to	racial	discrimination	the	amendment’s	protections	were	of	no	avail	under	the	facts.	That	holding	rendered	the	privileges	or	immunities	clause	useless	for	more	than	a	century.	
																																								 																				
58	Slaughter-House	Cases,	83	U.S.	36	(1873).	
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	 The	1897	case	of	Chicago,	Burlington	&	Quincy	Railroad	v.	Chicago59	saw	the	issue	of	taking	of	property	without	due	process	raised	against	a	state	actor	by	way	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	The	Court	did	not	hold	the	amendment	to	be	inapplicable	but	went	beyond	that	point	to	find	that	the	taking	was	not	without	due	process.	For	the	Court	to	issue	an	opinion	it	first	had	to	reach	a	jurisdictional	finding	and	that	jurisdiction	could	only	be	based	upon	a	constitutional	claim	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	Thus,	by	ruling	in	the	case	on	the	substantive	issue	the	Court	applied	the	due	process	taking	clause	to	the	state	by	virtue	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	The	case	of	Twining	v.	New	Jersey60	supported	the	applicability	of	the	due	process	clause	in	dictum	acknowledging	that	the	first	eight	amendments	might	apply	to	the	states	as	a	violation	could	deny	them	due	process	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.61		 	Most	of	the	decisions	incorporating	rights	into	the	purview	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	due	process	clause	arose	during	the	Warren	Court.	During	that	time,	the	Court	incorporated	into	the	due	process	provision	of	that	amendment	the	Fourth	Amendment	exclusionary	rule,	excluding	the	use	of	evidence	obtained	illegally	in	a	criminal	prosecution,62	the	Fifth	Amendment	double	jeopardy	bar,63	self-
																																								 																				
59	Chicago,	Burlington	and	Quincy	Railroad	Co.	v.	Chicago,	166	U.S.	226	(1897).	
60	Twining	v.	New	Jersey,	211	U.S.	78	(1908).	
61	Id.	at	98-99.	
62	Mapp	v.	Ohio,	367	U.S.	643	(1961).	
63	Benton	v.	Maryland,	395	U.S.	784	(1969).	
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incrimination,64	and	the	Sixth	Amendment	speedy	trial	requirement,65	chance	to	confront	witnesses,66	and	assistance	of	counsel67	rights.		
State	Action	Cases		 The	application	of	the	Enforcement	Act	in	a	criminal	indictment	served	as	an	early	test	of	the	new	Amendment.	State	officials	and	individuals	were	indicted	with	a	charge	that	they	joined	to	deprive	two	African	American	gentlemen	of	rights	“granted	and	secured”68	by	the	Constitution	or	laws	of	the	United	States.	The	initial	question	before	the	court	was	whether	the	rights	alleged	to	have	been	violated	were	so	granted	and	secured	by	the	Constitution.	Relying	on	earlier	decisions69,	the	Court	held	that	the	rights	to	freely	and	peacefully	assemble,	bear	arms,	due	process	and	equal	protection	were	merely	pre-existing	rights	stated	in	the	Constitution	without	adding	anything	to	those	rights.	Furthermore,	the	Court	added	that	as	to	seeking	redress	from	individuals,	even	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	did	not	bar	the	violation	of	those	rights	as	it	was	limited	to	prohibiting	a	state	from	infringing	upon	them.	Thus	began	the	delineation	between	who	is	and	is	not	acting	on	behalf	of	a	state.		 That	strict	limitation	was	slightly	expanded	when	the	Court	was	presented	with	a	claim	involving	the	removal	of	a	state	court	case	to	federal	court	claiming	that	the	
																																								 																				
64	Malloy	v.	Hogan,	378	U.S.	1	(1964).	
65	Klopfer	v.	North	Carolina,	386	U.S.	213	(1967).	
66	Pointer	v.	Texas,	380	U.S.	400	(1965).	
67	Gideon	v.	Wainwright,	372	U.S.	335	(1963).	
68	United	States	v.	Cruikshank,	92	U.S.	at	548.	
69	Twitchell	v.	Commonwealth,	74	U.S.	321	(1869);Gibbons	v.	Ogden,	22	U.S.	1	(1824).	
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African	American	defendant	could	not	receive	a	fair	trial	in	a	state	court	with	a	jury	of	all	white	people70.	The	men	in	question	had	been	indicted	by	a	jury	of	all	white	men	and	the	same	profile	described	the	venire	for	the	petit	jury.	However,	the	statute	providing	for	removal	required	that	a	pleading	be	filed	asserting	a	certain	denial	of	rights	before	trial	commenced	based	on	a	state	law	or	ruling	violating	the	rights	of	the	defendants.	Had	Virginia	barred	African	Americans	from	jury	panels	by	law	such	a	pleading	would	have	been	possible	but	no	such	law	was	in	existence.	The	Court	held	that	it	could	not	intervene	in	a	situation	of	a	lower	court	official	engaging	in	discriminatory	behaviors	that	could	still,	presumably,	be	rectified	on	appeal	in	the	state	courts	at	the	end	of	the	trial.	The	distinction	was	that	the	fact	of	an	all-white	jury	was	not	evidence	of	a	discriminatory	law	of	the	state	and	therefore	failed	to	fall	within	the	reach	of	the	federal	courts.		 Racially	mixed	juries	were	the	subject	of	two	appeals	on	different	questions.	In	one,	the	Court	declared	invalid	a	state	statute	restricting	jury	service	to	white	persons	as	amounting	to	a	denial	of	the	equal	protection	of	the	laws	to	a	non-white	defendant.71	In	the	same	volume	of	the	reports,	the	Court	held	that	a	similar	discrimination	imposed	by	the	action	of	a	state	judge	denied	equal	protection	even	though	the	language	of	the	state	statute	relating	to	jury	service	contained	no	such	restrictions.72	
																																								 																				
70	Virginia	v.	Rives,	100	U.S.	313	(1880).	
71	Strauder	v.	West	Virginia,	100	U.S.	303	(1880).	
72	Virginia	v.	Rives,	100	U.S.	313	(1880)	
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	 The	next	step	in	the	development	of	the	doctrine	was	a	series	of	cases	that	recognized	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	reached	all	state	agencies	but	found	nothing	but	individual	action	in	the	set	of	cases.	In	1883,	the	Court	struck	down	certain	provisions	of	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1875	holding	that	it	impermissibly	addressed	individual	action	and	that	was	not	authorized	by	the	Constitution	or	any	amendments73.	The	provisions	set	criminal	penalties	for	any	individual	who	violated	certain	rights	of	another.	The	Court	reviewed	the	legislative	history	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	the	basis	for	the	support	for	the	statute.	Finding	the	provision	unconstitutional	the	Court	held	that	the	amendment	plainly	prohibits	action	by	states	and	by	state	law	but	does	not	authorize	Congress	to	act	directly	to	control	individual	behavior.	An	1897	case	pitted	the	Chicago,	Burlington	and	Quincy	Railroad	against	the	City	of	Chicago	in	an	eminent	domain	claim	that	the	city	obtained	a	jury	verdict	of	$1	setting	the	value	of	the	railroad’s	property	at	a	street	crossing.74	The	railroad	claimed	that	was	a	taking	without	due	process	despite	having	participated	at	trial.	The	Supreme	Court	first	made	clear	that	anyone	with	a	public	position	acts	on	behalf	of	the	state.	No	limitation	is	placed	on	whether	the	actor	is	an	employee	of	the	State	of	Illinois	or	the	City	of	Chicago.	The	Supreme	Court	made	clear	that	a	government	actor	at	any	level	is	“the	state”	in	the	meaning	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	The	railroad	lost	the	appeal	based	on	a	holding	that	the	$1	compensation	was	appropriate	under	the	circumstances.	
																																								 																				
73	Civil	Rights	Cases,	109	U.S.	3	(1883).	
74	Chicago,	Burlington	and	Quincy	Railroad	Co.	v.	Chicago,	166	U.S.	226	(1897).	
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The	Court	turned	to	the	state	court	enforcement	of	the	private	agreements	to	find	state	action	and	noted	the	earlier	cases	that	held	that	any	manner	of	state	involvement	could	be	state	action	invoking	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	protections.	Even	a	state’s	Supreme	Court	has	been	held	to	be	subject	to	the	limitations	of	the	Amendment	as	state	action.	The	Court	went	on	to	hold	in	these	cases	that	judicial	enforcement	of	a	private	agreement	that	violates	constitutional	rights	protected	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	is	state	action	sufficient	to	overturn	the	state	court	action.	Thus,	the	first	test	of	state	action	beyond	actual	state	laws	and	state	agents	is	that	judicial	enforcement	of	a	private	action	constitutes	state	action.	As	an	absolute	that	principal	will	not	hold	for	all	factual	situations.			 A	unique	situation	gave	rise	to	a	new	category	of	state	action	in	the	case	of	Marsh	
v.	Alabama75	involving	a	town	wholly	owned	by	the	Gulf	Shipbuilding	Corporation.	The	town	appeared	like	any	other	town	with	streets,	homes,	stores,	police	services,	and	a	Post	Office	all	on	a	main	highway	and	entirely	open	to	the	public.	Stores	contained	a	sign	notifying	visitors	that	they	were	on	private	property	and	that	no	soliciting	was	allowed.	When	a	woman,	after	being	denied	a	permit	to	do	so,	attempted	to	distribute	religious	literature	in	what	seemed	to	be	public	areas	she	was	told	to	leave	the	area	and	refused	to	do	so.	She	was	charged	and	convicted	of	refusing	to	leave	private	property	after	being	warned	to	leave	and	asserted	as	a	defense	her	First	and	Fourteenth	Amendment	rights.	The	state	courts	held	that	the	public	use	of	the	property	did	not	
																																								 																				
75	Marsh	v.	Alabama,	326	U.S.	501	(1946).	
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convert	it	to	public	property	and	found	the	statute	criminalizing	the	woman’s	behavior	valid	and	enforceable.		 The	Court	began	by	making	clear	that	had	this	been	a	municipal	street	in	public	ownership	there	could	be	no	doubt	that	her	defense	would	stand	as	an	absolute	defense.		The	sole	question	presented	for	review	was	whether	private	company	ownership	of	the	entire	town	was	sufficient	to	allow	that	company	the	power	to	infringe	the	free	speech	rights	of	the	woman	arrested.	Setting	aside	the	issue	of	whether	the	streets	had	been	dedicated	to	public	use	by	the	actions	of	the	corporate	owners	the	Court	held	that	property	held	open	to	the	public	carried	with	it	some	of	the	responsibilities	to	protect	the	individual	freedoms	of	those	who	use	the	premises.	This	“public	function”76	as	described	by	the	Court	made	applicable	the	constitutional	guarantees	of	individual	freedom	by	means	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	That	label	will	become	an	argument	to	extend	this	holding	further	in	later	cases	with	mixed	success.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	term	“state	action”	is	not	even	used	in	the	opinion	of	the	Court	despite	the	necessity	of	finding	that	the	duties	of	the	state	applied	to	the	corporate	owners	of	the	town.		 The	issue	of	restrictive	covenants	entered	into	by	private	landowners	that	limited	the	occupation	of	adjacent	lands	based	on	racial	identity	often	leads	to	a	state	action	decision.	One	was	limited	to	Caucasians	and	the	other	excluded	“people	of	the	Negro	or	Mongolian	Race.”77	The	agreements	were	entirely	private	contracts	until	
																																								 																				
76	Id.	at	507.	
77	Shelley	v.	Kraemer,	334	U.S.	1	(1948).	
	 32	
African	American	individuals	purchased	some	of	the	property	and	occupied	the	premises.	At	that	point,	other	landowners	who	were	party	to	the	covenant	sought	judicial	enforcement	of	the	covenant	by	injunction.	The	Court	first	made	clear	that	had	the	state	or	city	involved	legislated	the	restrictions	they	would	clearly	be	barred	from	doing	so	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	Because	these	were	the	acts	of	private	individuals	they	presented	a	new	set	of	facts	to	the	Court.	The	Court	noted	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	“erects	no	shield	against	merely	private	conduct,	however	discriminatory	or	wrongful.”78	The	Shelley	holding	was	reinforced	in	a	later	case	in	which	an	attempt	was	made	by	a	neighbor	to	enforce	a	restrictive	covenant	by	seeking	damages	for	the	breach	of	the	covenant.	The	Court	held	that	the	judicial	enforcement	by	awarding	damages	would	be	state	action	making	the	attempt	to	enforce	the	covenant	unconstitutional.79		 Public	schools	were	the	focus	of	a	Fourteenth	Amendment	analysis	in	Brown	v.	
Board	of	Education,80	perhaps	the	most	famous	of	school	cases.	The	Court	held	in	that	case	that	the	local	school	board	of	Topeka,	Kansas	could	not	operate	schools	separately	for	different	races.	Many	issues	were	raised	in	that	case	and	the	meaning	of	equal	protection	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	had	been	clouded	for	over	60	years	by	a	jurisprudence	of	“separate	but	equal”	facilities	typified	by	Plessy	v.	Ferguson.81	In	Brown,	the	Court	made	clear	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	applied	to	public	education	and	
																																								 																				
78	Id.	at	13.	
79	Barrows	v.	Jackson,	346	U.S.	249	(1953).	
80	Brown	v.	Board	of	Education,	347	U.S.	483	(1954).	
81	Plessy	v.	Ferguson,	163	U.S.	537	(1896).	
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required	actual	equality	rather	than	pro	forma	equality.	Education	was	held	to	be	“a	right	which	must	be	made	available	to	all	on	equal	terms.”82	State	action	was	involved	in	state	sanctioned	separation	of	children	by	race	in	local	school	districts	and	that	separation	was	not	beyond	the	reach	of	the	Constitution.		 The	mid-twentieth	century	ushered	in	a	new	era	of	civil	rights	activism	and	litigation	that	began	to	develop	a	wider	definition	of	state	action.	Previously	the	Court	had	focused	on	the	involvement	of	state	officials	and	meticulously	avoided	including	the	acts	of	others	in	the	analysis.	The	cases	from	this	period	push	that	boundary	into	more	complex	interactions	between	private	individuals	and	state	officials.	The	several	current	categories	of	state	action	begin	with	these	cases	and	their	analysis	forms	the	main	argument	for	or	against	a	finding	of	state	action	in	the	Court.	What	is	clear	from	this	line	of	cases	is	that	there	is	no	single	test	or	circumstance	by	which	a	private	entity	or	individual	can	be	held	to	be	a	state	actor.			 A	Delaware	statute	authorized	the	creation	of	a	public	authority	by	the	City	of	Wilmington,	Delaware	that	resulted	in	the	construction	of	a	public	parking	lot	of	the	sort	found	in	most	urban	settings.83	As	a	source	of	revenue	to	pay	for	the	structure	in	addition	to	parking	fees	a	portion	of	the	building	was	dedicated	to	retail	businesses,	including	a	coffee	shop.	The	coffee	shop	was	a	part	of	the	parking	lot	but	was	accessible	by	an	entrance	on	the	public	sidewalk	adjacent	to	the	structure.	The	building	was	labeled	as	public	by	signs	and	flags	but	the	retail	operations	were	tenants	and	owned	
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privately.	The	Authority	had	borne	the	costs	of	the	initial	construction	of	the	coffee	shop	under	its	agreement	with	the	tenant	and	the	tenant	finished	with	its	own	fixtures	and	front	at	its	own	cost,	benefiting	from	the	tax	exemption	of	the	Authority	to	the	extent	of	its	improvements.	The	Authority	also	paid	for	the	heating	of	the	shop	and	to	provide	regular	maintenance	to	the	structure.	Other	than	a	general	requirement	that	the	premises	be	used	for	serving	food	and	drink	and	an	agreement	to	follow	all	laws,	there	were	no	other	restrictions	on	the	use	of	the	premises	in	the	lease	agreement,	including	no	requirement	that	the	tenant	serve	all	members	of	the	public.		 In	1958,	an	African	American	gentleman	parked	in	the	structure,	walked	out	to	the	sidewalk	and	entered	the	coffee	shop.	The	owner	refused	him	service	based	on	his	race	so	declaratory	relief	was	sought	in	the	state	courts	of	Delaware.	The	trial	court	found	the	action	in	violation	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	but	the	Delaware	Supreme	Court	held	that	the	shop	owner	was	acting	purely	in	his	own	private	capacity	and	could	not	be	held	to	the	standard	for	state	action.	The	Supreme	Court	accepted	the	case	and	reversed	with	a	finding	that	the	State	had	“so	far	insinuated	itself	into	a	position	of	interdependence	with	[the	coffee	shop]	that	it	must	be	recognized	as	a	joint	participant	in	the	challenged	activity”84	and	thus	applied	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	standard	of	equal	protection.	The	public	ownership	of	the	building,	the	public	nature	of	its	purpose,	and	the	fact	that	profits	from	the	shop	benefitted	the	public	by	supplementing	the	parking	income	all	led	to	the	conclusion	that	there	was	a	sort	of	symbiotic	relationship	
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between	the	shop	and	the	Authority.	That	entwinement	led	to	the	finding	of	state	action	by	a	purely	private	store	owner.		The	Court	explicitly	rejected	any	call	to	develop	a	“precise	formula	for	recognition	of	state	responsibility”85	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	A	detailed	analysis	of	the	facts	and	circumstances	is	required	to	reveal	“the	nonobvious	involvement	of	the	State	in	private	conduct”86	to	attribute	that	conduct	to	state	action.	It	requires	a	detailed	statement	of	the	factual	bases	of	each	case	to	identify	those	factors	that	influenced	the	Court	to	find	or	deny	state	action.	Unfortunately	for	later	litigants	the	Court	specified	that	the	required	state	action	could	only	be	tied	to	this	unique	set	of	facts	–	language	used	later	to	limit	its	reach	to	those	cases	in	which	“the	state	leases	public	property	in	the	manner	and	for	the	purpose	shown”87	in	that	case.		 Taking	another	approach	in	a	1963	decision	the	Court	was	presented	with	a	case	of	a	sit-in	demonstration	at	a	lunch	counter	in	Greenville,	South	Carolina.88	Ten	young	African	Americans	entered	a	store	and	sat	at	the	lunch	counter	reserved	for	whites	only.	The	store	manager	closed	the	store	and	the	participants	in	the	sit-in	were	arrested	for	trespass	and	later	found	guilty	of	that	charge.	The	store	manager	closed	the	counter	and	the	store	to	avoid	violating	a	Greenville	ordinance	prohibiting	mixed	race	lunch	counters	and	requiring	racially	segregated	facilities	in	the	form	of	tables,	counters,	dishes	and	preparation	areas	for	food.	The	Court	held	that	although	the	private	act	of	
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closing	the	counter	could	not	be	reached	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	the	involvement	of	the	City	of	Greenville	by	making	the	serving	of	the	young	people	a	violation	was	sufficient	to	invoke	state	action	and	call	for	the	reversal	of	the	convictions.		 Protestors	outside	of	a	privately-owned	amusement	park	in	Maryland	objected	to	the	park’s	policy	of	not	allowing	African	Americans	to	enter	or	enjoy	the	rides	in	the	park	even	though	the	rest	of	the	public	could	enter	and	ride.	A	security	guard,	with	the	credentials	as	a	deputy	sheriff,	asked	the	protestors	to	leave	when	they	lined	up	to	ride	one	of	the	rides	after	acquiring	tickets	for	that	ride.	When	the	protestors	did	not	leave,	the	deputy	sheriff	arrested	them	for	trespass	and	the	charges	were	brought	to	court.	After	the	Maryland	Court	of	Appeals	refused	to	reverse	the	charges	based	on	a	finding	that	this	was	a	purely	private	act	on	behalf	of	the	private	owners	of	the	amusement	park	the	case	came	before	the	Supreme	Court.	In	a	split	decision,	the	Court	held	that	the	acts	of	a	duly	authorized	deputy	sheriff,	even	if	enforcing	a	private	policy,	constituted	state	action	and	thus	violated	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	equal	protection	mandate.89		 Another	case	of	entwinement	involved	the	ownership	of	a	park	area	that	came	under	scrutiny.90	In	1911	a	decedent	devised	a	tract	of	land	to	the	City	of	Macon,	Georgia,	as	a	park	for	white	people	only.	It	was	governed	by	a	board	of	managers,	all	of	whom	were	white.	The	City	operated	the	park	initially	as	a	segregated	one	but	eventually	decided	that	it	could	not	do	so	constitutionally	and	it	integrated	the	park	facility.	The	Board	of	Managers	sought	a	court	order	to	remove	the	City	as	trustee	and	
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to	name	new	trustees	who	would	honor	the	wishes	of	the	original	testator	that	the	park	remain	for	white	people	only.	African	American	citizens	intervened	claiming	the	segregation	to	be	unconstitutional	and	the	City	resigned	voluntarily	as	trustee.	The	heirs	of	the	original	testator	intervened	to	have	the	trust	revert	to	the	estate	if	the	original	wishes	of	the	testator	to	keep	it	segregated	were	not	honored	by	the	naming	of	new	trustees	to	enforce	that	limitation.	The	state	court	named	new	trustees	and	the	Georgia	Supreme	Court	affirmed.		 The	Supreme	Court	noted	the	balance	between	private	rights	to	associate	with	those	of	one’s	own	choosing	and	the	public	requirement	to	provide	public	spaces	for	all	equally.	A	private	golf	club	could	select	freely	its	own	members	but	a	public	golf	facility	is	required	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	be	open	to	all.	Deciding	what	is	public	and	what	is	private	is	“not	always	easy	to	determine.”91	The	Court	said	that	private	conduct	may	become	“so	entwined”92	with	government	as	to	become	state	action	subject	to	Fourteenth	Amendment	equal	protection	requirements.	“That	is	to	say,	when	private	individuals	or	groups	are	endowed	by	the	State	with	powers	or	functions	governmental	in	nature,	they	become	agencies	or	instrumentalities	of	the	State	and	subject	to	its	constitutional	limitations.”93		 The	Court	also	distinguished	cases	involving	golf	clubs,	supper	clubs	and	other	private	associations	saying	that	a	public	park	is	a	service	to	a	community	like	the	police	
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or	fire	departments.	The	City	of	Macon	had	provided	all	the	operations	for	the	park	and	it	was	public	in	all	ways	except	the	denial	of	use	by	non-whites.	The	Court	held	that	the	mere	appointment	of	private	trustees	could	not	defeat	the	public	nature	of	the	park	and	that	it	must	be	operated	subject	to	constitutional	limitations.		 In	the	era	of	the	mid-twentieth	century	the	question	of	who	was	a	state	actor	was	addressed	in	parallel	with	concept	of	acting	“under	color	of	state	law”	as	was	required	by	the	42	U.S.C.	§	1983.94	In	a	case	that	involved	local	law	enforcement	officers	who	released	three	African	American	prisoners	only	to	catch	up	with	them	far	from	the	prison	joined	by	several	civilians	to	murder	them	the	Court	found	that	the	civilians	were	acting	under	color	of	state	law.	The	joint	action	that	necessarily	involved	the	law	enforcement	officers	created	a	connection	between	state	officials	and	non-officials	that	made	them	all	state	actors.95		 California	tenants	charged	discrimination	under	a	constitutional	provision	that	protected	a	person’s	right	to	refuse	sale	or	lease	of	property	to	anyone	for	any	reason,	including	racially	motivated	reasons.96	A	statute	barred	discrimination	in	housing	for	racial	reasons.	The	California	Supreme	Court	struck	down	the	constitutional	provision	declaring	it	in	violation	of	the	equal	protection	clause	and	the	Court	affirmed.	The	Court	agreed	with	the	California	Supreme	Court	in	its	finding	that	the	state	was	involved	in	a	similar	manner	to	the	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority97	case.	Even	though	the	
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constitutional	provision	was	neutral	on	its	face	it	was	operating	to	sustain	discrimination	in	a	way	barred	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.98		 Teacher	rights	in	public	schools	were	the	focus	of	a	case	in	which	a	teacher	was	fired	after	sending	a	letter	to	the	local	newspaper	criticizing	the	district’s	handling	of	tax	referenda.99	The	free	speech	claim	was	dismissed	by	trial	and	appellate	courts	in	Illinois	and	certiorari	was	granted	from	the	Illinois	Supreme	Court	to	the	United	States	Supreme	Court.	The	teacher	presented	a	First	Amendment	defense	claiming	a	right	to	publish	his	opinions	about	the	district’s	handling	of	the	referendum	as	a	voting	citizen.	That	claim	could	only	stand	based	on	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	application	of	the	First	Amendment	to	the	states.	Most	significant	for	the	purposes	of	this	study	is	the	holding	that	the	school	board,	as	a	public	employer,	may	not	compel	a	teacher	to	relinquish	his	First	Amendment	rights	as	a	condition	of	employment.100	That	holding	was	supported	by	other	previous	cases	to	the	same	effect.101	Constitutional	rights	extend	to	public	school	teachers	through	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	in	several	aspects	including	due	process102,	freedom	of	association103,	and	free	speech104	rights.	
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	 As	the	Civil	Rights	movement	continued	into	the	mid-twentieth	century	demonstrations	at	lunch	counters	offered	new	perspectives	on	state	action	and	how	private	acts	could	be	folded	into	the	acts	of	the	state	prohibited	to	be	discriminatory	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	In	one	such	case	a	so-called	Freedom	School	in	Hattiesburg,	Mississippi,	and	its	white	teacher’s	actions	with	her	African	American	students	raised	issues	of	state	action.105	Walking	into	the	Public	Library	the	students	were	refused	the	use	of	that	facility.	Following	that	refusal,	the	group	went	to	the	lunch	counter	at	the	Kress	department	store	where	the	African	American	students	were	offered	service	but	the	white	teacher	was	denied	service	since	she	was	in	their	company	–	an	act	previously	prohibited	in	Mississippi.	The	group	left	the	store	and	the	teacher	was	immediately	arrested	on	a	charge	of	vagrancy	by	a	local	policeman.	The	students	were	not	arrested.		 The	case	arrived	at	the	Court	on	a	Summary	Judgment	granted	to	the	store	ending	the	teacher’s	Fourteenth	Amendment	claim	that	her	right	to	equal	protection	was	violated	by	the	custom	and	practice	of	discrimination	and	her	allegation	of	a	conspiracy	between	the	store	and	the	local	police	to	deny	her	of	her	rights.	The	Court	split	on	the	first	question	of	whether	a	custom	and	practice	was	involved	but	overwhelmingly	found	in	favor	of	the	teacher’s	claim	that	her	allegations	contained	the	facts	of	a	conspiracy	based	on	evidence	that	the	policeman	who	arrested	her	immediately	on	her	leaving	the	store	had	been	inside	the	store	while	she	was	there	and	had	in	some	way	communicated	with	the	counter	waitress	before	making	the	arrest	
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outside	the	store.	The	holding	typified	the	Court’s	willingness	to	push	the	limits	of	state	action	in	racially	motivated	discrimination	to	prevent	circumvention	of	the	constitutional	guarantees	by	making	actions	informal	or	appear	private	to	avoid	that	protection.	Throughout	the	civil	rights	era,	the	Court	has	exhibited	a	greater	willingness	to	extend	the	state	action	doctrine	to	find	state	action	and	protect	individual	rights	violated	in	racially	discriminatory	ways.		Institutions	and	businesses	became	the	subject	of	state	action	cases	with	the	complaint	of	an	African	American	guest	in	a	Moose	Lodge	who	was	denied	service.106	The	Lodge	was	a	private	club	and	as	such	was	free	to	set	membership	requirements	but	as	a	guest	he	was	only	interested	in	joining	his	member	friend	for	a	meal.	The	Court	considered	the	by-laws	of	the	Moose	Lodge	and	found	that	although	membership	was	denied	to	African	Americans,	there	was	no	such	limitation	on	guests	in	the	clubs.	Because	Moose	was	the	holder	of	a	publicly	issued	liquor	license	the	guest	argued	that	the	denial	to	serve	him	was	state	action	and	sought	the	revocation	of	the	license.		 The	Court	denied	the	request	to	address	the	membership	discrimination	but	did	cite	a	requirement	of	the	liquor	law	that	the	organization	must	conform	to	its	own	by-laws	as	a	condition	of	the	license.	By	requiring	the	Moose	Lodge	to	comply	with	a	discriminatory	bylaw,	the	liquor	commission	converted	the	action	of	the	private	club	into	state	action	that	was	held	in	violation	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
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	 When	a	utility	company	with	a	government	granted	monopoly	terminated	service	to	a	customer	pursuant	to	its	own	policies,	the	Court	found	no	state	action.107	The	customer	sued	alleging	a	§1983	Civil	Rights	Act	violation	by	the	utility	requiring	her	to	prove	the	utility	acted	“under	color	of	state	law”	held	by	the	Court	to	be	the	same	test	as	state	action.	The	monopoly	status	of	the	utility	and	the	high	degree	of	regulation	under	which	it	operated	was	held	not	to	convert	its	decision	to	terminate	into	an	act	under	color	of	state	law	and	the	case	dismissal	was	upheld	by	the	Court.	The	Court	also	dismissed	the	public	function	argument	presented	by	the	petitioner	saying	that	utilities	were	provided	widely	by	private	companies	even	though	government	regulated	them	quite	extensively.		 The	use	of	public	parks	by	private	organizations	with	racially	discriminatory	admissions	policies	in	Montgomery,	Alabama,	served	to	demonstrate	just	how	detailed	the	fact	situations	are	required	to	be	to	find	state	action.	Although	the	Court	had	no	problem	holding	that	exclusive	use	of	the	parks	by	discriminatory	groups	could	not	be	tolerated	it	required	further	findings	of	fact	before	ruling	on	all	possible	uses	by	those	groups.	The	Court	compared	the	facts	to	the	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority	case	saying	that	the	relationship	between	state	and	private	groups	becomes	more	involved	than	mere	regulation.	Interestingly	the	Court	lists	those	activities	that	could	be	held	traditionally	exclusive	realms	of	government	as	“electricity,	water,	and	police	and	fire	protection.”108		
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A	statutory	scheme	for	commercial	transactions	was	challenged	Flagg	Brothers	v.	
Brooks109,	a	claim	brought	by	two	owners	of	property	that	was	stored	in	a	warehouse	and	which	the	warehouse	owner	threatened	to	sell	for	non-payment	of	fees.	The	claim,	solely	against	the	private	warehouse	owner,	was	that	the	statutory	scheme	delegated	the	governmental	responsibility	to	resolve	the	dispute	over	fees	through	the	seizure	and	sale	of	property	to	the	warehouse	and	thus	the	actions	were	subject	to	the	due	process	requirements	of	the	Constitution.	The	Court	disagreed	with	that	position	and	drew	a	narrow	line	around	the	activities	that	could	be	said	to	be	governmental	in	nature	and	a	delegation	of	state	power	to	a	private	party.	Following	a	review	of	the	election	cases	successfully	prosecuted	under	this	sovereign	function	theory	the	Court	observed	that	many	state	functions	have	been	more	exclusive	to	the	state	than	the	issue	presented	of	dispute	resolution.	“Among	these	are	such	functions	as	education,	fire	and	police	protection,	and	tax	collection.”110	Later	cases	will	not	provide	much	support	for	the	inclusion	of	education	in	that	list.	Addressing	a	second	position	of	the	aggrieved	parties	in	Flagg	Brothers	the	Court	rejected	the	claim	that	the	warehouse	owner	had	acted	in	a	way	compelled	by	the	statute.	The	Court	held	that	the	statute	established	a	means	by	which	the	state	could	remain	uninvolved	in	such	commercial	transactions	rather	than	require	them	all	to	enter	a	court	of	law	to	resolve	differences.	Acquiescence	in	a	private	action	is	not	
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equivalent	to	compelling	an	action	or	even	encouragement	of	it	such	that	the	action	is	fairly	attributable	to	the	state	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	An	issue	of	private	parties	and	judicial	intervention	served	as	the	platform	for	a	Texas	case	in	which	an	injunction,	allegedly	issued	as	a	result	of	an	illegal	conspiracy	between	a	state	judge	and	the	private	parties,	barred	the	complainants	from	accessing	the	minerals	on	land	to	which	they	had	mineral	rights.111	The	injunction	was	dissolved	after	29	months	of	litigation	and	a	federal	civil	suit	was	filed	claiming	a	conspiracy	to	wrongfully	take	property	without	due	process	naming	the	judge,	parties	who	obtained	the	injunction,	and	others	as	co-conspirators.	The	lower	courts	held	that	the	judge	had	judicial	immunity	and	after	dismissing	him	from	the	suit	further	found	that	there	was	no	state	action	among	the	remaining	alleged	co-conspirators	and	dismissed	the	claims	against	them	also.	The	Court	agreed	that	the	judge	had	immunity	from	the	suit	but	that	immunity	did	not	change	the	allegation	of	a	conspiracy	that	lead	to	the	wrongful	issuance	of	an	injunction.	Private	citizens,	engaged	with	public	officials,	are	state	actors	if	they	act	in	conspiracy	with	those	public	officials	even	if	the	officials	have	immunity	from	suit.	The	nature	of	the	actions	taken	–	the	conspiracy	with	the	judge	to	gain	issuance	of	an	illegal	injunction	–	served	as	the	guiding	factor	in	the	finding	that	the	private	individuals	engaged	in	sufficient	action	under	color	of	state	law	to	be	held	liable	for	the	deprivation	of	property	rights	of	the	injured	party.	
																																								 																				
111	Dennis	v.	Sparks,	449	U.S.	24	(1980).	
	 45	
	 In	1981,	the	Court	considered	a	case	in	which	a	public	defender,	an	attorney	admittedly	an	employ	of	the	county	government,	was	sued	by	a	client	for	malpractice	in	his	representation	pursuant	to	court	appointment.112	The	Court	went	beyond	the	fact	that	the	attorney	was	a	public	employee	to	examine	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	attorney	and	client.	The	Court	cited	United	States	v.	Classic113	to	support	the	position	“that	a	person	acts	under	color	of	state	law	only	when	exercising	power	‘possessed	by	virtue	of	state	law	and	made	possible	only	because	the	wrongdoer	is	clothed	with	the	authority	of	state	law.’114	Holding	that	the	attorney’s	authority	and	obligations	to	her	client	were	independent	of	the	state	and	the	employment	relationship	with	the	public	defender’s	office,	the	Court	rejected	the	claim	that	her	acts	as	an	attorney	could	constitute	acts	under	color	of	state	law.	The	key	to	the	decision	was	that	the	Court	looked	not	to	the	relationship	but	to	the	function	involved.	An	attorney	was	noted	to	be	an	independent	professional	with	duties	only	to	her	client	and	not	to	the	public,	her	employer.	The	Court	also	excluded	any	thought	that	their	decision	was	a	blanket	denial	that	public	defenders	were	public	employees	noting	that	a	public	defender	might	have	administrative	duties,	such	as	hiring	employees	for	the	office,	that	could	be	classified	as	acts	under	color	of	state	law.115	The	study	of	the	precise	function	involved	is	essential	for	an	understanding	of	the	requirements	for	state	action.	
																																								 																				
112	Polk	County	v.	Dodson,	454	U.S.	312	(1981).	
113	United	States	v.	Classic,	313	U.S.	299	(1941).	
114	Polk	County	v.	Dodson,	454	U.S.	at	317-318.	
115	Id.	at	325.	
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	 Perhaps	the	case	most	cited	as	indicative	of	charter	school	predictions	of	state	action	is	that	of	Rendell-Baker	v.	Kohn116.	At	issue	in	this	case	is	a	private	school	that	contracted	with	public	school	districts	for	as	much	as	99	percent	of	its	funding	by	providing	students	who	had	difficulty	in	traditional	high	schools	with	ways	to	complete	their	high	school	diploma.	In	fact,	the	diplomas	they	offered	were	issued	by	the	local	public	school	district.	The	school	was	subject	to	extensive	regulation	as	a	school	and	had	to	follow	many	of	the	same	rules	that	public	schools	were	subject	to.	The	regulations	required	written	employment	policies	and	job	descriptions	but	little	else	regarding	personnel.	The	contract	with	the	school	district	does	state	that	employees	of	the	school	are	not	school	district	employees	–	separating	them	from	any	existing	union	contracts	with	district	teachers.	Rendell-Baker	was	a	special	sort	of	employee	hired	under	a	state	grant	and	as	such	had	to	pass	state	approval	of	her	qualifications	before	being	hired.		 The	case	arose	when	Rendell-Baker	was	fired	without	notice,	a	hearing,	or	stated	cause	for	speaking	up	against	certain	actions	of	the	director,	Kohn.	Following	her	dismissal	five	other	teachers	expressed	their	disagreement	with	the	director’s	actions	and	informed	her	that	they	were	forming	a	union	at	the	school.	They	were	fired	the	following	day.	The	dismissed	employees	filed	the	action	claiming	a	violation	of	their	First	Amendment	rights	of	free	speech	under	color	of	state	law	without	due	process.	The	lower	court	dismissed	Rendell-Baker’s	claims	holding	that	there	was	not	the	
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requisite	action	under	color	of	state	law	quoting	Jackson	v.	Metropolitan	Edison117	in	support	of	the	ruling	saying	that	the	nexus	was	not	close	enough	to	hold	the	state	responsible	for	the	acts	of	the	school.	A	separate	District	Court	ruled	in	favor	of	the	other	five	teachers	citing	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority118	to	find	that	the	school	served	what	was	primarily	a	public	function	and	was	so	entwined	with	the	state	regulations	that	its	actions	could	fairly	be	attributed	to	the	state.		 The	Court	of	Appeals	dismissed	both	claims	noting	that	the	regulations	imposed	on	the	school	by	the	state	did	not	reach	far	into	the	employment	relationship	and	that	action	was	therefore	not	fairly	attributable	to	the	state.	[Lugar	language].	The	Supreme	Court	consolidated	the	cases	into	one	and	began	by	establishing	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	that	served	to	protect	the	due	process	rights	of	individuals	could	only	be	applied	to	the	state	and	not	to	private	individuals.	The	Court	compared	the	school	to	the	nursing	homes	in	Blum	v.	Yaretsky119	because	both	received	over	90%	of	their	funding	from	public	sources	and	both	were	highly	regulated.	Holding	that	both	were	more	like	private	contractors	who	build	roads	or	buildings	for	the	public	the	Court	dispensed	the	argument	as	inadequate.	Neither	funding	nor	regulation	was	enough	to	create	the	required	nexus.	The	Court	noted	that	the	personnel	actions	were	not	required	nor	even	regulated	by	the	state,	making	the	activity	involved	more	important	than	the	relationship.	
																																								 																				
117	Jackson	v.	Metropolitan	Edison,	419	U.S.	345	(1974).	
118	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority,	365	U.S.	715	(1961).	
119	Blum	v.	Yaretsky,	457	U.S.	991	(1982).	
	 48	
	 The	teachers	raised	the	issue	of	the	“public	function”	served	by	the	school	but	the	Court	set	that	aside	because	schooling	was	not	“traditionally	the	exclusive	prerogative	of	the	state”120	that	factor	did	not	change	the	school	into	a	state	actor.	Finally,	the	argument	was	presented	that	the	school	was	in	a	“symbiotic	relationship”	with	the	state	similar	to	that	found	in	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority121.	That	decision	contained	language	that	limited	it	to	the	specific	case	of	a	lessor	of	public	property	and	the	Court	applied	that	limitation	to	find	that	the	school	was	not	in	such	a	relationship	with	the	state.	The	claims	were	all	dismissed	and	the	school	was	not	found	to	be	a	state	actor.		 Another	category	of	case	based	on	the	involvement	of	the	courts	by	a	party	to	enforce	a	debt	thus	infringing	on	the	debtor’s	right	to	due	process	is	Lugar	v.	
Edmondson	Oil	Co.,	Inc.122	In	that	case	the	Court	outlined	the	two-part	test	requiring	first	a	determination	that	the	State	has	created	some	right	or	privilege	that	has	deprived	a	complainant	of	a	constitutional	right	and	then	that	the	one	who	infringed	on	that	right	could	fairly	be	said	to	be	a	state	actor.123	In	this	case	the	complaint	was	based	on	the	acts	of	a	creditor	who	obtained	a	writ	of	attachment	in	court	to	attach	property	of	the	debtor	and	the	writ	was	executed	by	the	County	sheriff,	effectively	preventing	the	debtor	from	having	access	to	his	equipment	used	to	operate	his	business.	The	debtor	subsequently	obtained	a	dismissal	of	the	writ	as	not	properly	issued	and	then	sued	the	
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121	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority,	365	U.S.	715	(1961).	
122	Lugar	v.	Edmondson	Oil	Co.,	Inc.,	457	U.S.	922	(1982).	
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creditor	for	taking	his	property	without	due	process,	citing	the	involvement	of	the	County	sheriff	in	the	process	to	claim	that	the	creditor	was	a	state	actor	working	jointly	with	state	actors	making	the	creditor	effectively	an	agent	of	the	state.		 The	District	Court	and	Court	of	Appeals	cited	Flagg	Brothers	v.	Brooks124	to	deny	adequate	involvement	in	the	deprivation	by	the	state	to	convert	the	creditor’s	acts	to	state	action	for	which	he	could	be	held	responsible.	The	Court	cited	earlier	cases	of	creditor	action	under	a	state	statute	for	attachment	or	other	pre-judgment	remedies	and	noted	that	they	had	uniformly	resulted	in	a	finding	that	the	creditor	was	liable	as	a	state	actor	because	it	had	used	state	statutes	and	state	enforcement	to	deprive	the	debtor	of	due	process	rights.	That	the	complainant’s	due	process	rights	were	violated	was	not	questionable	in	this	case.	No	hearing	or	opportunity	to	be	heard	took	place	and	property	was	undoubtedly	taken.	The	question	moves	to	the	second	aspect	of	the	inquiry	to	determine	whether	the	behavior	of	the	creditor	could	fairly	be	attributable	to	the	state.	The	test	for	that	is	found	in	Flagg	Brothers	from	pre-judgment	interest	cases	and	is	called	the	“joint	action	test”125.		 The	Court	first	distinguished	the	three	counts	of	the	complaint	with	the	third	being	a	complaint	under	state	law	and	therefore	pendant	to	the	remaining	two	counts.	The	second	count	alleged	abuse	of	the	statutory	procedures	by	the	creditor	and	the	Court	held	that	the	state	could	not	be	held	responsible	for	wrongful	use	of	its	procedures.	The	first	count	set	out	a	claim	that	the	creditor	had	followed	the	state	
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statute	to	attach	the	debtor’s	property	and	that	by	using	the	statutory	scheme	the	debtor	was	deprived	of	that	property	without	due	process.	That	is,	the	Court	looked	to	the	constitutionality	of	the	statutory	scheme	to	determine	if	it	violated	due	process	requirements	when	used	as	designed.	The	Court	cited	the	case	of	United	States	v.	
Price126	to	hold	that	the	creditor	had	acted	jointly	with	the	state	in	seizing	the	debtor’s	property	and	therefore	was	subject	to	the	requirements	of	due	process.	The	misuse	of	the	statute	could	not	be	so	characterized	but	by	following	the	statutory	scheme	the	state	was	implicated	in	the	process.		 A	nursing	home	decision	to	transfer	Medicare	patients	to	a	lower	level	of	care	provided	the	background	for	a	charge	that	the	high	level	of	regulation	via	Medicare	made	decisions	of	the	nursing	home	those	of	the	state	in	Blum	v.	Yaretsky127.	The	regulatory	scheme	required	the	nursing	home	operators	to	determine	whether	the	patients	were	placed	in	the	appropriate	level	of	care,	meaning	that	the	services	were	necessary	as	provided.	At	the	point	that	a	decision	to	transfer	patients	to	a	lower	level	of	care	is	made	the	operator	was	required	to	notify	the	state	of	the	decision	so	the	proper	level	of	reimbursement	could	be	provided	through	Medicare.	The	patients	sued	claiming	a	denial	of	Due	Process	because	they	had	no	notice	or	opportunity	to	be	heard	in	the	meeting	of	the	committee	that	made	the	decision	to	reduce	their	level	of	care.	The	lower	courts	found	that	the	patients	were	entitled	to	hearings	and	full	due	process	
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holding	the	transfers	to	be	state	action	based	on	the	state	reduction	in	reimbursement	under	Medicaid	in	response	to	the	decisions	to	transfer.		 The	Court	observes	that	this	case	differs	from	other	state	action	cases	in	that	it	is	attempting	to	make	state	officials	liable	for	the	acts	of	private	entities	rather	than	trying	to	hold	private	entities	liable	as	if	they	were	state	actors.	The	Second	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	had	held	that	there	was	a	close	enough	nexus	between	the	private	actors	and	the	state	that	the	state	was	liable	for	the	transfers	without	due	process.	The	Supreme	Court	disagreed	holding	that	the	conduct	had	not	“received	the	imprimatur	of	the	State	so	as	to	make	it	‘state’	action	for	the	purposes	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.”128	Despite	strict	regulation	of	the	nursing	homes	by	the	state	the	Court	failed	to	find	the	close	relationship	between	the	State	and	the	particular	acts	complained	of.	The	Court	goes	on	to	say	that	the	state	should	not	be	held	liable	for	private	actions	unless	it	“exercised	coercive	power	or	has	provided	such	significant	encouragement”129	over	the	decision.		 Some	interaction	with	state	officials	was	held	to	be	necessary	in	a	dispute	that	pitted	non-union	workers	against	union	members	who	had	assaulted	them130.	The	non-union	workers	claimed	a	violation	of	their	freedom	of	association	and	the	lower	courts	held	the	conspiracy	involving	the	unions	had	been	for	the	purpose	of	denying	the	non-union	workers	of	their	right	not	to	associate	with	a	union	and	found	a	political	and	
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economic	motivation	for	the	conspiracy	in	the	absence	of	the	usual	racial	bias.	The	Court	first	reached	the	question	of	a	requirement	of	state	action	to	assert	liability	for	a	deprivation	of	rights	under	the	First	Amendment	as	extended	through	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	A	long	history	of	cases	holding	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	protects	against	state	action	served	as	the	foundation	for	holding	that	this	case	required	such	a	finding	also.	Without	state	involvement	in	any	way	the	conspiracy	could	not	sustain	the	action	and	the	lower	courts	were	reversed.		 Charter	organizations	are	the	topic	in	a	case	pitting	the	San	Francisco	Gay	Games	against	the	United	States	Olympic	Committee	(USOC).131	The	USOC	was	granted	a	statutory	charter	by	Congress	and	given	exclusive	use	of	the	term	“Olympic”	and	other	words	and	phrases.	When	the	San	Francisco	group	tried	to	use	the	term	as	part	of	the	title	of	their	own	games	the	USOC	sought	and	obtained	an	injunction.	Among	other	claims	the	groups	alleged	that	the	enforcement	of	the	exclusive	use	of	the	word	violated	the	Fifth	Amendment	and	claimed	that	the	USOC	was	a	state	actor	subject	to	that	Amendment.	The	Court	held	that	the	grant	of	a	charter	and	exclusive	use	of	certain	words	and	phrases	did	not	transform	the	private	USOC	into	a	public	body.	Even	some	federal	funding	did	not	create	constitutional	limitations	on	its	actions.	The	public	function	argument	was	met	with	the	reminder	that	such	functions	must	have	been	the	“exclusive	prerogative”132	of	the	government	and	the	USOC	did	not	perform	such	functions.	Nor	did	the	government	coerce	the	USOC	to	enforce	its	exclusive	use	of	the	
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word	in	question.133	As	a	passive	observer	the	government	could	not	be	held	responsible	for	the	acts	of	the	USOC.	A	four-justice	dissent	argued	that	the	majority	erred	in	the	finding	that	the	USOC	was	not	a	state	actor.	The	dissenters	found	the	body	to	serve	a	public	function	and	had	a	close	enough	nexus	with	the	government	to	make	it	a	state	actor.		 In	what	appears	at	first	a	twist	of	the	decision	in	Polk	County	v.	Dodson,	134	the	Court	held	that	a	physician	contracted	by	the	state	to	treat	prisoners	is	a	state	actor.135	Distinguishing	the	adversarial	relationship	of	the	public	defender	to	the	state	in	Polk	from	the	physician	who	acted	in	collaboration	with	the	prison	officials	to	meet	their	obligation	to	care	for	prisoners,	the	Court	held	that	as	a	contractor	of	the	state	the	physician’s	acts	were	the	acts	of	the	state.	The	attorney	in	Polk	had	as	a	primary	responsibility	the	representation	of	the	client	against	the	state	and	therefore	legal	decisions	could	not	be	attributed	to	the	state	in	the	same	way	the	doctor’s	decisions	could.		 Private	insurers	terminating	medical	payments	under	the	Pennsylvania	Worker’s	Compensation	statute,	a	highly-regulated	system,	were	not	acting	on	behalf	of	the	state	when	they	terminated	those	payments	without	a	hearing.136	Decisions	to	
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of	the	nation	to	the	world	as	the	USOC,	in	fact,	does	and	is	chartered	to	do	but	finds	the	lack	of	
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134	Supra	at	n.104.	
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terminate	benefits	were	in	the	discretion	of	the	insurer	and	the	creation	of	authority	and	a	process	to	enact	those	decisions	did	not	implicate	the	state	in	the	action.	Again,	the	Court	looked	at	the	specific	behavior	complained	of	rather	than	an	overall	scheme	of	regulation	reiterating	the	holding	in	Jackson	v.	Metropolitan	Edison	Co.,137	that	a	high	level	of	regulation	of	private	actors	is	not	enough	to	create	state	action.	Citing	the	earlier	Blum138	case	the	majority	compared	the	decision	to	transfer	patients	to	a	lower	tier	of	care	to	the	reduction	in	disputed	medical	payments	by	the	worker’s	compensation	insurers.	The	effect	of	that	holding	is	to	require	a	careful	examination	into	the	specific	behavior	complained	of	and	its	nexus	to	the	state.		 In	a	case	that	moves	closer	to	schools	the	Court	faced	a	decision	by	a	statewide	high	school	athletic	association	to	penalize	a	member	school	for	alleged	recruiting	activities	contrary	to	the	association’s	bylaws.139	In	that	case	the	Tennessee	Secondary	School	Athletic	Association	(Association)	membership	included	almost	all	the	state’s	public	high	schools	which	made	up	84%	of	the	voting	members.	The	major	committees	operating	the	Association	were	required	to	be	school	administrators	and	the	public-school	members	attended	to	this	business	during	school	hours	as	a	part	of	their	jobs.	The	bylaws	of	the	Association	allowed	for	enforcement	and	penalties	for	non-compliance	of	its	member	schools.	An	express	agreement	existed	between	the	state	
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	 55	
education	agency	and	the	Association	acknowledging	its	supervision	of	athletics	in	the	state’s	schools.		 In	a	demonstration	of	the	difficulty	applying	the	tests	previously	applied	by	the	Court	the	District	Court	found	state	action	based	on	the	close	relationship	between	the	Association	and	the	schools.	The	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	reversed	and	analyzed	the	three	tests	it	found	in	Supreme	Court	decisions	to	hold	that	there	was	no	state	action	involved.	The	Supreme	Court	reversed	that	decision	in	a	5-4	vote	recognizing	that	defining	what	is	“fairly	attributable”	to	the	state	is	not	a	matter	of	“rigid	simplicity”.140	Although	not	explicitly	stated	the	Court	implied	that	once	again	this	decision	was	limited	to	this	particular	fact	situation	showing	such	extreme	involvement	by	school	officials,	admittedly	state	actors,	in	the	decision	making	process	of	the	Association	creating	the	criterion	of	“pervasive	entwinement	to	the	point	of	largely	overlapping	identity”141	for	state	action.	
Circuit	Court	cases		 Since	the	last	Supreme	Court	cases	decided	on	the	state	action	doctrine	the	Circuit	Courts	of	Appeals	have	applied	the	various	tests	in	several	cases	to	determine	the	presence	or	absence	of	state	action.	Although	the	cases	are	decided	by	learned	judges	they	do	differ	in	their	application	of	the	doctrine	because	of	the	lack	of	clear	lines	of	distinction	in	the	Supreme	Court	decisions.	They	do	provide	some	insight	into	the	
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possible	approaches	relating	to	charter	schools.	This	review	will	limit	itself	to	those	cases	particularly	well	related	to	charter	schools.		 The	First	Circuit	held	that	a	“contract	school”	serving	as	the	sole	provider	of	high	school	services	to	public	school	students	in	Maine	was	not	serving	a	public	function.142	In	an	unusual	arrangement	the	local	school	district	elected	not	to	provide	a	high	school	but	contracted	with	a	private	school	to	provide	those	services.	A	student	who	alleged	that	he	was	unfairly	disciplined	and	not	provided	procedural	due	process	because	he	was	not	provided	an	opportunity	for	a	hearing	before	his	suspension143	sued	both	the	private	school	and	the	public	school	district.	The	lower	court	granted	summary	judgement	to	both	the	private	school	and	the	public	school	district	and	the	student	appealed.		 Confirming	what	has	often	been	stated	the	court	noted	that	the	state	action	doctrine	was	“too	generally	phrased	to	be	self-executing”144	and	lacked	“neat	consistency.”145	The	argument	presented	by	the	student	was	that	the	private	school	was	performing	a	public	function.	The	court	cited	the	San	Francisco	Arts	&	Athletics146	case	to	hold	that	historically	schools	are	not	the	exclusive	function	of	government	and	thus,	unless	clearly	a	government	entity	must	be	held	to	be	private	actors.	Another	factor	that	seems	influential	in	this	holding	is	that	the	private	school	was	governed	entirely	by	
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private	trustees	and	had	only	the	contractual	arrangement	tying	it	to	the	public	school	district.		 The	court	then	engages	in	an	interesting	section	of	dictum	speculating	that	there	might	be	a	balancing	of	rights	approach	that	would	induce	a	contrary	finding.	They	note	that	if	the	student	truly	had	no	other	options,	the	threat	of	suspension	of	education	was	widespread	and	without	any	means	of	redress	there	could	be	an	argument	for	state	action	but	deferred	to	the	Supreme	Court	for	the	development	of	any	such	new	tests	and	further	found	that	the	student	did	have	redress	beyond	this	constitutional	challenge.	The	state’s	obligation	to	continue	to	provide	schooling	for	this	student	did	not	end	with	the	suspension	so	the	state	was	not	denying	him	an	education.		 In	a	final	relevant	analysis,	the	court	ruled	against	the	student	in	his	claim	against	the	public	school	officials	for	not	including	due	process	for	suspensions	in	the	contract	with	the	private	school.	First	acknowledging	that	the	public	school	officials	are	state	actors	the	court	addresses	the	issue	of	state	inaction	as	opposed	to	action.	Could	the	school	district	officials	be	liable	as	state	actors	for	not	acting	to	include	the	provision?	The	court	noted	that	in	a	due	process	claim	inaction	has	never	served	as	the	basis	for	liability.	Equal	protection	claims	are	handled	differently,	however.		 In	a	factual	setting	that	is	somewhat	parallel	to	the	charter	school	situation	the		Secondary	sources	the	Fifth	Circuit	considered	a	claim	against	a	private	contractor	for	prison	services.147	In	a	§1983	action	an	employee	of	the	private	contractor	claimed	that	his	termination	violated	his	First	and	Fourteenth	amendment	rights,	among	other	
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claims.	The	court	acknowledged	that	the	infringement	of	rights	was	properly	set	out	in	the	complaint	so	that	could	not	be	argued	on	this	Motion	to	Dismiss	ruling.	What	did	require	examination	was	whether	the	private	contractor	for	prison	services	was	acting	under	color	of	state	law	–	in	other	words,	whether	that	contractor	was	a	state	actor.		 Given	the	Supreme	Court’s	reluctance	to	establish	a	broadly	applicable	test	to	define	state	actors	the	court	starts	with	the	process	of	“identifying	the	specific	conduct	of	which	the	plaintiff	complains.”148	In	this	case	it	is	classified	as	an	employment	decision	and	the	inquiry	becomes	whether	that	behavior	is	“fairly	attributable	to	the	State.”149	In	an	interesting	approach	to	answering	that	question	the	court	distinguishes	the	act	of	keeping	prisoners	from	the	act	of	terminating	an	employee	saying	the	former	would	be	state	action	while	the	latter	is	not.	The	court	identifies	the	keeping	of	prisoners	as	a	traditional	public	function	while	ruling	that	the	termination	of	employees	is	not.	That	holding	is	certainly	one	that	would	impact	teachers	in	charter	schools.		 Teachers	sued	their	charter	school	employer	in	a	§1983	action	for	violation	of	their	First	Amendment	rights	among	other	claims	in	a	Tenth	Circuit	arising	out	of	their	dismissal	resulting	from	their	meeting	off	school	grounds	and	after	hours	at	various	locations	to	discuss	their	concerns	about	the	operation	of	the	school.150	The	court	ruled	on	a	variety	of	claims	for	violation	of	freedom	of	speech,	prior	restraint	of	speech,	freedom	of	association,	due	process,	and	pendant	state	claims.	Despite	the	requirement	
																																								 																				
148	American	Manufacturers	v.	Sullivan,	526	U.S.	40	(1999).	
149	Cornish	v.	Correctional	Services	Corp.,	402	F.3d.	545	(5th	Cir.	2005).	
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under	§1983	that	the	actions	must	be	under	color	of	state	law	there	is	no	discussion	of	that	requirement	and	the	status	of	the	teachers	as	government	employees	is	taken	as	a	given	in	the	decision	of	the	court.		 Contrast	that	decision	to	a	Ninth	Circuit	ruling	in	a	case	involving	the	termination	of	a	teacher	from	an	Arizona	charter	school.151	The	charter	was	run	by	a	private,	non-profit	operator	and	that	organization	was	the	employer	of	the	teacher.	Arizona	law	provided	that	charter	school	teachers	could	participate	in	the	state	teacher	retirement	system	and	the	state	retirement	laws	provided	that	those	benefits	are	available	only	to	public	employees,	defining	charter	schools	specifically	as	political	subdivisions	of	the	state.152	The	charter	legislation	required	that	personnel	policies	be	filed	with	the	chartering	district	and	imposed	several	other	regulations	on	charter	schools.	The	Attorney	General	of	Arizona	had	even	ruled	that	charter	schools	were	subject	to	the	Open	Meetings	Act	as	public	bodies.153	Charters	are	exempted	from	teacher	certification	requirements	and	teacher	tenure	and	dismissal	procedures.		 The	teacher	was	dismissed	after	allegations	by	a	student	of	some	inappropriate	contact	but	the	evidence	of	that	was	presented	to	the	governing	board	without	any	opportunity	for	the	teacher	or	a	representative	of	the	teacher	to	participate.	The	teacher’s	demand	for	a	hearing	to	clear	his	name	was	ignored	by	the	charter	school.	The	teacher	filed	suit	claiming	that	the	charter	had	deprived	him	of	his	liberty	interest	in	
																																								 																				
151	Caviness	v.	Horizon	Community	Learning	Center,	590	F.3d	806	(9th	Cir.	2010).	
152	See	Ariz.	Rev.	Stat.	§§15-181	through	189.	
153	See	Ariz.	Op.	Atty.	Gen.	No.	I95-10,	(1995).	
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preventing	him	from	gaining	other	employment	and	his	First	Amendment	right	of	free	association	by	barring	him	from	attending	track	meets	in	which	his	former	students	participated.	As	a	§1983	action	he	also	plead	that	the	above	was	done	by	the	charter	school	under	color	of	state	law.	His	case	was	dismissed	by	the	District	Court	rejecting	the	claim	that	the	charter	was	a	state	actor	in	its	termination	of	his	employment	based	solely	on	the	argued	grounds	that	the	school	was	a	public	function.	Because	it	was	decided	on	a	motion	to	dismiss	there	was	no	evidence	taken	or	considered	and	there	was	nothing	plead	about	any	entwinement,	encouragement,	coercion	or	other	state	involvement	in	the	termination.		 The	court	began	from	the	point	that	even	though	the	state	had	defined	the	charter	school	as	a	public	entity	and	treated	it	as	such	it	must	look	at	the	operator	as	a	private	corporation	and	find	state	action	as	it	would	for	any	other	private	entity.	There	is	no	citation	of	authority	for	taking	that	stance	offered	by	the	court.	Thus,	the	decision	progresses	through	the	standard	state	action	analysis.	That	analysis	begins	by	drawing	parallels	between	the	present	case	and	an	earlier	case	decided	by	the	same	court	in	which	a	contractor	operating	a	correctional	facility	was	found	not	to	be	a	state	actor	in	its	role	as	an	employer	even	though	it	might	be	for	other	actions.154	That	case	acknowledged	that	even	if	the	private	prison	operator	were	a	state	actor	for	operating	a	prison	it	was	not	a	state	actor	as	an	employer.	The	court	rejected	the	teacher’s	claim	for	having	no	allegation	that	the	state	participated	directly	in	the	personnel	decisions	and	actions	of	the	charter	school	operator.	The	Second	Circuit	followed	a	similar	line	of	
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reasoning	in	a	claim	against	a	private	contractor	for	ambulance	services	to	a	municipality	limiting	the	consideration	of	state	action	solely	to	the	employment	decision	and	not	to	any	overall	examination	of	the	relationship.155	The	Third	Circuit	held	that	there	was	no	state	action	in	the	removal	of	certain	commercial	literature	from	a	toll	road	service	plaza	by	the	private	contractor	with	the	state	to	operate	that	plaza	because	the	state	did	not	participate	in	the	removal	or	the	day-to-day	operations	of	the	plaza.156	
Secondary	sources	There	is	a	significant	body	of	legal	literature	regarding	the	state	action	doctrine.	A	small	portion	of	that	literature	also	addresses	some	aspect	of	charter	schools	in	light	of	that	legal	doctrine.	This	section	of	the	literature	review	will	look	at	the	existing	legal	literature	state	action,	including	the	manner	in	which	it	relates	to	charter	schools,	to	highlight	what	has	been	done	and	what	is	left	to	analyze	on	the	research	questions	posed	in	this	study.		 The	literature	addressing	the	state	action	doctrine	generally	is	extensive	and	reflects	the	confusion	over	the	various	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	on	the	issue	of	public	versus	private	action.	Chemerinsky	divides	state	action	decisions	into	two	broad	categories:	public	function	and	entanglement.157	Nearly	all	writers	agree	on	the	public	function	category	and	find	it	very	limited	following	the	additional	requirement	that	the	
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156	P.R.B.A.	Corp.	v.	HMS	Host	Toll	Roads,	808	F.3d	221	(3d	Cir.	2015).	
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function	be	an	exclusively	governmental	function.158	Nowak	and	Rotunda159	add	another	category	involving	government	coercion	or	encouragement.	One	author	has	gone	so	far	as	to	suggest	that	the	entire	concept	needs	to	be	scrapped	in	favor	of	a	simpler	analysis160	as	it	relates	to	charter	schools.	Martin	completed	a	lengthy	study	examining	the	challenges	to	the	existence	of	charter	schools	in	both	federal	and	state	courts	but	didn’t	address	the	status	of	charters	in	those	courts	beyond	their	right	to	exist.161			 Isolation	of	a	single	case	for	analysis	does	not	provide	a	broad	understanding	of	the	trends	and	tendencies	of	the	Court	over	a	long	history	of	development	of	a	particular	legal	doctrine.	Also,	looking	at	winners	versus	losers	fails	to	draw	nuance	from	decisions	that	have	shaped	a	doctrine.	Facts	require	a	detailed	analysis	to	draw	from	them	underlying	reasons	for	the	Court	to	decide	a	case	and	limit	it	to	those	facts.		 Other	scholars	have	more	directly	addressed	the	state	action	question	but	not	exhaustively.	A	study	early	in	the	charter	school	era	briefly	analyzed	the	state	actor	status	of	charter	schools	and	the	public	function	test	but	came	to	no	conclusion	about	how	that	might	result	in	a	finding	of	state	action	in	the	charter	school	realm.	No	distinction	is	made	in	that	article	as	to	the	possible	difference	between	student	rights	
																																								 																				
158	Jackson	v.	Metropolitan	Edison,	419	U.S.	at	544;Flagg	Brothers	v.	Brooks,	436	U.S.	149	
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and	employee	rights	in	the	state	action	context.162	Another	early	note	focused	on	Fourteenth	Amendment	challenges	to	the	existence	of	charter	schools	addressed	a	single	case	and	came	to	no	conclusion	about	the	question	of	state	action	for	charters.163		 The	first	study	directly	addressing	the	issue	of	state	action	for	charter	schools	is	one	that	carefully	examines	the	history	of	the	doctrine	and	the	characteristics	of	charter	schools	(with	a	focus	on	Texas	school	law)	but	fails	to	consider	that	there	might	be	a	difference	in	how	student	claims	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	might	differ	from	those	of	employees	seeking	to	enforce	rights.	Central	to	this	study	is	the	premise	that	those	two	situations	under	the	sort	of	analysis	applied	by	the	Supreme	Court	may	very	well	move	in	different	legal	directions.164		 		 	There	is	a	line	of	scholarship	that	emphasizes	the	limitations	inherent	to	the	constitutional	structure	of	identifying	rights	that	are	declared	to	be	in	existence	for	all	and	barring	the	government	from	interfering	with	those	rights.	Bhagwat165	argues	that	because	the	rights	stated	in	the	Bill	of	Rights	are	stated	only	to	be	free	from	governmental	interference	they	are	not	actually	individual	rights	assured	by	the	Constitution.	They	are	subject	to	being	impaired	or	ignored	by	private	action	and	thus	are	not	accurately	described	as	rights.		Even	the	oft	cited	right	of	free	speech	is	not	protected	against	private	invasion.	A	private	employer	may	fire	at	will	an	employee	
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based	on	disagreement	with	the	words	spoken	by	that	employee.	Government	employees	do	not	enjoy	unfettered	freedom	of	speech	but	there	is	some	protection	for	certain	types	of	speech	not	enjoyed	by	privately	employed	individuals.166	The	basic	mistrust	of	government	reflected	in	this	approach	to	the	Constitution	is	one	part	of	the	present	day	dismantling	of	public	institutions,	including	schools,	into	private	control.	Along	with	that	change,	rights	are	left	back	to	wither	for	lack	of	any	basis	for	enforcement.		 Perhaps	the	most	quoted	characterization	of	the	state	action	doctrine	in	the	literature	is	that	of	Professor	Black	saying	that	it	“is	a	conceptual	disaster	area”167	citing	“its	multiple	vaguenesses	and	ambiguities”168	and	calling	it	“a	map	whose	every	country	is	marked	incognita.”169	His	analysis	in	1967	even	foreshadowed	the	retraction	of	the	
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doctrine	he	asserts	was	extended	to	address	racial	discrimination	far	more	broadly	than	it	could	be	sustained	in	other	cases.			 A	serious	consideration	in	the	matter	of	the	interpretation	of	Court	decisions	is	found	in	the	division	of	perspectives	on	the	law	between	what	Tushnet170	calls	progressive	constitutionalism	and	what	defaults	to	conservative	constitutionalism.	Often	the	divide	is	labeled	in	terms	of	Justices	who	are	liberal	versus	those	who	are	conservative.	The	current	balance	between	the	two	on	the	Court	has	created	much	tension	over	certain	major	issues	that	will	come	before	it	and	the	questions	surrounding	charter	schools	are	a	part	of	that	tension.	The	late	Justice	Scalia	was	the	most	eloquent,	and	probably	the	most	vocal,	advocate	for	the	conservative	perspective	asserting	that	the	Court	should	“ascertain	an	objective	law”171	without	consideration	of	societal	pressures.	Those	labeled	as	progressive	constitutionalists	or	liberals172	would	interpret	the	Constitution	as	a	developing	document	that	reaches	well	beyond	the	direct	language	and	is	not	subject	to	a	single	correct	interpretation.	Those	divides	play	an	important	role	in	predicting	how	the	Court	may	handle	a	set	of	facts	before	it.		 Many	scholars	have	attempted	to	define	categories	into	which	the	state	action	decisions	might	fit.	The	Court	itself	has	used	several	labels	to	match	the	arguments	in	any	given	case	leading	to	a	long	list	of	terms	describing	the	basis	for	a	given	decision.	Those	categories	can	serve	to	organize	decisions	but	because	the	Court	has	limited	the	
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effect	of	many	decisions	to	the	unique	facts	of	that	case	and	repeated	that	a	close	study	of	the	facts	is	required	in	each	case	there	are	limits	to	the	usefulness	of	categories.	Still,	there	are	some	useful	perspectives	in	what	has	been	published.	Professor	Black’s	report	of	the	1966	Supreme	Court	term	identifies	state	action	as	“the	single	most	important	problem	in	American	law”173	and	his	famous	“conceptual	disaster	area”174	characterization	so	often	quoted.	He	expresses	his	belief	that	the	state	action	doctrine	needs	to	be	broadly	interpreted	because	it	is	primarily	a	remedy	to	racial	discrimination	and	disadvantage.	He	discusses	the	position	that	state	inaction	is	often	a	source	of	damage	to	rights,	specifically	equal	protection,	and	should	be	recognized	as	state	action	in	violation	of	rights.		 Long	discussion	of	Reitman	v.	Mulkey175	followed	by	a	discussion	of	how	uncertain	the	decisions	leave	the	field.	He	argues	that	the	uncertainty	protects	discriminators.	He	cites	current	scholarship	on	the	doctrine	to	be	summary	in	nature	and	non-controversial.	He	points	out	that	a	few	writers	are	calling	for	eliminating	the	state	action	doctrine	all	together.	State	neutrality	is	impossible	and	whether	by	action	or	inaction	of	the	state	one	race	is	discriminated	against	or	disadvantaged	there	is	a	denial	of	equal	protection	and	that	should	end	the	inquiry.		 He	really	argues	that	the	state	action	doctrine	has	been	so	narrowly	interpreted	as	to	vitiate	the	equal	protection	clause.	He	accepts	that	private	decisions	in	private	
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places	are	not	within	the	ambit	of	the	fourteenth	amendment	but	no	analysis	should	be	needed	to	determine	some	mystical	amount	of	state	involvement	elsewhere.	The	Court	has	focused	on	the	“significance”	of	the	state	involvement	and	that	has	led	to	the	mess	that	the	field	is	in.		 Choper	expressed	his	thoughts	on	the	doctrine	in	mere	observations	after	stating	that	he	would	not	attempt	any	sort	of	comprehensive	solution	to	the	issue.	The	Civil	Rights	Acts	of	1866	and	1964	largely	addressed	private	racial	discrimination	issues	and	the	latter	removed	them	from	most	of	the	state	action	cases.		 Glennon	and	Nowak176	bemoan	the	deconstruction	of	the	state	action	doctrine	by	the	Court	in	1975	cases	that	pushed	most	racial	claims	onto	the	Thirteenth	Amendment	that	has	no	state	action	requirement.	That	left	other	claims	to	survive	a	state	action	analysis	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	a	series	of	cases	that	has	been	already	described	as	lacking	a	consistency.	In	fact,	they	claim	that	the	Court	had	brought	to	an	“end	any	possibility	of	a	meaningful	role	for	formal	state	action	tests.”177	Undaunted,	they	proceed	with	an	analysis	of	the	cases	first	dividing	them	into	cases	of	“official	government	action”178	and	those	not	involving	such	action.	In	the	first	instance,	there	is	little	to	decide	other	than	whether	the	official	action	is	allowable.	They	argue	that	in	the	second	instance	there	still	remains	only	the	single	question	of	whether	the	action	is	proscribed	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	That	is,	the	determination	is	not	
																																								 																				
176	ROBERT	J.	GLENNON,	JR.	&	JOHN	E.	NOWAK,	A	Functional	Analysis	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	"State	
Action"	Requirement,	1976	THE	SUPREME	COURT	REVIEW	221(1976).	
177	Id.	at	224.	
178	Id.	at	228.	
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“whether	a	state	has	‘acted,’	but	whether	a	state	has	‘deprived’	someone	of	a	guaranteed	right.”179	A	state	that	has	deprived	one	of	a	right	by	inaction	in	the	face	of	a	private	act	is	therefore	as	guilty	of	state	action	as	a	state	that	has	legislated	that	deprivation.	The	determination	boils	down	to	a	balancing	of	the	interests	of	the	private	actor	and	the	private	person	who	has	suffered	the	deprivation	of	a	right	by	deciding	whether	the	value	of	the	right	for	which	protection	is	sought	exceeds	the	value	of	the	complained	of	act	or	practice.	If	it	does	then	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	bars	the	complained	of	act	or	practice.		 The	balance	test	is	evident	in	what	are	generally	labelled	as	the	public	function	cases.	In	those	cases,	the	property	rights	of	one	individual	are	weighed	against	the	First	Amendment	rights	of	another.	Where	the	limitation	of	property	rights	is	reasonably	found	to	be	a	lesser	evil	than	the	limitation	of	First	Amendment	rights	the	latter	prevailed.	As	in	the	shopping	mall	case	decided	in	favor	of	the	property	rights	the	court	balanced	the	ability	of	the	individuals	seeking	to	pass	out	pamphlets	just	outside	the	shopping	mall	on	public	streets	and	sidewalks	to	be	an	adequate	protection	of	their	First	Amendment	rights	thus	allowing	the	property	rights	to	prevail.		 Nowak	and	Rotunda180	approach	the	factors	used	by	the	Court	to	find	state	action	by	first	segregating	out	the	public	function	analysis	as	sui	generis.	They	cite	the	various	instances	of	the	use	of	that	factor	from	the	original	white	primary	cases	[Nixon	v.	Condon,	Grovey,	Smith	v.	Allwright	and	Terry	v.	Adams]	to	the	company	town	and	
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city	parks	of	Marsh	and	Evans,	to	the	more	contemporary	cases	involving	shopping	centers	and	eventually	public	utilities	and	jury	selection	cases.		 Direct	state	involvement	in	ordering	or	encouraging	behaviors	is	the	next	factor	examined	by	Nowak	and	Rotunda.	This	category	appeared	often	in	the	Civil	Rights	era	of	the	mid-twentieth	century	involving	remaining	laws	or	customs	of	segregation	that	influenced	private	parties	to	discriminate	illegally	against	African-American	individuals.	It	also	encompasses	enforcement	of	discriminatory	contractual	arrangements	in	state	courts	as	in	Shelly	v.	Kraemer.181	Policemen	who	killed	a	prisoner	while	in	custody	were	found	to	be	state	actors	despite	the	illegality	of	their	actions	because	they	were	given	power	as	policemen	by	the	state.182	This	factor	also	covers	the	creditor	cases	in	which	various	collection	efforts	resulted	in	some	legal	enforcement	of	or	enablement	of	a	property	right	violation.183		 The	question	of	entanglement,	entwinement	and	symbiotic	relationships	fall	within	another	category	according	to	Nowak	and	Rotunda.	This	category	includes	issues	of	government	granted	licenses	and	preferences,	heavy	involvement	in	the	form	of	support,	regulation,	participation	by	government	employees	in	an	organization	and	even	lack	of	government	action	when	it	is	alleged	the	government	should	act.	Benefits	received	by	the	private	parties	are	examined	as	well	as	benefits	to	the	public	as	connections	sufficient	to	find	state	action.	School	desegregation	cases	fall	within	this	
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category	based	on	the	Court’s	consistent	reliance	on	de	jure	segregation	and	refusal	to	accept	as	state	action	de	facto	segregation.	That	line	of	cases	culminated	in	the	Kansas	City,	Missouri,	decision	refusing	to	allow	a	remedy	that	reached	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	Kansas	City	school	district	because	the	outlying	districts	had	no	history	of	de	jure	segregation.184		 Tribe185	looks	differently	at	the	question	of	how	the	Court	decides	the	cases	and	sees	that	the	chaos	that	is	the	accumulation	of	holdings	may	define	a	negative	order	or	what	he	calls	an	“’anti-doctrine’”186	He	suggests	that	a	more	rational	approach	to	the	analysis	of	state	action	decisions	and	the	issues	raised	in	them	would	be	to	start	with	the	right	being	infringed.	He	argues	that	a	well-defined	concept	of	liberty	that	all	citizens	should	be	expected	to	enjoy	would	define	the	limits	of	governmental	action	whether	affirmatively	undertaken	or	accomplished	through	inaction	in	the	face	of	private	infringement.	He	analyzes	the	existing	cases	and	for	many,	his	approach	seems	to	hold	true	despite	not	receiving	the	Court’s	recognition.	He	asserts	that	the	confusion	in	the	doctrine	is	that	the	Court	has	not	consistently	followed	a	particular	analysis	and	moves	from	his	liberty	concept	to	analysis	of	identity	of	the	actor	as	government	or	not	and	that	leaves	the	field	inconsistently	decided.		 Quite	a	different	approach	to	the	cases	is	developed	by	Choper187	in	his	perspective	of	the	doctrine	as	a	distribution	of	power	rather	than	a	protector	of	liberty.	
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185	LAURENCE	H.	TRIBE,	AMERICAN	CONSTITUTIONAL	LAW	(The	Foundation	Press		1978).	
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He	suggests	that	the	doctrine	merely	limits	the	power	of	the	national	government	as	against	the	states.	The	action	of	the	alleged	infringer	of	rights	is	not	examined	for	a	liberty	or	right	to	act	in	the	fashion	complained	of	but	the	question	is	the	power	of	the	national	government	to	exert	power	over	the	state	or	the	individual	involved.	Writing	in	the	era	after	most	of	the	racial	discrimination	cases	had	been	resolved	by	statutory	prohibition	even	in	the	states	the	question	of	state	action	no	longer	was	entirely	about	resolving	the	lingering	effects	of	slavery.	He	acknowledges	the	growing	position	that	all	action	amounts	to	state	action	in	situations	where	the	state	has	power	to	act	–	whether	it	does	or	does	not.	That	is,	state	courts	or	officials	are	generally	able	to	limit	acts	of	their	citizens	and	their	failure	to	limit	one	infringing	another’s	rights	amounts	to	state	action	subjecting	the	state	to	national	authority.		 What	derives	from	that	view	of	state	action	is	a	disconnect	between	the	equal	protection	analysis	and	the	other	constitutional	rights	of	free	speech	and	religion,	and	procedural	due	process.	Equal	protection	jurisprudence	has	developed	a	requirement	that	the	actions	infringing	the	rights	must	be	committed	with	a	discriminatory	motive	and	if	the	state	is	to	be	involved,	the	state’s	action	has	to	be	so	motivated.	An	independent	judge,	admittedly	a	state	actor,	by	merely	allowing	an	attorney	in	a	case	to	strike	jurors	with	a	discriminatory	impetus	could	not	be	found	to	violate	equal	protection.	Thus,	the	inquiry	needs	to	focus	on	the	actual	actor	rather	than	the	acquiescing	state	to	find	a	need	for	a	remedy	even	if	there	is	no	discriminatory	motive	on	the	part	of	the	state.	He	supports	the	Glennon	and	Nowak	position	on	this.		 Many	writers	divide	the	development	of	the	doctrine	into	eras	of	the	Court.	Just	as	Nowak	and	Rotunda	drew	the	1980s	and	1990s	as	a	line	of	demarcation	in	the	
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development	of	the	doctrine,	most	writers	have	set	apart	the	mid	twentieth	century	as	a	time	of	expansion	of	the	doctrine.188	The	expansion	seemed	to	end	with	the	cases	dealing	with	shopping	centers	as	the	best	illustration	of	the	departure	from	freer	findings	of	state	action.189			 Just	as	there	are	writers	attempting	to	draw	identifiable	categories	of	tests	for	state	action	from	the	confusion	of	decisions	of	the	Court,	there	are	many	who	call	for	greater	clarity	from	the	Court.	After	listing	the	seven	tests190	appearing	in	the	opinions	of	the	Court	one	writer	focuses	on	the	confusion	created	for	Circuit	Courts	to	decide	state	action	cases	and	calls	for	a	clarifying	decision	from	the	Supreme	Court	to	“declutter”	the	doctrine.191	Another	writer	suggests	that	with	increasing	privatization	a	new	approach	is	called	for	that	looks	at	delegation	of	government	power	and	adequacy	of	remedies	for	constitutional	infringements.192	 	
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Chapter	3	Methodology	Traditional	legal	research	is	not	classified	as	qualitative	or	quantitative	but	is	an	interpretive	process	that	systematically	investigates	legal	authorities	and	commentaries.193	The	process	requires	finding	applicable	law	and	commentary	and	making	meaning	from	the	combined	material	that	informs	the	question.	Lawyers	research	to	understand	the	law	while	education	researchers	more	often	examine	the	wider	consequences	to	influence	policy	and	practice	and	raise	issues	that	legal	decisions	may	create	for	the	future.194	This	study	is	a	blend	of	the	two	as	the	questions	serve	to	understand	the	law	and	also	to	inform	policymakers	and	influencers	by	building	understanding	of	the	topic.	This	study	is	based	on	a	legal	principle	in	constitutional	law	and	is	thus	a	study	of	the	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	that	developed	that	principle.	Some	Circuit	Courts	of	Appeals	have	also	handed	down	opinions	since	the	last	Supreme	Court	case	and	those	can	be	informative	even	if	they	are	not	precedential	when	the	Court	takes	a	case	under	consideration.	Law	review	articles	and	hornbooks	provide	additional	understanding	and	perspectives	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	possible	direction	of	the	Court	when	this	issue	arrives	before	it.	This	study	will	also	examine	something	of	the	larger	political	context	surrounding	the	Court	to	understand	how	the	law	changes	over	time.	
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To	study	the	law	one	must	first	understand	how	it	is	shaped	and	created	in	the	legal	system	of	the	United	States.	The	starting	point	of	law	in	the	United	States	is	the	Constitution	–	the	foundational	document	upon	which	the	nation	was	built.	All	other	law	and	action	must	not	violate	the	principles	in	the	Constitution	and	no	court	or	legislature	can	ignore	its	mandates.	Likewise,	the	power	of	the	federal	government	is	limited	to	the	powers	and	authority	granted	to	it	in	the	Constitution.195	The	Supreme	Court	is	tasked	with	the	responsibility	to	interpret	the	Constitution	to	determine	if	laws	or	behavior	have	fallen	outside	of	its	principles	and	in	doing	so	its	decisions	essentially	create	of	the	body	of	constitutional	law.	To	conduct	legal	research	is	to	find	the	sources	of	that	law	and	the	interpretation	of	those	sources	to	see	how	those	fit	together	to	predict	a	result	in	future	disputes.	When	researching	questions	of	constitutional	law	such	as	the	state	action	doctrine	for	this	study	it	is	best	to	start	with	the	Constitution	and	then	follow	the	development	of	the	doctrine	through	time	to	the	present.	Because	courts	are	bound	by	the	principle	of	
stare	decisis196	to	make	decisions	based	on	prior	decisions	of	the	same	court	or	higher	courts	there	is	a	progression	of	decisions	that	shed	light	on	an	issue	that	has	been	litigated	in	several	contexts	under	several	different	fact	situations.	The	declared	
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196	The	principle	of	stare	decisis	means	that	given	the	same	fact	situation	the	court	is	bound	to	make	
the	same	decision.	Of	course,	seldom	are	two	identical	fact	situations	before	the	court	separately	so	
new	fact	situations	may	logically	lead	to	a	different	result	if	warranted	but	the	court	must	provide	
some	rationale	for	the	new	direction.	
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principle	of	stare	decisis	does	not	mean	that	the	Court	always	follows	a	syllogistic	pathway	to	a	decision.	When	the	decisions	of	the	Court	are	not	clear	with	definitions	and	do	not	create	concrete	tests,	there	is	room	for	interpretation	in	each	new	case.	Because	the	state	action	doctrine	has	been	built	on	terms	that	lack	clear	definition	it	is	important	to	follow	the	path	of	decisions	through	time	to	understand	its	development.		 Under	the	principle	of	stare	decisis	the	same	fact	situation	presented	in	a	dispute	should	yield	the	same	decision.	If	the	Court	finds	a	way	to	factually	distinguish	a	new	case	it	may	elect	to	proceed	in	a	new	direction	and	nearly	every	case	can	be	in	some	way	distinguished	from	a	previous	one.	The	Court	is	free	to	create	a	well-defined	test	that	applies	broadly	across	all	cases	in	some	way	similar	but	it	is	also	free	to	make	the	holding	dependent	on	the	unique	set	of	facts	of	a	case	before	it	limiting	the	precedential	value	of	that	holding.	When	tests	are	applied,	but	limited	to	a	given	fact	situation	it	becomes	more	difficult	to	rely	on	that	principle	in	future	cases	with	even	slightly	different	facts.	As	will	be	seen	in	this	study	the	state	action	doctrine	has	generated	several	loosely	defined	tests	with	limited	application	and	discerning	a	thread	running	through	the	cases	is	less	than	obvious.	Professor	Black	opines	that	“the	whole	thing	has	the	flavor	of	a	torchless	search	for	a	way	out	of	a	damp	echoing	cave.”197		 Not	all	scholars	or	even	Justices	believe	stare	decisis	is	the	primary	force	behind	decisions	made	by	the	Court.	The	late	Justice	Scalia	criticized	the	majority	in	his	dissent	in	Planned	Parenthood	v.	Casey	saying,	“The	Court’s	reliance	upon	stare	decisis	can	best	
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be	described	as	contrived.”198	He	decried	the	Court’s	consideration	of	what	he	believed	to	be	political	pressure	on	the	topic	of	abortion	in	that	decision.	The	majority	included	in	its	opinion	its	belief	that	to	reverse	the	longstanding	decision	in	Roe	v.	Wade199	would	place	the	Court	in	a	bad	public	light	and	serve	to	make	it	and	illegitimate	institution.	Scalia	retorts	that	both	sides	of	the	argument	have	been	subjected	to	“political	pressure”200	on	the	topic	of	abortion.	Without	examining	the	surrounding	pressures	and	positions	one	cannot	expect	stare	decisis	to	carry	the	day	in	all	cases.	By	considering	the	various	influences	and	perspectives	over	the	course	of	time	an	arc	of	decisions	can	be	drawn	from	what	seem	to	be	inconsistent	decisions.	No	single	case	or	decision	or	holding	can	be	relied	upon	individually	to	predict	the	next	steps	the	Court	will	take.	The	law	is	a	whole	and	knit	together	sometimes	precariously	but	always	with	ties	that	make	it	into	a	conjoined	whole.	It	is	prudent	to	explain	here	that	there	are	times	when	precedent	is	abandoned	and	a	totally	new	direction	is	taken	by	the	Court.	Such	was	the	case	when	the	holding	of	Plessy	v.	Ferguson201	was	abandoned	and	the	
Brown	v.	Board	of	Education202	decision	was	reached	just	over	50	years	ago.	That	is	not	subtly	accomplished,	however,	and	with	a	single	exception203	there	is	no	direct	refutation	of	previous	law	in	the	development	of	the	state	action	doctrine.	
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	 Sources	of	legal	research	are	divided	into	primary	sources,	secondary	sources,	and	publications	that	assist	in	locating	those	sources.	Primary	sources	fall	within	a	hierarchy	that	determines	which	law	will	control	in	certain	circumstances.	At	the	top	of	that	hierarchy	is	the	U.S.	Constitution.	It	is	the	supreme	law	of	the	land	for	those	matters	covered	by	its	terms.	It	is	a	self-limiting	document	that	acknowledges	that	all	matters	not	covered	by	it	are	left	to	the	states	or	other	bodies	to	establish	the	law.	Beneath	the	Constitution	there	is	legislation	of	all	sorts,	federal,	state	or	local,	that	spells	out	issues	of	concern	for	those	levels	of	government	and	creates	the	system	of	understandings	for	criminal	behavior,	commercial	relationships,	marital	and	family	matters	and	property	issues	among	many	other	topics.	Those	statutes	are	primary	sources	for	the	issues	they	cover	but	remain	subject	to	the	limits	of	the	Constitution	where	it	applies.	Regulatory	mandates	are	creatures	of	statutes	and	control	how	statutes	are	implemented	in	appropriate	ways.		Running	parallel	to	the	statutory	sources	there	are	courts	interpreting	statutes	and	the	Constitution	serving	as	additional	primary	sources.	When	a	case	or	controversy	is	put	before	the	court	a	decision	is	made.	That	decision	may	be	appealed	to	a	higher	court	until	it	reaches	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	(in	an	appropriate	case).	Each	court	issues	some	sort	of	written	decision	and	in	the	appellate	courts	those	are	accompanied	by	an	opinion	explaining	the	court’s	thinking	in	coming	to	that	decision.	Those	opinions	are	also	primary	sources	since	they	have	the	power	of	law	and	set	how	a	statute	or	constitutional	provision	must	be	interpreted	into	the	future	unless	overruled	by	a	higher	court	or	reversed	by	that	same	court.		 Secondary	sources	include	the	many	hornbooks,	articles,	notes	and	
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commentaries	on	the	law	by	scholars	and	other	writers	attempting	to	explain,	influence,	denounce,	or	advocate	for	a	change	in	the	law.	Some	secondary	sources	are	directed	to	specific	audiences	to	explain	the	law	in	an	area	of	practice	that	concerns	that	audience.	Others	are	part	of	the	scholarly	discussion	of	the	law	and	how	it	can	best	be	interpreted	or	decided.	The	range	of	topics	is	significant	but	only	a	small	portion	of	the	literature	has	the	effect	of	changing	how	courts	look	at	the	law	and	decide	cases.	These	sources	are	an	excellent	way	to	understand	how	other	scholars	and	practitioners	structure	their	analysis	of	what	the	courts	have	said	in	their	opinions	and	thus	can	shed	additional	light	on	a	given	topic.		 This	study	is	mainly	focused	on	the	primary	sources	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	and	the	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	because	the	requirement	of	state	action	is	directly	drawn	from	those	two	sources.	No	other	court	and	certainly	no	legislative	body	can	alter	the	course	of	the	state	action	doctrine.	Secondary	sources	specifically	addressing	the	state	action	doctrine	including	how	it	relates	to	charter	schools	were	also	helpful	in	developing	an	understanding	of	the	doctrine	but	the	conclusions	of	this	study	must	be	drawn	from	those	primary	sources	and	must	be	apparent	within	them	in	order	to	be	valid.		 To	locate	opinions	of	the	Court	is	accomplished	in	the	age	of	computers	and	online	decisions	by	searching	a	database	of	opinions	using	search	terms	and	pursuing	those	cases	that	are	most	relevant.	This	study	used	the	two	widely	accepted	resources	
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of	Lexis-Nexis	Academic	File204	and	HeinOnline205	to	conduct	a	search	for	terms	like	“charter	school”	and	“state	action”	to	identify	cases	that	addressed	the	issues	relevant	to	the	questions.	Once	an	initial	group	of	cases	is	established	legal	research	offers	two	other	major	avenues	to	find	additional	sources	of	investigation.		 In	each	court	opinion	the	Court	cites	other	decisions	it	has	made	or	those	of	other	courts	it	finds	instructive	on	a	particular	issue	or	that	were	cited	in	briefs	or	arguments	of	the	parties.	Those	citations,	found	relevant	by	the	Court,	are	the	next	line	of	inquiry	to	find	additional	decisions	that	will	shed	light	on	the	issues.	Another	source	of	related	cases	is	found	by	using	the	resource	commonly	referred	to	as	Shepherd’s	that	is	a	listing	of	all	court	opinions	that	cite	a	particular	case	and	whether	the	court	agreed	with	it,	distinguished	it,	upheld	it,	reversed	it	or	disagreed	with	it.	That	resource	is	found	within	the	previously	named	electronic	services.	Those	cases	are	consulted	to	find	additional	legal	reasoning	related	to	the	initial	search	cases.	Not	all	cases	thus	discovered	are	appropriate	for	use	in	the	study	so	the	next	stage	is	to	eliminate	those	only	peripherally	related	or	those	with	the	searched	terms	but	for	one	reason	or	another	do	not	actually	address	those	issues	directly.	Likewise,	dissenting	opinions	or	concurring	opinions	that	lack	a	majority	support	on	the	Court	cannot	be	considered	precedential	for	later	cases.	The	thoughts	of	a	Justice	in	dissent	may	be	considered	to	understand	a	point	made	by	the	majority	and,	on	occasion,	point	the	way	for	a	later	decision	by	the	Court	in	a	changing	environment.	
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	 In	addition	to	cases	the	body	of	legal	literature	published	by	scholars	providing	their	interpretation	of	specific	areas	of	the	law	can	also	lead	to	additional	sources.	Some	are	books	and	others	are	legal	journals	and	other	scholarly	publications.	Both	online	sources	also	include	those	articles	so	the	same	search	process	yields	literature	in	which	scholars	have	analyzed	the	legal	principles	at	issue.	They	are	not	binding	on	any	court	nor	are	they	law	but	they	can	be	instructive	in	interpreting	the	issues	and	providing	additional	perspectives	on	the	Court’s	decision-making	process	on	a	given	topic	or	case.		 Gathering	the	cases	and	scholarly	literature	provides	the	data	upon	which	an	analysis	will	be	made	and	that	analysis	is	a	specialized	sort	of	interpretive	exercise	seeking	to	understand	and	perhaps	predict	the	course	of	the	legal	principle	in	question.	This	study	seeks	to	answer	questions	that	are	not	yet	answered	directly	by	the	Supreme	Court	and	the	existing	case	law	does	not	always	follow	a	set	of	persistent	rules	or	tests	that	yield	predictable	results.	A	study	of	this	sort	requires	the	construction	of	meaning	from	the	cases	that	help	understand	the	direction	the	Court	is	taking	and	how	it	might	decide	future	cases	more	nearly	on	point	with	the	research	questions.	A	study	of	the	changing	decisions	on	state	action	over	time	will	serve	as	the	method	of	answering	the	legal	questions	at	issue	in	this	study.		 What	is	required	to	make	meaning	in	such	cases	is	to	find	the	threads	that	run	throughout	a	series	of	related	cases	and	to	locate	the	similarities	as	well	as	the	disparities.	Fact	situations	and	circumstances	that	have	yielded	different	results	must	be	closely	read	to	link	them	together	into	a	whole	to	understand	how	the	Court	might	proceed.	It	is	important	to	factor	into	the	analysis	is	the	makeup	of	the	Court	at	a	given	time.	Different	Justices	approach	the	Constitution	from	different	perspectives	and	as	the	
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Court	changes	personnel	those	different	perspectives	move	from	a	majority	to	a	minority	causing	shifts	in	the	general	direction	of	the	Court.	By	studying	those	shifts	over	time	an	arc	of	decisions	can	be	detected	that	leads	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	state	action	doctrine	today.		 	
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Chapter	4	The	Arc	of	State	Action	in	the	Supreme	Court	
Theoretical	underpinning	of	this	analysis		 The	traditional	legal	analysis	for	this	study	will	be	from	the	legal	realist	perspective.	To	define	that	requires	a	comparison	to	two	other	categories	of	analysis.	The	formalist	viewpoint	assumes	that	there	is	a	“correct”	decision	that	is	made	apparent	by	the	review	and	understanding	of	existing	case	law.	It	begins	with	the	expectation	that	a	group	of	judges,	looking	at	the	same	facts,	will	consult	the	same	cases	and	eventually	come	to	the	same	conclusion.	Of	course,	were	that	truly	the	case	there	would	be	no	split	decisions	on	the	Supreme	Court	so	that	perspective	has	been	quite	effectively	criticized.	The	other	end	of	the	scale	is	the	radical	skeptical	analysis	and	it	begins	from	the	position	that	there	is	support	for	any	decision	in	any	fact	situation	if	one	puts	together	the	case	argument	that	supports	that	position.	The	radical	skeptical	analysis	assumes	that	judges	decide	the	outcome	they	want	and	then	construct	the	argument	based	on	prior	opinions	to	support	their	preferred	decision.	The	legal	realist	perspective	falls	between	those	two	polar	opposites.206			 Legal	realism	accepts	the	insertion	of	political	positions	by	judges	making	decisions	but	assumes	some	constraint	inherent	in	prior	opinions.	There	is	a	narrower	range	of	available	outcomes	because	of	the	existing	law	that	has	created	those	limits.	The	realist	will	not	simply	choose	a	result	but	will	look	for	support	for	the	political	
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result	that	best	fits	with	the	preferred	result.	Recent	discussions	of	judicial	decision-making	have	widely	accepted	that	the	judiciary	are	not	able	to	eliminate	their	pre-existing	political	biases	and	will	in	some	way	include	those	in	the	selection	of	a	result	and	a	line	of	cases	to	support	that	result.	For	that	reason,	this	analysis	will	follow	that	line	of	thinking	to	trace	the	state	action	doctrine	to	understand	existing	jurisprudence	on	the	issue.	In	the	next	chapter	that	jurisprudence	will	be	applied	to	the	relationship	of	charter	schools	to	teachers	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	Because	the	Court	changes	over	time	the	political	and	philosophical	perspective	of	the	Court	changes	leading	to	pathways	for	various	areas	of	the	law	to	wind	and	turn	rather	than	follow	a	straight	path	as	might	be	suggested	by	stare	decisis	or	the	formalist	approach.	Despite	the	argument	by	formalists	that	the	law	remains	constant	following	a	syllogistic	path	of	interpretation	it	is	the	thesis	of	this	study	that	the	path	changes	with	both	political	influence	and	personal	preferences	and	philosophies	of	those	who	serve	on	the	Court.	That	thesis	is	supported	by	distinguished	jurists	including	Judge	Richard	Posner	in	his	work	explaining	judicial	decision-making.207	The	history	of	Court	decisions	in	state	action	cases	demonstrates	quite	a	winding	pathway	and	this	study	will	follow	that	changing	body	of	law	to	understand	where	it	is	likely	to	take	charter	schools	in	their	relationship	to	teachers.		 The	hypothesis	of	this	study	is	that	the	arc	of	decisions	on	state	action	by	the	Court	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	charter	school	personnel	decisions	where	the	charter	school	employer	is	not	the	state	or	school	district	will	likely	be	held	not	to	be	state	
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action	and	subject	to	constitutional	scrutiny.	As	a	cautionary	addendum	to	that	hypothesis	it	must	be	noted	that	at	the	time	of	the	writing	of	this	study	the	Court	is	incomplete	with	eight	sitting	Justices.	Those	on	the	Court	are	evenly	divided	from	a	philosophical	and	political	perspective	so	the	next	appointee	could	shift	the	Court	to	a	majority	with	a	different	perspective	than	it	has	demonstrated	recently	and	that	certainly	could	shift	the	way	charter	schools	are	viewed	as	state	actors	in	their	relationships	with	teachers	and	other	employees	but	a	major	shift	seems	quite	unlikely	given	the	recent	election	results.		 The	analysis	will	trace	the	precedents	through	from	the	passage	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	the	present	day	to	examine	how	the	Court	has	changed	its	analysis	of	the	state	action	issue.	Most	previous	studies	have	approached	this	analysis	using	the	so-called	categories	for	the	presence	of	state	action	labeled	by	the	Court	in	its	decisions	and	seemingly	exhaustively	listed	in	more	than	one	decision.208	The	difficulty	with	the	category	analysis	is	that	those	categories	are	inconsistent,	at	best,	and	in	most	cases	after	their	initial	application	are	distinguished	to	reach	a	decision	that	state	action	does	not	exist	later	cases.	
The	Arc	of	the	State	Action	Doctrine	 		 The	arc	of	the	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	on	state	action	issues	follows	a	pattern	established	largely	by	the	politically	important	issues	of	the	day	and	the	directions	demanded	by	the	dominant	political	powers.	Although	there	is	much	written	
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about	the	doctrine	trying	to	develop	a	coherent	line	of	decisions	from	the	various	labels	and	categories	cited	by	the	Court209	there	is	much	to	support	the	position	that	the	Court	reacts	to	political	context	and	political	demands	to	maintain	the	legitimacy	of	the	Court	and	reinforce	the	position	of	the	President	who	has	appointed	the	Justices.	A	majority	of	the	Court	at	any	given	time	serves	upon	nomination	by	a	President	no	longer	in	office	and	for	that	reason	the	political	leaning	of	the	Court	often	lags	behind	the	current	leadership	in	the	White	House	and	on	occasion	that	has	moved	a	Justice	well	outside	what	was	expected	at	the	time	of	appointment.	One	need	look	no	further	than	the	appointment	of	Earl	Warren	to	see	a	Justice	who	did	not	meet	the	expectations	of	President	Eisenhower	who	appointed	him.210	It	is	certainly	not	a	hard	and	fast	rule	that	the	Justices	position	themselves	in	accord	with	the	President	who	appoints	them	but	the	exceptions	to	that	are	certainly	in	the	minority.	No	less	an	authority	on	judicial	decision	making	than	Judge	Richard	Posner	has	asserted	that	especially	in	constitutional	cases	the	Supreme	Court	is	a	political	court	making	decisions	based	on	the	political	pressure	of	the	day.211	Although	skilled	at	citing	
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various	authorities	in	support	of	any	given	decision	and	distinguishing	others,	the	Court	has	followed	a	path	of	political	decisions	that	have	shaped	the	law	into	the	rather	convoluted	“disaster	area”212	famously	described	by	Professor	Black	prior	to	the	past	50	years	of	additional	twists	and	turns	to	the	jurisprudence	around	state	action.	Those	years	have	not	made	the	pathway	any	clearer	but	it	has	shed	some	light	on	the	particular	factors	that	seem	to	have	driven	the	Court	to	hold	for	and	against	the	litigants	seeking	to	apply	or	deny	the	state	action	applicability	in	their	own	cases.	This	analysis	will	begin	with	the	period	from	the	passage	of	the	Amendment	through	the	first	60	years	of	state	action	decisions.	During	this	period,	what	seems	apparently	state	action	was	tested	and	the	Court	dealt	also	with	the	balancing	of	rights	of	individuals	vis-à-vis	the	state.	The	second	period	of	analysis	will	consist	of	the	next	nearly	50	years	in	a	period	of	racial	tension	and	civil	rights	protests	raising	the	political	profile	of	those	issues	to	the	fore	moving	the	Court	to	address	those	issue	through	expansion	of	the	definition	of	state	action	doctrine.	The	following	30	years	began	a	retraction	of	much	of	what	the	Court	had	accomplished	previously	based	on	the	presidential	campaign	against	“judicial	activism”	that	rallied	Richard	Nixon	into	office	changing	the	face	of	the	Court	and	the	path	of	its	decisions	to	match	that	political	position.	The	modern	Court	has	not	addressed	the	issue	of	state	action	directly	and	offers	little	insight	to	its	inclination	but	based	on	the	makeup	of	the	Court	it	seems	the	trends	developed	earlier	will	continue.	These	periods	will	describe	an	arc	of	political	decisions	by	the	Court	on	state	action	that	will	send	charter	school	teachers	on	the	
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“torchless	search	for	a	way	out	of	a	damp	echoing	cave”213	as	Professor	Black	described	it	so	many	years	earlier.	In	the	final	chapter	I	will	look	at	how	charters	and	their	teachers	may	fare	given	the	current	path	of	state	action	and	provide	some	avenues	for	argument	that	charter	schools	be	found	to	be	state	actors.		
Establishment	of	the	state	action	requirement		 The	state	action	requirement	arises	from	the	language	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	directly	addressing	what	a	state	may	not	do	and	some	very	early	cases	deciding	the	constitutionality	of	an	act	of	Congress	under	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1875214	adopted	by	Congress	after	the	passage	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	These	cases	attempted	to	define	the	new	relationship	between	the	federal	government	and	the	states	following	the	Civil	War.	The	passage	of	the	Fourteenth	and	Fifteenth	Amendments	were	a	response	to	an	intransigent	South	to	establish	the	power	of	the	federal	government	to	protect	the	former	slaves	and	provide	some	way	to	avoid	both	the	fact	and	the	appearance	of	a	continuation	of	the	institution	of	slavery.	The	earliest	cases	then	dealt	with	the	extent	of	power	established	in	the	new	amendments	and	the	early	maneuvering	for	position	on	the	issues	was	apparent	when	Congress	passed	statutes	to	enforce	the	newly	declared	power	to	enforce	rights	and	quite	soon	they	were	challenged	in	court.	An	early	case	addressed	the	Enforcement	
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Act215	and	made	clear	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	merely	protected	citizens	from	action	by	the	states	to	infringe	their	rights	as	set	out	in	the	Constitution.		State	action	was	held	up	as	a	limitation	on	the	scope	of	the	amendment	allowing	individuals	to	deny	other’s	rights	with	impunity.	In	a	series	of	cases	known	as	the	Civil	
Rights	Cases216	the	Court	further	established	the	basic	rule	interpreting	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	holding	that	it	could	only	apply	to	state	action	and	not	to	individual	actions.	The	case	involved	a	federal	statute	prohibiting	individual	discrimination	in	various	public	settings	and	the	Court	struck	down	the	laws	in	the	absence	of	some	state	law	or	state	action.	Having	created	that	basic	limitation	on	the	extent	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	the	Court	created	many	extensions	beyond	that	initial	limitation	resulting	in	the	following	categories	allowing	the	amendment	to	reach	beyond	direct	state	action	and	state	actors.		 These	questions	of	federalism	would	shape	the	initial	state	action	doctrine	and	remain	an	influence	long	after	the	limitations	placed	on	the	federal	government	by	the	early	decisions	were	rejected	and	new	definitions	and	limitations	developed.	Before	ratification	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	the	Court	had	made	clear	that	the	rights	contained	in	the	Constitution	and	its	amendments	applied	only	to	restrain	the	federal	government	from	violation	of	those	rights.	States	were	free	to	create	rights	or	limitations	on	government	powers	as	each	saw	fit	without	interference	from	the	federal	
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courts	or	Congress217.	The	passage	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	asserted	federal	protection	of	certain	of	the	rights	contained	in	the	Constitution	as	against	the	state	authorities	leading	to	the	series	of	cases	defining	that	relationship.		 A	sharply	divided	Court	drew	initial	distinctions	between	United	States	citizenship	and	state	citizenship	and	limited	the	federal	reach	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	only	those	privileges	and	immunities	directly	related	to	the	Constitution	allowing	the	states	to	grant	special	privileges	for	a	large	area	to	a	single	corporation	to	control	animal	imports	and	slaughter	for	food218.	That	limitation	on	the	privileges	and	immunities	portion	of	the	amendment	remains	largely	intact	to	the	present219.	Cases	since	that	early	one	have	focused	on	the	equal	protection	clause	of	the	amendment.		 The	Court	drew	clear	distinctions	between	acts	of	the	state	and	acts	of	individuals	holding	that	the	federal	courts	could	not	enforce	an	act	of	Congress	that	barred	interference	by	an	individual	with	the	rights	of	another	individual.	Purely	individual	acts	were	held	not	to	be	within	the	reach	of	Congress	which	could	only	act	under	the	amendment	to	prevent	states	from	violating	certain	rights220.	In	a	pair	of	cases	deciding	whether	an	African	American	criminal	defendant	was	entitled	to	a	mixed	race	jury	the	Court	applied	a	narrow	reading	of	the	federal	removal	statute	holding	that	
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the	cause	for	removal	–	the	denial	of	rights	of	the	defendant	–	must	occur	before	trial	in	order	to	allow	for	removal.	Thus,	in	one	case	the	defendant	was	denied	relief	because	the	discrimination	was	based	on	the	judge’s	acts	during	trial221	while	the	other	defendant	making	the	same	claim	was	entitled	to	relief	because	the	law	of	West	Virginia	prohibited	African	Americans	from	serving	on	juries	so	that	discrimination	occurred	before	trial222.	Both	cases	acknowledged	that	acts	of	the	judiciary	branch	of	state	government	did	constitute	state	action.		 Perhaps	the	most	significant	early	decision	of	the	Court	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	is	in	a	group	of	cases	collectively	decided	as	The	Civil	Rights	Cases223.	The	five	cases	arose	out	of	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1875224	and	arrived	in	different	procedural	fashion	but	all	involved	the	denial	of	the	use	of	public	accommodations	of	one	sort	or	another	by	companies	or	individuals	operating	those	accommodations.	At	issue	was	the	constitutionality	of	the	act	of	Congress	in	regulating	individual	actions	discriminating	against	individuals	of	a	particular	race.	The	statute	declared	the	right	of	all	persons	to	enjoy	those	accommodations	without	regard	to	race,	color	or	previous	condition	of	servitude	and	then	made	it	a	criminal	act	for	any	person	to	deny	that	right.	The	claim	of	right	was	based	upon	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	the	Court	held	that	unless	the	statute	barred	state	discrimination	through	state	laws	it	violated	the	constitutional	limitation	set	out	in	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	Citing	the	Tenth	Amendment,	the	
																																								 																				
221	Virginia	v.	Rives,	100	U.S.	313	(1880).	
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223	Civil	Rights	Cases,	109	U.S.	3	(1883).	
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Court	notes	that	there	is	no	power	granted	in	the	Constitution	to	address	private	discrimination	and	thus	that	power	is	reserved	to	the	states	or	to	the	people.	Unless	the	“evil	or	wrong	actually	committed	rests	upon	some	State	law	or	State	authority	for	its	excuse	and	perpetration”225	Congress	was	without	power	to	address	the	acts	and	the	sole	recourse	would	lie	in	state	courts	–	an	unfriendly	venue	for	people	of	color.	The	decision	in	The	Civil	Rights	Cases	has	never	been	overturned	but	an	end	run	by	application	of	the	Fifteenth	Amendment	and	a	much	broader	interpretation	of	that	amendment’s	enforcement	power	has	allowed	what	the	decision	forbade.			 The	dissent	by	Justice	Harlan	in	The	Civil	Rights	Cases	foreshadows	the	public	function	category	of	the	state	action	doctrine.	Arguing	that	the	majority	had	ignored	the	intent	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	provide	authority	to	the	federal	government	to	protect	the	rights	of	all	persons	he	starts	by	calling	for	judicial	restraint	in	overturning	acts	of	the	legislative	branch.	He	then	presents	the	case	that	railroads,	inns,	and	public	amusements	bear	a	unique	relationship	with	the	public	because	their	property	is	used	for	public	purposes	and	thus,	in	his	opinion,	they	are	also	burdened	with	certain	public	requirements	including	providing	the	service	to	all	members	of	the	public	in	the	same	manner.	In	an	argument	setting	up	the	public	function	exception	that	would	develop	later	he	says	that	those	properties	used	for	public	purposes	“are	charged	with	duties	to	the	public,	and	are	amenable,	in	respect	of	their	duties	and	functions,	to	governmental	regulation.	…denial,	by	these	instrumentalities	of	the	State,	…	is	a	denial	by	the	State,	
																																								 																				
225	Civil	Rights	Cases,	109	U.S.	at	18.	
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within	the	meaning	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.”226	He	highlights	the	language	of	the	amendment	creating	a	national	and	state	citizenship	for	all	persons	and	based	upon	that	national	citizenship	he	argues	that	the	rights	granted	to	all	national	citizens	are	within	the	power	of	Congress	to	protect.	Those	rights	did	not	arise	from	the	states	and	thus	only	Congress	can	enforce	them.	Although	his	opinion	was	a	dissent	and	thus	not	precedential	it	provided	a	map	to	later	opinions.	
The	early	years		 The	Court	faced	questions	about	the	reach	of	the	state	action	doctrine	during	this	initial	period	and	did	begin	to	define	how	states	might	be	limited	under	the	new	amendments.	The	Court	following	the	Civil	War	was	functioning	in	a	time	of	great	turmoil	over	the	rights	of	the	southern	states	as	opposed	to	the	federal	government.	Many	decisions	of	this	period	failed	to	account	for	the	surrounding	racial	struggle	and	took	only	a	narrow	dominant-centered	view	of	the	situation.	That	narrow	focus	without	considering	the	context	of	the	dispute	limited	the	impact	of	the	constitutional	amendments.	The	results	enabled	those	whose	aim	was	to	maintain	power	over	the	former	slaves	and	allowed	states	to	continue	long-standing	patterns	of	racial	mistreatment	under	new	laws	and	customs	despite	the	intent	of	the	amendments.	In	the	first	case	over	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	reach	the	Court,	five	sitting	justices	were	Lincoln	nominees,	three	were	Grant’s	choices	and	one	remained	from	Buchanan’s	administration.	They	were	loyal	to	Lincoln’s	vision	of	the	union	but	were	conscious	of	the	precarious	relationship	between	the	states	and	the	federal	government	
																																								 																				
226	Id.	at	58-59.	
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in	the	Reconstruction	era.	Despite	the	history	of	the	amendment	as	a	means	of	addressing	issues	of	former	slaves,	the	first	battle	was	without	any	racial	element	and	served	only	to	define	states’	rights	in	controlling	what	occurred	in	their	own	borders.	The	Slaughter	House	Cases227	raised	all	three	of	the	new	categories	of	rights	to	be	applied	to	the	states	and	the	Court	used	it	to	build	a	dual	citizenship	argument	holding	that	citizenship	in	the	United	States	was	separate	from	citizenship	in	any	state.	The	rights	the	Court	would	protect	had	to	emanate	directly	from	the	Constitution	and	all	others	were	left	to	the	states.	The	privileges	and	immunities	of	citizens	were	limited	to	those	existing	solely	because	the	Constitution	created	them.	Even	previous	rights	generally	held	by	free	people	were	held	not	within	its	reach.	The	action	complained	of	was	a	statutory	enactment	so	there	was	no	question	that	the	state	had	acted.	What	was	important	was	that	the	Court	severely	limited	what	was	protected	from	state	action	rendering	the	amendment	far	less	encompassing	than	it	might	seem	upon	initial	reading.	The	Court	also	read	into	the	amendment	a	limitation	that	it	was	meant	to	deal	with	slavery.	The	absence	of	any	issue	of	slavery	directly	caused	the	Court	to	dismiss	arguments	that	the	statute	violated	equal	protection	of	the	laws	and	to	suggest	that	only	Congress,	under	the	enforcement	clause	of	the	amendment,	could	act	to	protect	the	former	slaves	under	the	equal	protection	clause.	It	was	a	clause	empowering	Congress	to	act	but	was	not	self-executing	allowing	the	Court	to	take	action.	Great	deference	was	shown	to	the	states	to	handle	the	rights	of	their	own	citizens	leaving	the	amendment	
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with	little	effect.	Those	holdings	were	reinforced	when	the	Court	later	repeated	the	dual	citizenship	concept	with	approval	and	narrowly	reading	the	rights	protected	by	the	amendment	leaving	the	protection	of	citizens’	rights	up	to	the	states	holding,	“The	duty	of	protecting	all	its	citizens	in	the	enjoyment	of	an	equality	of	rights	was	originally	assumed	by	the	States,	and	it	remains	there.”228	Even	the	right	of	suffrage	apparently	granted	in	the	Fifteenth	Amendment	was	limited	to	a	right	not	to	be	barred	from	voting	on	account	of	race	only.	With	no	Congressional	action	to	enforce	even	that	right	the	Court	declared	itself	unable	to	do	so.229	These	decisions	were	made	while	southern	states	continued	to	enact	laws	limiting	the	rights	of	the	new	citizens	based	on	their	race	and	ignoring	acts	of	individuals	who	prevented	them	from	enjoying	their	new	rights.	This	blind	eye	of	the	Court	has	been	evident	in	many	areas	despite	the	clear	evidence	that	the	Court,	at	times,	appears	to	respond	to	public	and	political	pressure	on	issues	of	great	national	interest.230	It	is	this	blind	eye	that	would	allow	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	be	narrowed	for	the	first	several	years	of	its	existence.	All-white	juries	were	found	by	the	Court	to	violate	equal	protection	when	the	discrimination	was	by	statute	barring	non-whites	from	jury	service231	but	if	a	jury	panel	
																																								 																				
228	United	States	v.	Cruikshank,	92	U.S.	at	542.	
229	United	States	v,	Reese,	92	U.S.	214	(1876).	
230	For	a	discussion	of	this	period	and	the	political	pressures	on	the	Court	see,	ABRAHAM.	(2008),	
chapter	7.	
231	Strauder	v.	West	Virginia,	100	U.S.	303	(1880).	
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has	no	non-whites	on	it	in	de	facto	discrimination	without	a	statutory	basis	the	Court	refused	to	address	the	issue	as	beyond	its	power.232	Without	the	statute,	the	Court	would	not	find	state	action	and	repeated	its	claim	that	the	black	defendant	was	on	the	same	equal	footing	with	his	white	counterparts	in	jury	selection	again	turning	a	blind	eye	to	the	truth	of	the	circumstances.	Congressional	action	under	the	new	amendments	came	under	scrutiny	as	Congress	tried	to	expand	the	rights	protected	and	the	reach	of	the	federal	government.	The	states’	rights	oriented	Court	would	strike	the	attempt	to	prohibit	discrimination	in	public	accommodations	and	transportation	while	allowing	a	prohibition	barring	states	from	preventing	citizens	from	serving	on	juries	based	on	race.	In	the	former	situation,	the	statute	was	addressed	to	the	acts	of	individuals	while	in	the	latter	the	actions	were	those	of	state	officials	creating	jury	panels.233	Justice	Harlan	dissented	arguing	that	despite	the	fact	that	the	transportation	and	accommodations	were	privately	owned	it	was	a	governmental	obligation	to	make	and	maintain	that	transportation	such	as	rail	and	highway	traffic	ways.	His	foreshadowing	of	the	public	function	argument	would	not	reappear	until	much	later	and	would	not	carry	the	day	in	the	way	he	envisioned	it.	Repeating	the	limitation	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	controlling	state	action	alone	the	Court	struck	down	a	Congressional	act	making	criminal	the	act	of	depriving	another	of	constitutional	rights	claiming	it	exceeds	federal	authority	by	addressing	
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233	Civil	Rights	Cases,	109	U.S.	3	(1883).	
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individual	behavior.234	Even	when	an	individual	in	police	custody	is	beaten	to	death	the	Court	held	the	statute	too	broad	and	therefore	unconstitutional	claiming	that	it	was	not	the	role	of	the	federal	government	to	control	criminal	law	in	the	states	and	that	it	was	up	to	the	state	to	prosecute	a	murder	claim	in	the	situation.	The	decision	defines	the	low	point	in	the	reach	of	the	amendment	in	Court	holdings	and	the	starting	point	for	the	arc	of	decisions	on	state	action.	An	outlier	for	the	period	came	before	the	Court	in	the	case	of	Yick	Wo	v.	Hopkins235	to	examine	a	laundry	regulatory	law	in	San	Francisco	that	was	applied	to	bar	Chinese	laundries	from	operation	while	allowing	white-owned	laundries	to	operate	in	the	same	conditions.	State	action	was	found	not	in	the	actual	language	of	the	ordinance	but	in	the	enforcement	of	the	ordinance	by	granting	exceptions	to	all	white-owned	laundries	and	denying	them	to	all	but	one	Chinese-owned	laundry.	The	Court	found	violation	of	equal	protection	in	the	enforcement	of	what	might	be	a	valid	law	extending	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	non-citizens236	based	on	the	“all	persons”	introduction	to	equal	protection.	This	unanimous	decision	offered	the	first	look	at	equal	protection	as	a	broad	protector	of	civil	rights	beyond	voting	and	service	on	juries.	In	what	might	appear	to	be	a	California	rule	the	Court	again	rejected	a	city	ordinance	–	this	time	in	Los	Angeles	–	that	set	telephone	rates	so	low	as	to	be	
																																								 																				
234	United	States	v.	Harris,	106	U.S.	629	(1883).	
235	Yick	Wo	v.	Hopkins,	118	U.S.	356	(1886).	
236	Chinese	people	were	not	considered	citizens	at	the	time	of	this	decision	despite	the	14th	
Amendment.	They	were	subjects	of	the	Emperor	of	China	and	remained	such	despite	being	present	in	
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considered	a	taking	of	property	without	due	process	reinforcing	the	reach	of	state	action	to	such	ordinances	and	subjecting	them	to	constitutional	scrutiny.237	The	case	involved	no	racial	issues	and	stood	essentially	as	a	preservation	of	the	commercial	rights	of	the	telephone	company.	A	decade	after	Yick	Wo	with	only	three	of	the	same	justices	remaining	decided	the	
Plessy	v.	Ferguson238	case	recognizing	whiteness	to	be	property	and	declaring	that	it	was	powerless	to	put	black	citizens	“on	the	same	plane”239	as	white	ones	by	eliminating	enforced	segregation.	The	blind	eye	ignored	the	obvious	inequalities	in	accommodations	that	existed	and	declared	them	equal.	Even	the	great	dissenter,	Justice	Harlan,	seemed	resigned	to	the	inability	of	the	Court	to	change	the	dominant	relationship	of	the	white	race	over	the	black	race	but	declared	it	the	obligation	of	the	law	to	eliminate	that	inequality	and	not	to	“tolerate	classes	among	citizens.”240		The	state	action	doctrine	became	a	firm	wall	of	protection	for	racial	discrimination	when	black	workers	were	intimidated	by	white	workers	and	prevented	by	threats	of	violence	from	working	for	an	employer	with	whom	they	had	a	contract	of	employment.241	The	Court	found	no	state	action	in	that	discrimination	and	even	rejected	the	claim	under	the	Thirteenth	Amendment	claiming	it	was	not	a	continuing	badge	of	slavery	so	the	federal	government	had	no	power	to	address	the	behavior	with	
																																								 																				
237	Home	Telephone	and	Telegraph	v.	Los	Angeles,	227	U.S.	278	(1913).	
238	Plessy	v.	Ferguson,	163	U.S.	537	(1896).	
239	Id.	at	552.	
240	Id.	at	559.	
241	Hodges	v.	United	States,	203	U.S.	1	(1906).	
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a	charge	of	violation	of	constitutional	rights.	Individuals	continued	to	be	free	to	infringe	the	rights	of	others	without	consequence.	Again,	Justice	Harlan	dissents	declaring	that	being	physically	restrained	from	working	at	an	employer	with	whom	one	has	a	contract	is	as	bad	as	slavery	but	he	did	not	carry	the	day	with	that	argument.	In	a	later	decision	the	Court	staunchly	defended	an	employer’s	liberty	right	to	hire	only	non-union	workers	and	to	rid	itself	of	any	who	unionize	even	when	the	State	of	Kansas	adopted	a	law	protecting	the	rights	of	employees	to	join	unions.242	The	Court	generously	allowed	employees	to	join	any	union	but	did	not	see	any	coercion	in	the	employer	dictating	the	terms	of	employment	to	include	resignation	from	a	union	and	denied	that	insurance	coverage	offered	by	the	union	was	any	real	pecuniary	interest	of	the	employee.	The	narrow	view	of	the	Court	took	only	the	viewpoint	of	the	employer	and	simply	explained	away	any	interest	the	employee	might	have.	A	dissent	noted	that	fourteen	states	and	one	territory	had	similar	laws	and	found	the	declaration	of	them	as	contrary	to	the	Constitution	when	several	previous	cases	had	held	the	liberty	of	contract	subject	to	the	public	welfare	rather	than	absolute.	The	majority	had	considered	only	the	right	of	the	employer	and	not	that	of	the	employee.	State	police	powers	were	held	exempt	from	constitutional	scrutiny	when	exercised	to	grant	and	take	public	right	of	ways	for	the	safety	of	the	public243	But	barring	coal	companies	from	mining	under	land	to	which	they	owned	mineral	rights	was	not	a	valid	
																																								 																				
242	Coppage	v.	Kansas,	236	U.S.	1	(1915).	
243	Chicago,	Burlington	and	Quincy	Railroad	Co.	v.	Chicago,	166	U.S.	226	(1897).	
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police	power	but	an	unconstitutional	taking	without	compensation.244	Negligent	operation	of	a	railroad	even	on	a	public	right	of	way	was	held	not	to	serve	as	state	action.245	The	right	to	be	free	from	self-incrimination	was	also	held	not	to	be	included	in	rights	protected	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	after	being	held	by	the	Court	not	to	be	one	of	the	privileges	and	immunities	of	citizens	and	was	also	not	a	due	process	requirement	despite	referring	to	it	as	a	right	“universal	in	American	law”246	declaring	that	it	had	its	origins	in	state	law	and	thus	was	not	protected	by	the	Bill	of	Rights.	This	early	period	of	decisions	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	avoided	any	attempt	to	stretch	the	doctrine	beyond	actual	state	or	local	officials	and	demonstrated	a	very	cautious	approach	to	finding	constitutional	violations	even	after	finding	state	action.	The	exception	being	when	the	Court	acted	to	protect	the	business	interests	as	described	above	making	it	difficult	to	draw	a	conclusion	that	there	was	a	consistent	thread	to	support	the	finding	or	failing	to	find	state	action	in	these	cases.	The	conservative	reading	of	the	reach	of	federal	power	and	the	concept	of	dual	citizenship	left	the	amendment	without	far-reaching	effect	and	allowed	states	to	continue	to	deny	their	own	citizens	many	of	what	we	now	consider	basic	rights.	That	trend	changed	as	the	doctrine	began	to	expand	as	racism	became	a	more	public	issue	and	as	the	Court	became	far	more	willing	to	insert	constitutional	limits	on	marginally	state	actors.	
Early	expansion	of	the	doctrine	
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	 If	the	initial	years	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	drew	a	strict	line	around	its	reach	and	the	power	of	the	Court	to	extend	constitutional	protection	the	next	era	saw	the	wall	created	by	state	action	extended	somewhat	to	include	action	that	could	be	interpreted	as	state	action	even	though	accomplished	by	private	citizens.	Race	cases	began	to	dominate	the	discussion	and	the	call	to	eliminate	racial	discrimination	was	growing	louder	despite	the	best	efforts	of	southern	states	to	limit	the	rights	of	their	African	American	citizens.	Starting	in	the	late	1920s	and	up	to	the	Warren	era	the	Court	saw	more	plainly	race	based	discrimination	brought	before	it	and	developed	new	arguments	to	define	state	action	to	prevent	it.	No	longer	did	most	cases	involve	clear	state	action	in	the	form	of	statutes	or	city	ordinances	although	those	continued.	In	this	era,	the	Court	was	faced	with	individual	actors	with	some	ties	to	state	action	so	the	definition	began	to	expand.	Still,	nine	of	the	fourteen	cases	presented	here	involved	racial	issues	as	the	country	continues	to	address	the	divisions	from	the	Civil	War	that	were	at	the	time	of	these	cases	more	than	six	decades	in	the	past.		 The	most	significant	issue	facing	the	Court	during	the	early	part	of	this	era	was	voting	rights	and	the	methods	used	to	prevent	black	citizens	from	participating	in	the	democratic	exercise.	For	every	decision	finding	a	constitutional	violation	there	was	a	shift	in	strategy	to	work	around	the	ruling	that	required	a	broader	definition	of	what	constituted	state	action.	Other	issues	did	arise	and	in	general	the	Court	used	the	later	part	of	the	period	to	extend	the	reach	of	state	action.	Few	decisions	were	unanimous	as	the	difficult	issue	of	federal	intrusion	into	states’	rights	was	still	a	tough	issue	to	
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balance.	The	multiplicity	of	opinions	–	dissenting	and	concurring	–	during	this	period247	reveals	how	those	issues	pulled	the	Court	in	many	directions.	The	hard	work	of	reaching	a	majority	also	left	many	of	the	decisions	weakened	by	limitations	made	necessary	to	constitute	a	majority	of	the	Court.		 Voting	rights	cases	came	to	the	Court	first	from	Texas	where	a	statute	barred	African	American	citizens	from	voting	in	the	Democratic	primary.248	The	statute	was	plainly	state	action	and	the	violation	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	apparent	as	demonstrated	by	a	unanimous	Court.	Five	years	later,	when	the	same	African	American	voter	was	barred	from	the	Democratic	primary	by	a	resolution	of	the	Texas	State	Executive	Committee	of	the	Democratic	Party	the	Court	was	faced	with	a	voluntary	association	in	the	form	of	the	party	now	asserting	what	the	state	could	not.249	What	had	changed	since	the	previous	decision	was	that	the	state	had	withdrawn	its	unconstitutional	statute	and	replaced	it	with	a	directive	that	political	parties	in	Texas	were	empowered	to	determine	the	qualification	for	membership	in	their	own	parties.	Avoiding	the	larger	question	presented	in	arguments	suggesting	that	political	parties	had	become	the	agents	of	the	state	in	primary	elections	the	Court	found	a	much	narrower	way	to	address	the	problem.	The	Court	observed	that	the	Democratic	Party	convention	had	not	initiated	that	change	but	that	it	was	assigned	to	the	State	Executive	Committee	by	the	legislature	and	thus	it	followed	that	it	was	state	action.	This	case	
																																								 																				
247	Between	1927	and	1953	the	fourteen	cases	involving	some	state	action	issue	included	four	
unanimous	rulings,	five	with	one	or	more	concurrence,	and	nine	with	one	or	more	dissent.	
248	Nixon	v.	Herndon,	273	U.S.	536	(1927).	
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drew	only	a	5-4	majority	with	a	dissent	arguing	that	the	mere	passage	of	the	statute	did	not	convert	the	party	into	an	agent	of	the	state.	Sadly,	the	Court	again	laid	out	a	pathway	to	allow	discrimination	to	continue	by	declaring	that	the	inherent	power	of	the	party	resided	not	in	the	State	Executive	Committee	but	in	the	convention,	opening	the	door	for	the	next	case	in	the	sequence.		 It	took	only	three	years	for	the	Court	to	receive	the	next	case	that	squarely	presented	what	the	Court	had	laid	out	in	Nixon	v.	Condon250	when	the	Texas	Democratic	Party	convention	itself	set	its	membership	requirements	to	include	only	white	citizens	and	limit	primary	voting	to	its	members.251	The	Court	had	held	that	it	was	an	inherent	power	of	the	party	to	determine	its	own	membership	so	it	was	a	short	step	to	declare	this	to	be	the	act	of	a	private,	voluntary	association	without	any	connection	to	the	state	and	therefore	beyond	the	reach	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	The	claim	in	the	case	was	that	the	county	clerk	refused	the	plaintiff	a	ballot	in	the	Democratic	primary	election	based	on	the	discriminatory	membership	requirements.	Despite	the	enforcement	of	that	private	discriminatory	decision	by	a	state	official	the	Court	unanimously	rejected	it	as	an	act	of	the	State.	The	wall	that	protected	discrimination	through	a	finding	of	no	state	action	was	crossed	and	the	primary	cases	seemed	a	dead	end	for	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.		 Primary	voting	returned	to	the	Court	in	a	5-3	decision	finally	declaring	voting	in	
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those	elections	to	be	a	right	under	Article	I	of	the	Constitution.252	The	state	action	requirement	in	the	Louisiana	case	was	easily	met	because	the	charge	was	against	the	Commissioners	of	Election	who	refused	to	count	ballots	and	in	some	cases	changed	votes	on	primary	ballots	of	primary	voters.	Race	was	not	asserted	as	a	factor	in	this	denial	of	the	right	to	vote.	The	state	took	an	active	role	in	administering	the	primary	but	it	was	acknowledged	by	the	Court	that	nomination	in	the	primary	of	the	Democratic	party	in	Louisiana	was	essentially	a	guarantee	of	election	in	the	general	election.	The	Court	did	not	limit	its	holding	to	the	participation	of	official	state	employees	committing	the	violations.	Instead,	the	Court	turned	to	the	constitutional	provision	that	authorized	states	to	set	the	time	place	and	manner	of	holding	elections	for	Congressional	representatives	but	allowed	Congress	to	alter	those	arrangements	by	law	in	all	ways	except	the	place	of	selection	of	Senators.	In	this	primary	for	the	House	of	Representative	nominee	the	state	paid	for	the	primary	and	the	general	election	ballot	could	contain	no	candidates	except	the	primary	winners.	Thus,	with	the	Democratic	primary	as	the	only	route	to	the	ballot,	it	amounted	to	election	to	the	House	for	the	winner.	The	Court	held	that	the	only	real	opportunity	to	cast	a	vote	for	a	candidate	for	Congress	existed	in	the	primary,	when	it	might	matter.	Side-stepping	the	Fourteenth	and	Fifteenth	Amendments	the	Court	held	that	Article	I	of	the	Constitution	has	no	limitations	on	its	application	and	applies	to	both	individuals	and	states.			 Nine	years	after	erecting	the	wall	of	state	action	in	primaries	in	Grovey253	and	
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after	seven	new	justices	were	appointed	to	the	Court	by	President	Franklin	Roosevelt	a	new	opportunity	to	examine	the	Texas	Democratic	primary	system	came	before	the	Court.	A	new	Court	with	new	political	pressure	to	open	the	voting	process	resulted	in	overturning	Grovey	and	re-asserting	the	principle	of	primary	voting	as	a	constitutional	right.254	Faced	with	the	identical	argument	by	the	state	that	the	political	party	was	a	voluntary	and	private	organization,	the	Court	pushed	back	the	wall	of	state	action	to	find	a	violation	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	In	Texas,	as	in	the	earlier	Louisiana	case,	the	primary	election	selected	the	only	candidate	with	a	real	chance	to	be	elected	in	the	general	election	so	the	nomination	process	was	essentially	the	election	process.			 The	principle	of	stare	decisis	required	a	detailed	explanation	of	what	had	changed	in	the	period	between	Grovey	and	Smith.	Detailing	the	history	of	the	Texas	litigation	over	primary	voting,	the	majority255	identified	the	Louisiana	case	as	a	change	in	the	law	identifying	the	primary	as	an	integral	part	of	the	election	process.	It	opened	the	door	for	a	finding	that	the	delegation	of	the	nomination	process	to	the	party	constituted	assignment	of	a	state	function	to	that	private	organization.	Noting	that	the	change	from	the	Nixon	cases	to	Grovey	was	“so	slight	a	change	in	form”	as	to	cause	a	new	look	at	the	“legal	validity	of	the	distinction”256	between	the	holdings.	After	a	review	of	the	extensive	statutory	scheme	controlling	the	nomination	process	and	election	of	party	officers	holding	that	it	made	the	party	“an	agency	of	the	State	in	so	far	as	it	
																																								 																				
254	Smith	v.	Allwright,	321	U.S.	649	(1944).	
255	The	sole	dissenter	was	the	author	of	Grovey,	Justice	Roberts,	also	one	of	only	two	justices	
remaining	on	the	Court	who	participated	in	that	decision.	
256	Smith	v.	Allwright,	321	U.S.	at	661.	
	 105	
determines	the	participants	in	a	primary	election.”257	That	statutory	scheme	imposed	duties	that	the	State	could	not	delegate	to	a	mere	private	party.	This	served	to	open	the	public	function	concept	as	a	definition	of	state	action	–	a	concept	that	would	expand	and	then	substantially	contract	over	time.		 The	next	step	in	the	public	function	definition	of	state	action	came	in	the	company	town	in	Alabama	that	was,	in	all	aspects,	a	normal	town	but	the	property	of	the	town	was	owned	by	a	business	corporation.	The	decision	that	the	town	was	subject	to	the	same	constitutional	limitations	of	a	municipality	was	supported	by	many	years	of	finding	that	toll	bridges	and	roads	and	railroads	were	similar	in	their	nature.	Designed	to	serve	the	public	interest	and	subject	to	extensive	state	regulation,	those	facilities	were	operated	on	behalf	of	the	government	and	their	acts	were	state	acts.	Justice	Black,	writing	for	the	majority,	declared	that	“The	more	an	owner,	for	his	advantage,	opens	up	his	property	for	use	by	the	public	in	general,	the	more	do	his	rights	become	circumscribed	by	the	statutory	and	constitutional	rights	of	those	who	use	it.”258	Justice	Black,	of	course,	was	a	fierce	defender	of	the	First	Amendment	and	seldom	found	any	limitation	of	speech	to	be	justifiable.	His	decisions	would	play	a	significant	role	in	the	state	action	discussion	over	time	extending	into	the	Warren	Court	years.		 Expansion	beyond	the	right	to	vote	stemmed	from	the	same	criminal	statute	making	it	a	crime	to	violate	constitutional	rights	of	another	when	acting	on	behalf	of	the	
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state.	That	statute	was	upheld	in	United	States	v.	Classic259	and	was	further	tested	in	the	case	of	a	brutal	beating	to	death	of	an	African	American	man	arrested	by	the	police	in	Georgia.260	The	question	of	state	action	seems	now	to	be	clear	but	the	argument	was	presented	that	the	acts	of	a	state	officer	outside	of	his	state	authority	should	be	considered	individual	and	escape	the	reach	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	the	statutes	enforcing	it.	The	Court	dealt	with	that	argument	by	declaring	that	the	authority	that	placed	the	policemen	in	charge	of	the	deceased	through	arrest	was	what	placed	them	in	the	position	to	take	his	life	and	therefore	the	power	derived	from	the	state	and	was	state	action.	Arguments	were	also	made	that	the	federal-state	balance	of	power	would	be	altered	by	a	federal	enforcement	of	its	criminal	statute	in	a	case	of	violation	of	a	state	statute	–	murder,	in	this	case.	The	Court	made	the	distinction	between	knowingly	and	intentionally	denying	the	constitutional	rights	of	another	and	violating	a	criminal	state	statute	making	it	clear	that	the	federal	government	charge	was	a	separate	matter	from	the	state’s	obligation	to	enforce	its	criminal	laws.	The	federal	government	could	only	enforce	those	rights	reserved	to	it	in	the	Constitution	and	its	amendments.		 The	Fourteenth	Amendment	requirement	of	equal	protection	under	the	laws	does	have	limitations	and	the	Court	has	recognized	situations	in	which	a	state	has	treated	different	citizens	differently	but	was	somehow	justified	in	doing	so.	Not	strictly	a	question	of	state	action	but	a	limitation	on	the	reach	of	equal	protection	should	state	action	be	present,	this	could	come	into	play	in	a	case	involving	teachers	and	the	
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treatment	of	non-charter	school	public	school	teachers	differently	from	charter	school	public	teachers.	In	Louisiana	in	the	early	part	of	the	twentieth	century	the	profession	of	pilot	for	a	river	boat	was	largely	a	closed	group	filled	by	family	members	of	previous	pilots	as	it	had	been	for	many	decades.	Selected	by	the	state	to	serve	in	that	post,	pilots	were	subject	to	a	set	of	laws	and	prerequisites	for	their	entry	into	service	on	the	rivers.	The	position	was	an	important	one	because	only	by	the	skill	of	the	pilot	could	river	boats	safely	navigate	the	waterways	of	Louisiana	that	carried	a	great	deal	of	the	goods	of	the	Midwest	in	and	out	of	the	port	of	New	Orleans.	The	system	of	appointment	of	new	pilots	required	the	recommendation	of	existing	pilots	who	uniformly	recommended	their	family	members	and	those	of	other	pilots	currently	in	service.		 In	this	system	of	obvious	nepotism,	a	claim	was	filed	charging	that	Louisiana	in	this	manner	was	violating	the	rights	of	those	not	members	of	pilots’	families	to	be	equally	considered	for	the	post	in	violation	of	equal	protection.261	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	state	acted	with	each	appointment	and	there	was	no	question	that	family	members	of	current	pilots	were	treated	differently	than	others.	The	unequal	treatment	of	applicants	for	the	pilot	profession	was	carried	out	by	direct	state	action.	Justice	Black	wrote	for	the	Court	holding	that	there	is	no	requirement	that	a	specific	method	of	appointment	be	used	for	skilled	positions	and	no	requirement	for	a	competitive	method	to	be	used.	The	Constitution	simply	would	not	reach	into	the	method	of	selection	of	people	to	serve	a	highly-specialized	position	of	service	within	the	state.			 The	holding	drew	a	sharp	dissent	from	four	justices	asserting	that	had	the	
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statute	limited	the	position	of	pilot	to	the	members	of	a	single	family	it	would	not	doubt	violate	the	law	of	equal	protection.	By	allowing	the	state	to	limit	the	selection	of	pilots	to	persons	of	several	families	the	dissent	argues	there	is	no	real	distinction.	Both	sides	of	the	issue	cited	the	Yick	Wo262	case	with	the	majority	distinguishing	it	as	based	on	racial	discrimination	and	the	dissent	arguing	that	the	case	was	precisely	what	Yick	Wo	had	ruled	unconstitutional:	the	discriminatory	administration	of	a	facially	neutral	law.	The	dissent	argued	that	selection	or	treatment	of	professionals	in	different	ways	required	something	upon	which	to	base	a	decision	that	justifies	the	differing	treatment.	The	majority	used	a	perceived	higher	level	of	skill	in	families	of	existing	pilots	as	their	justification.		 As	the	Court	began	to	reflect	the	policies	of	President	Roosevelt	the	cases	continued	to	expand	the	reach	of	the	Constitution	and	move	back	the	wall	of	state	action.	Justices	appointed	by	Roosevelt	were	mostly	supportive	of	his	New	Deal	and	therefore	a	stronger	central	government.	With	a	few	exceptions	that	meant	that	the	expansion	of	what	could	be	considered	state	action	began	to	move	apace.	No	single	case	opened	more	possibilities	for	expansion	than	a	unanimous	decision	in	two	situations	involving	restrictive	covenants	on	real	estate.263	Arising	in	two	different	states	neither	of	which	had	any	statute	involved	in	the	claims,	the	Court	addressed	private	covenants	that	attached	to	land	used	as	residential	property.		
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In	Missouri,	the	covenant	was	agreed	to	by	thirty	of	thirty-nine	owners	of	property	along	a	street	in	St.	Louis	applying	a	fifty	year	restriction	to	occupancy	of	the	properties	only	by	members	of	the	“Caucasian	race.”264	to	the	exclusion	of	any	other	race.	The	neighborhood	involved	consisted	of	fifty-seven	parcels	of	land,	forty-seven	of	which	were	owned	by	the	thirty	signatories	of	the	covenant.	Five	parcels	were	owned	by	African	Americans	at	the	time	of	the	covenant	and	four	were	still	owned	by	members	of	that	race	and	had	been	for	periods	of	twenty-three	to	sixty-three	years.	The	case	arose	when	an	African-American	buyer	purchased	a	parcel	and	other	land	owners	sued	to	prevent	him	from	taking	title	and	occupying	the	property.	The	state	courts	granted	the	relief	enforcing	the	restrictive	covenant.	The	other	case	involved	a	Detroit	neighborhood	with	a	restrictive	covenant	barring	only	occupancy	of	any	of	the	properties	by	anyone	not	of	the	Caucasian	race.	When	an	African	American	family	purchased	one	of	the	properties	and	occupied	it	the	neighbors	filed	suit	to	remove	them.	The	state	court	granted	the	relief	enjoining	the	purchasers	from	occupying	the	premises.	Both	purchasers	asserted	that	their	Fourteenth	Amendment	right	to	equal	protection	had	been	violated	by	the	court	action	in	their	respective	states.	
Two	prior	cases	involving	restrictive	covenants	were	distinguished	by	the	Court	–	the	preferred	method	of	upholding	stare	decisis	without	overruling	a	prior	decision.	One	case	involved	property	in	the	District	of	Columbia	and	it	was	thus	found	not	to	be	the	action	of	a	state265	eliminating	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	argument	as	the	Court	
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found	the	real	issue	to	be	the	validity	of	a	private	agreement	and	not	the	action	of	any	government.	In	the	other	case	the	Court	remanded	the	case	to	the	state	court	to	allow	the	issues	to	be	properly	litigated	there	on	the	question	of	the	validity	of	the	agreement	in	property	law	terms	rather	than	on	any	constitutional	basis.266	Having	distinguished	those	two	prior	cases	the	Court	was	free	to	consider	the	issue	whether	judicial	enforcement	of	a	private	agreement	constituted	state	action	invoking	constitutional	equal	protection.	
The	Court	began	its	analysis	by	identifying	the	right	to	own	and	enjoy	property	as	one	of	the	rights	the	drafters	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	sought	to	protect.	Had	a	state	passed	a	law	prohibiting	ownership	of	property	by	a	particular	race	there	would	be	no	doubt	that	it	would	be	stricken	as	contrary	to	that	amendment.	An	earlier	case	had	held	that	a	city	ordinance	limiting	certain	blocks	of	property	to	whites	and	others	to	black	persons	was	unconstitutional.267	Other	cases	had	further	extended	that	ruling	making	it	clear	that	a	government	could	not	discriminate	in	the	manner	demonstrated	by	the	private	agreements	before	the	Court.268	Returning	to	The	Civil	Rights	Cases	the	Court	reinforces	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	is	no	bar	to	private	discrimination	but	
																																								 																				
266	Hansberry	v.	Lee,	311	U.S.	32	(1940).	
267	Buchanan	v.	Warley,	245	U.S.	60	(1917).	
268	The	Court	cited	several	examples	of	state	courts	ruling	on	the	issue	in	n.11	saying:	“Courts	of	
Georgia,	Maryland,	North	Carolina,	Oklahoma,	Texas,	and	Virginia	have	also	declared	similar	statutes	
invalid	as	being	in	contravention	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	Glover	v.	Atlanta,	148	Ga.	285,	96	S.	
E.	562	(1918);	Jackson	v.	State,	132	Md.	311,	103	A.	910	(1918);	Clinard	v.	Winston-Salem,	217	N.	C.	
119,	6	S.	E.	2d	867	(1940);	Allen	v.	Oklahoma	City,	175	Okla.	421,	52	P.	2d	1054	(1936);	Liberty	Annex	
Corp.	v.	Dallas,	289	S.	W.	1067	(Tex.	Civ.	App.	1927);	Irvine	v.	Clifton	Forge,	124	Va.	781,	97	S.	E.	310	
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can	only	apply	to	action	that	“may	fairly	be	said	to	be	that	of	the	States.”269	If	those	covenants	are	complied	with	on	a	voluntary	basis	there	could	be	no	challenge	based	on	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
Acts	of	state	courts	had	previously	been	held	state	action	in	the	jury	selection	cases	as	well	as	in	criminal	case	due	process	violations	and	the	issue	was	well	settled	that	state	courts	were	subject	to	constitutional	restraints	as	state	actors.	The	unique	question	in	this	case	was	whether	a	court	acting	to	enforce	a	purely	private	agreement	could	be	held	to	be	state	action	preventing	it	from	enforcing	a	discriminatory	agreement.	The	Court	held	the	state	court	actions	to	be	state	action	noting	that	there	would	be	no	other	way	for	the	covenants	to	operate	but	for	the	court	providing	the	full	power	of	the	state	to	carry	out	the	original	agreements	in	denigration	of	the	agreements	of	the	current	sellers	and	purchasers	of	the	property.	The	argument	was	advanced	by	the	plaintiffs	that	the	state	court	was	free	to	enforce	covenants	against	white	ownership	and	thus	the	races	were	treated	equally	by	the	court	in	its	application	of	the	law.	Even	the	Court,	famous	for	ignoring	reality	in	such	cases,	could	find	no	instance	of	such	a	holding	and	saw	through	the	argument	that	the	races	were	somehow	equally	treated	by	the	state.	In	a	final	analysis,	the	Court	explicitly	balanced	the	individual	civil	rights	of	the	purchasers	of	the	property	as	a	greater	value	than	the	rights	of	property	owners	to	discriminate	and	held	that	enforcement	of	property	rights	must	comply	with	Fourteenth	Amendment	limitations.	
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State	action	was	further	extended	in	a	case	involving	the	radio	service	playing	on	the	speakers	in	rail	cars	in	Washington,	D.C.270	The	rail	company	was	a	private	corporation	operating	under	a	franchise	granted	by	the	federal	government,	also	serving	as	the	local	government	in	the	District	of	Columbia.	The	Public	Utilities	Commission,	created	by	Congress,	provided	supervision	of	all	public	utilities	including	the	rail	car	operation.	When	the	radio	broadcasts	were	installed	on	the	rail	cars	there	were	customer	complaints	over	the	issue	of	being	forced	to	listen	to	particular	content	as	a	violation	of	the	First	and	the	Fifth	Amendments.	The	Commission	found	no	violation	and	the	passengers	appealed	to	federal	court.	The	rail	company,	the	radio	company	and	the	Public	Utilities	Commission	were	all	parties	to	the	appeal	to	present	their	positions.	Both	the	rail	company	and	the	radio	company	were	private	entities	and	the	issue	for	the	Court	was	to	decide	if	the	amendments	to	the	Constitution	even	applied	to	their	behavior.	
The	Court	found	a	“sufficiently	close	relation”271	to	the	government	to	apply	constitutional	limitations	on	the	private	rail	operator	with	very	specific	reasoning	for	that	finding.	The	Court	refused	to	“rely	on	the	mere	fact”272	that	the	company	operated	a	public	utility	granted	by	Congressional	authority	or	the	“substantial	monopoly”273	for	the	transportation	provider.	What	did	make	sufficient	connection	was	the	“regulatory	
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supervision	of	the	Public	Utilities	Commission	…	an	agency	authorized	by	Congress.”274	It	was	the	action	taken	by	the	Commission	to	investigate	the	practice	that	seemed	to	be	what	shifted	the	Court’s	opinion	to	finding	that	special	relationship	that	invoked	constitutional	limitations	on	the	acts	of	the	rail	company.	Interestingly,	after	finding	that	connection	adequate,	the	Court	failed	to	find	any	violation	of	either	amendment	in	this	situation.275	
That	case	removed	the	connection	to	the	state	one	more	step	by	identifying	governmental	regulation	and	supervision	as	sufficient	to	convert	a	private	company	into	a	state	actor.	That	concept	failed	to	raise	a	dissent	in	this	Court	but	it	would	come	under	attack	as	the	arc	of	the	decisions	on	state	action	starts	to	be	rolled	back	in	later	years.	It	is	particularly	important	to	note	that	this	claim	was	not	based	on	racial	discrimination	but	it	did	involve	the	highly	protected	rights	of	the	First	Amendment	and	Fifth	Amendment	liberties	that,	as	in	the	Marsh276	case	caused	the	Court	to	reach	further	beyond	direct	action	of	the	state	to	apply	the	protection	of	the	Constitution	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
The	Court	stepped	further	away	from	direct	government	action	in	the	last	of	the	primary	voting	cases	from	Texas	raising	an	early	test	of	whether	inaction	could	
																																								 																				
274	Id.		
275	In	a	prophetic	dissent,	Justice	Douglas	argued	that	the	practice	violated	a	right	to	be	free	from	
governmental	intrusion	and	labeled	it	a	right	to	privacy	that	would	reappear	in	more	famous	cases	
later.	Justice	Frankfurter	recused	himself	from	the	case	describing	himself	as	a	“victim	of	the	
practice.”	Id.	at	467.	
276	Marsh	v.	Alabama,	326	U.S.	501	(1946).	
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constitute	action	by	the	state.277	The	Jaybird	Association	was	composed	of	all	registered	white	voters	and	operated	on	a	county	level.	It	funded	its	own	pre-primary	election	in	which	only	members	could	vote	and	candidates	interested	in	running	for	office	would	submit	their	names	to	the	association	for	inclusion	in	those	pre-primaries.	Successful	candidates	in	the	pre-primaries	nearly	always	submitted	their	names	to	the	Democratic	official	primary	and	nearly	always	won	both	the	primary	and	the	general	election	without	opposition.	Every	county-wide	official	was	elected	through	this	unofficial	pre-primary	system.	The	stated	purpose	of	the	association’s	actions	was	to	exclude	black	citizens	from	having	a	meaningful	vote.	The	Jaybird	Association	argued	that	as	a	private,	voluntary	organization	it	could	conduct	at	its	own	expense	and	under	its	own	rules	any	sort	of	activity	to	select	candidates	to	endorse	in	the	later	official	election	process.	
The	case	was	presented	under	the	Fifteenth	Amendment	right	to	vote	which,	like	the	Fourteenth,	limited	only	state	or	national	action.	The	Jaybird	Association	was	not	a	state	organization	on	its	face	and	the	state	operated	a	separate	primary	system	in	which	black	citizens	could	vote	under	the	earlier	cases.	The	Court	held	that	the	vote	taken	by	the	Jaybirds	rendered	any	other	vote	ineffective	and	meaningless	thus	depriving	the	black	citizens	a	meaningful	right	to	vote.		It	held	that	a	state	could	not	“permit	such	a	duplication	of	its	election	processes”278	in	compliance	with	the	Fifteenth	Amendment.	It	was	not	active	involvement	by	the	state	that	crossed	the	constitutional	limitation	but	the	failure	to	act	in	the	presence	of	a	private	system	to	deny	a	meaningful	vote	to	black	
																																								 																				
277	Terry	v.	Adams,	345	U.S.	461	(1953).	
278	Id.	at	469.	
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citizens	that	was	held	to	be	state	action.	The	argument	over	action	and	inaction	continues	and	will	appear	again	as	the	state	action	doctrine	is	further	established	by	the	Court.	Only	Justice	Minton,	in	dissent,	flagged	the	inaction	aspect	of	the	case	as	problematic	for	the	future.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	five	justices	in	two	concurrences	declared	that	they	would	find	state	action	in	the	presence	of	Jaybird	Association	members	in	public	offices	and	in	the	leadership	of	the	Democratic	Party	weakening	the	impact	of	the	inaction	finding	by	the	lead	opinion.	
In	the	final	decision	of	this	era	Justice	Minton	lead	the	Court	in	an	8-1	decision	following	up	on	the	holding	in	the	Shelley	v.	Kramer279	case	involving	judicial	enforcement	of	racial	restrictive	covenants	on	real	estate.	The	Court	faced	a	claim	by	one	landowner	against	the	seller	of	land	in	contravention	of	the	restrictive	covenant	for	damages	to	his	property	value	resulting	from	the	sale	of	land	to	a	black	family.280	Even	though	the	suit	was	brought	by	white	property	owners	against	a	white	seller	the	Court	allowed	the	seller	to	assert	the	constitutional	rights	of	the	black	citizens	who	would	be	impaired	in	their	right	to	purchase	property	if	sellers	could	be	sued	for	damages	by	other	owners.	The	Court	held	that	judicial	enforcement	of	the	racially	restrictive	covenant	was	no	less	a	violation	of	equal	protection	than	the	attempt	in	Shelley	to	vitiate	the	sale	on	the	same	grounds.	
	
																																								 																				
279	Shelley	v.	Kraemer,	334	U.S.	1	(1948).	
280	Barrows	v.	Jackson,	346	U.S.	249	(1953).	
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The	Warren	Court	
By	1953	the	Court	had	extended	the	reach	of	the	Constitution	somewhat	under	the	strength	of	the	nine	Roosevelt	appointments	who	had	supported	his	New	Deal	legislation	and	filled	in	by	Truman	appointees	with	similar	tendencies.	The	majority	most	often	sided	with	individual	rights	as	against	property	rights	or	business.	There	were	disagreements	within	over	the	power	of	the	judiciary	to	overrule	the	legislature	and	those	persisted	but	generally	the	Court	took	a	more	activist	role	than	had	previous	Courts.	The	state	action	doctrine	had	begun	to	expand	the	reach	of	the	Constitution	but	there	was	greater	expansion	to	come	under	the	leadership	of	Chief	Justice	Earl	Warren.	The	splits	in	opinions	largely	arose	from	disagreements	over	whether	legislative	action	should	take	precedence	over	the	Court’s	policy	positions	but	under	Warren	that	moved	dramatically	to	the	position	that	the	Court	should	intervene	in	any	situation,	with	or	without	legislative	action.	With	that	approach,	the	state	action	doctrine	underwent	a	broad	extension	of	the	definition	of	who	might	be	a	state	actor	but	as	seen	in	the	opinions	there	was	still	great	concern	not	to	create	a	set	definition	that	would	apply	broadly	to	a	group	of	facts.	State	action	may	be	the	area	of	most	caution	for	the	activist	Warren	Court	in	that	respect.	
Warren	himself	was	appointed	by	President	Eisenhower	apparently	with	the	expectation	that	he	would	perform	as	a	moderate	Republican	judge	hard	on	crime	but	fair	minded	in	civil	rights.	What	he	did	was	quite	disparate	from	that	expectation	but	he	was	but	a	single	case	of	changing	policy	loyalties	by	Justices	upon	reaching	the	Court.	Warren	established	his	independence	from	Eisenhower	in	his	first	opinion	for	the	Court	
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as	he	wrote	the	Brown	v.	Board	of	Education281	decision	for	a	unanimous	Court.	That	unanimity	represents	what	Warren	meant	to	the	Court	more	than	any	opinion	he	drafted	in	that	he	marshalled	support	for	positions	and	built	majorities	for	many	decisions	in	which	he	was	not	the	author.		
It	may	well	be	that	the	Warren	Court,	in	expanding	the	reach	of	the	Court	in	several	areas,	set	up	the	following	eras	to	build	political	pressure	to	select	more	restrained	justices	to	the	Court.	Although	most	of	the	major	decisions	of	the	Warren	Court	were	centered	around	criminal	procedure	and	the	rights	of	the	accused282	it	also	established	sweeping	new	law	in	the	highly	contested	civil	rights	arena.283	State	action	was	a	common	issue	in	the	discrimination	cases	and	to	reach	the	despised	practices	of	racial	prejudice	the	Court	did	expand	the	reach	of	the	definition	of	who	might	be	a	state	actor.	Later,	as	shown	in	the	following	sections,	many	of	those	expansions	were	reined	in	by	Court	appointees	specifically	tasked	with	making	the	Court	less	activist	according	
																																								 																				
281	Brown	v.	Board	of	Education,	347	U.S.	483	(1954).	
282	See	Mapp	v.	Ohio,	367	U.S.	643	(1961)	extending	the	exclusionary	rule	to	the	states	via	the	
Fourteenth	Amendment,	Gideon	v.	Wainwright,	372	U.S.	335	(1963)	extending	the	right	to	counsel	to	
state	court	prosecutions	and	establishing	it	as	a	fundamental	right,	Malloy	v.	Hogan,	378	U.S.	1	(1964)	
extending	the	Fifth	Amendment	privilege	against	self-incrimination	to	states	via	the	Fourteenth	
Amendment,	Pointer	v.	Texas,	380	U.S.	400	(1965)	applying	the	Sixth	Amendment	right	to	confront	
witnesses	to	the	states	via	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	Klopfer	v.	North	Carolina,	386	U.S.	213	(1967)	
applying	the	Sixth	Amendment	speedy	trial	requirement	to	the	states	via	the	Fourteenth	
Amendment,	and	Benton	v.	Maryland,	395	U.S.	784	(1969)	applying	the	prohibition	of	double	
jeopardy	to	the	states	via	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
283	It	should	also	be	noted	that	despite	the	original	decision	in	the	Brown	case,	Chief	Justice	Warren	
and	a	unanimous	Court	bowed	to	political	pressure	by	lifting	the	pressure	from	school	districts	and	
allowing	them	to	proceed	with	“all	deliberate	speed”	(Brown	v.	Board	of	Education,	349	U.S.	294,	301	
(1955))	thus	leading	to	an	extended	period	of	delay	in	implementing	the	principles	of	the	original	
decision	in	some	cases	for	decades.	
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to	the	political	claims	of	that	period.	That	is	why	this	period	of	the	Court	expresses	the	broadest	version	of	state	action	used	by	the	Court	to	date.	
In	a	brief	per	curiam	opinion	the	Court	held	that	a	municipal	agency	that	acted	as	the	trustee	of	a	college	established	by	a	private	citizen	to	support	the	education	of	poor	white	orphan	boys	could	not	enforce	the	requirement	that	applicants	must	be	white	to	gain	admittance.284	The	argument	that	the	original	grantor	who	established	the	trust	established	it	solely	for	white	students	could	not	withstand	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	bar	to	the	municipal	trustee	discriminating	as	a	state	actor.	The	mere	fact	of	holding	the	position	of	trustee	incorporated	the	state	and	its	limitations.	
It	could	be	said	that	no	decision	more	clouded	the	concept	of	state	action	than	
Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority285	although	there	are	many	cases	with	a	valid	claim	on	that	label.	Intermingling	the	issue	of	racial	discrimination	with	a	complex	set	of	relationships	between	the	state	and	the	actual	perpetrator	of	the	discrimination	served	as	the	basis	for	the	developing	confusion	over	state	action	and	its	definition.	Justice	Harlan,	in	dissent,	summed	up	the	clarity	of	the	decision	nicely	as	“a	process	of	first	undiscriminatingly	throwing	together	various	factual	bits	and	pieces	and	then	undermining	the	resulting	structure	by	an	equally	vague	disclaimer	…	leave[s]	
																																								 																				
284	Pennsylvania	v.	Board	of	Directors,	353	U.S.	230	(1957).	
285	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority,	365	U.S.	715	(1961).	
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completely	at	sea	just	what	it	is	in	this	record	that	satisfies	the	requirement	of	‘state	action.’”286	
The	facts	that	lead	to	such	a	conclusion	are	indeed	difficult	at	best	to	construct	into	a	definition.	The	clearest	fact	is	that	an	African	American	gentleman	was	refused	service	at	a	coffee	shop	that	was	part	of	a	parking	garage	built	by	the	Wilmington	Parking	Authority,	an	agency	of	the	State	of	Delaware,	to	provide	parking	for	government	agencies	and	also	housed	a	few	other	shops	along	the	sidewalk.	The	coffee	shop	was	leased	by	the	agency	to	the	private	owner	whose	action	in	denying	service	to	the	potential	customer	was	a	privately	made	decision.	Equally	clear	is	the	principle	established	soon	after	ratification	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	that	it	did	not	reach	mere	private	action	but	served	to	limit	only	state	action.287	The	layers	build	from	that	point	on.	
A	Delaware	statute	provided	that	providers	of	refreshments	were	not	required	to	serve	anyone	who	“would	be	offensive	to	the	major	part	of	his	customers,	and	would	injure	his	business.”288	The	statute	was	interposed	as	a	defense	to	the	rejected	customer’s	Fourteenth	Amendment	equal	protection	claim.	The	Delaware	Supreme	Court	held	that	the	action	of	the	shop	owner	was	purely	private	and	that	under	the	statute	he	was	not	required	to	serve	everyone	who	sought	service	in	his	shop.	The	majority	dismissed	the	issue	of	the	statute	and	took	on	the	sole	issue	of	whether	the	
																																								 																				
286	Id.	at	728.	
287	Civil	Rights	Cases,	109	U.S.	3	(1883).	
288	As	set	out	in	n.1	of	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority,	365	U.S.	at	717.	
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discrimination	was	private	or	was	state	action.	Justice	Stewart,	who	concurred	in	the	result,	took	the	position	that	the	Delaware	Supreme	Court	had	interpreted	the	statute	to	authorize	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	race	contrary	to	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	transferring	the	state	action	to	the	act	of	adopting	the	statute	that	supported	the	shop	owner’s	act.	Justices	Harlan	and	Frankfurter,	in	dissent,	argued	that	the	only	proper	disposition	of	the	case	was	to	send	it	back	to	the	Delaware	Supreme	Court	to	obtain	a	clear	ruling	on	the	nature	of	the	Delaware	statute	and,	if	it	returns	a	clear	finding	that	the	statute	authorized	racial	discrimination,	to	hold	the	law	unconstitutional	without	reaching	a	state	action	analysis	of	the	act	of	the	shop	owner.	That	simpler	approach	to	the	case	was	not	the	path	chosen	by	the	majority.	
After	citing	precedent	for	the	state	action	requirement,	the	majority	embarks	on	“sifting	facts	and	weighing	circumstances”	to	reveal	“the	nonobvious	involvement	of	the	State	in	private	conduct”289	to	determine	whether	the	state	was	adequately	involved	in	it	to	invoke	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	By	declaring	that	state	action	is	not	subject	to	a	precise	definition290	the	majority	obscured	the	doctrine	for	future	cases	and	extended	the	assumption	that	each	case	must	be	sui	generis	making	nothing	clearly	precedential.	The	Court	pursued	the	sifting	with	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	various	links	the	state	had	to	the	shop	owner	in	the	case.	Briefly,	the	shop	was	leased	from	the	state	and	had	been	essentially	built	and	maintained	by	the	state.	The	parking	facility	in	which	the	
																																								 																				
289	Id.	at	722.	
290	Perhaps	more	accurately	it	could	be	said	that	no	precise	definition	could	muster	a	majority	of	the	
Court.	
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shop	was	located	was	financially	not	feasible	without	income	from	tenants	like	the	coffee	shop.	The	building	was	“dedicated	to	‘public	uses’”291	in	the	statute	that	created	the	Authority.	The	failure	of	the	Authority	to	require	non-discrimination	of	its	tenant	is	noted	by	the	Court	and	the	failure	to	act,	what	would	later	become	a	significant	issue	in	state	action,	was	cited	as	making	the	state	a	participant	in	the	discrimination.	In	sum,	the	Court	holds	that	the	state	had	“so	far	insinuated	itself	into	a	position	of	interdependence”292	as	to	prevent	the	discrimination	as	being	a	private	act	beyond	the	scope	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
Had	the	majority	stopped	at	that	point	some	certainty	may	have	existed	for	the	state	action	doctrine	but	again	claiming	that	precision	of	definition	was	impossible	the	holding	was	limited	to	cases	in	which	the	state	“leases	public	property	in	the	manner	and	for	the	purpose	shown	to	have	been	the	case”	in	this	dispute	rendering	it	a	marginally	useful	holding,	at	best,	for	future	consideration.	The	language	of	interdependence	and	the	application	to	leases	leaves	much	room	for	interpretation	and	the	Court	has	not	failed	to	move	in	and	out	of	that	space	freely	since	this	decision.	It	falls	within	a	general	category	of	entwinement	despite	the	use	of	the	term	“insinuation”	but	with	the	limitation	to	its	facts	it	fails	to	provide	much	guidance	for	cases	not	identical	in	facts.	
The	biggest	driving	force	behind	expansion	of	the	definition	of	state	action	arose	out	of	the	civil	rights	cases	involving	private	action	that	was	sometimes	based	on	law	
																																								 																				
291	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority,	365	U.S.	at	723.	
292	Id.	at	725.	
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and	other	times	customs	of	the	area.	The	sit-in	demonstrations	in	the	South	set	up	a	series	of	five	cases	taken	together	by	the	Court	and	for	the	8-1	majority	involved	the	same	issue.293	Writing	for	the	Court	in	an	unusually	brief	opinion	Chief	Justice	Warren	dispensed	with	all	arguments	except	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	state	action	claim	as	unnecessary.	Citing	a	city	ordinance	that	required	segregated	lunch	counters	the	Court	held	that	even	if	the	owner	of	the	counter	refused	to	serve	the	African	American	students	based	on	his	own	practice	and	custom	and	not	to	comply	with	the	ordinance	the	city	had	“become	involved”294	in	the	relationship	between	owner	and	patron	in	such	a	way	as	to	constitute	state	action.	The	State	could	not	advance	the	argument	that	the	store	owner	would	have	refused	service	even	without	the	ordinance	when	it	had	co-opted	that	decision	for	itself.	The	mental	state	of	the	owner	would	not	be	given	consideration.	
In	a	dissent,	Justice	Harlan	divided	the	cases	and	discussed	each	one	separately	urging	the	consideration	of	the	motivation	for	the	exclusion	of	the	patrons	and	whether	it	was	influenced	by	the	ordinance.	He	found	such	evidence	of	influence	by	the	ordinance	or	by	the	announcements	of	local	law	enforcement	officials	adequate	in	two	of	the	cases.	In	one	he	found	insufficient	evidence	of	a	violation	to	support	a	conviction	and	in	the	other	two	he	suggested	that	the	cases	should	be	sent	back	to	state	court	for	further	proceedings	to	decide	various	issues	of	state	law.	His	careful	analysis	of	the	cases	on	their	individual	facts	exposes	the	rather	broad	sweep	of	the	majority	in	its	
																																								 																				
293	Peterson	v.	City	of	Greenville,	373	U.S.	244	(1963).	
294	Id.	at	248.	
	 123	
effort	to	eliminate	racial	discrimination	without	making	a	finer	point.	This	approach	of	creating	broad	generalities	in	holdings	was	to	mark	many	areas	of	criminal	law	and	certain	areas	of	constitutional	law	during	the	Warren	Court	years	but	failed	to	establish	a	clear	rule	for	state	action.	
Expansion	of	the	definition	of	state	action	continued	with	two	cases	decided	the	same	day	involving	trespassing	charges	in	racial	discrimination	cases.295	In	the	Griffin	case	state	action	was	found	when	a	security	guard	working	while	not	on	duty	as	a	sheriff’s	deputy	arrested	African	Americans	for	remaining	in	an	amusement	park	when	told	to	leave	because	of	their	race.	The	Court	reiterated	the	Screws	holding	that	even	if	he	would	have	acted	the	same	way	without	official	power	or	has	no	statutory	authority	to	do	what	he	did	his	action	was	state	action	because	he	was	“possessed	of	state	authority”296	and	by	arresting	the	individuals	he	acted	under	that	authority.	The	dissenters	saw	no	difference	between	the	guard	making	the	arrest	and	simply	removing	the	people	from	the	premises	for	the	police	to	make	the	arrest	and	thus	found	no	state	action.	
The	Bell	case	majority	did	not	reach	state	action	holding	that	a	supervening	statute	forbidding	discrimination	in	restaurants	based	on	race	in	this	restaurant	sit-in	case.	Concurring	writers	made	clear	that	a	commercial	business	is	not	the	same	as	a	private	home	and	it	comes	with	less	protection	of	the	right	to	choose	who	enters	and	is	served.	Justice	Goldberg	suggested	that	Congress	could	adopt	a	statute	forbidding	such	
																																								 																				
295	Griffin	v.	Maryland,	378	U.S.	130	(1964);Bell	v.	Maryland,	378	U.S.	226	(1964).	
296	Griffin	v.	Maryland,	378	U.S.	at	135.	
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discrimination	even	by	private	commercial	business	owners	under	the	Commerce	Clause	avoiding	the	state	action	limitation	altogether.	The	dissent	by	Justice	Black	refused	to	find	judicial	enforcement	of	trespass	to	constitute	state	action	and	looked	only	to	the	original	act	of	the	private	individual	choosing	who	may	and	may	not	enter	his	commercial	property.	
The	differentiation	of	a	private	home	and	a	more	public	setting	for	privately	owned	property	was	the	first	explicitly	identified	public	function	case	involving	a	municipal	park	bequeathed	to	the	municipality	in	trust	by	a	private	individual	for	use	by	white	people	only.297	The	city	had	operated	the	park	for	some	time	in	a	segregated	manner	but	eventually	saw	that	was	not	within	its	power	to	maintain	segregation	and	allowed	all	races	to	use	the	parks.	The	family	of	the	original	owner	and	residual	beneficial	owners	of	the	trust	property	sought	removal	of	the	city	as	trustee	and	appointment	of	new	private	trustees	to	effectuate	the	discriminatory	wishes	of	the	grantor.	The	Court	considered	a	wider	context	than	merely	examining	the	concept	of	the	ability	of	a	grantor	of	a	trust	to	control	the	trust	property.	Had	that	been	the	scope	of	inquiry	it	would	leave	little	doubt	that	it	involved	private	action	not	subject	to	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
Instead,	the	Court	looked	at	the	broader	issue	that	took	in	the	nature	and	history	of	use	of	the	property	as	a	public	park	operated	by	the	municipality.	Despite	the	attempt	to	appoint	new	trustees	to	remove	the	municipal	trustees	the	Court	considered	
																																								 																				
297	Evans	v.	Newton,	382	U.S.	296	(1966).	
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that	history	to	find	that	the	park	had	become	a	public	park	not	a	private	tract	of	property.	The	language	of	the	Court	develops	the	public	function	category	clearly:	The	service	rendered	even	by	a	private	park	of	this	character	is	municipal	in	nature.	…	A	park	…	is	more	like	a	fire	department	or	police	department	that	traditionally	serves	the	community.	Mass	recreation	through	the	use	of	parks	is	plainly	in	the	public	domain,	[citation	omitted];	…	the	predominant	character	and	purpose	of	this	park	are	municipal.298	The	political	basis	for	the	Court’s	decision	is	that	it	involved	publicly	displayed	racial	discrimination	supported	by	an	attempt	to	circumvent	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	by	privatization	of	what	had	been	a	de	facto	public	facility.	By	looking	broadly	at	the	history	of	the	park	and	its	operation	the	Court	could	justify	its	holding.	The	decision	was	written	during	a	period	of	deep	involvement	of	the	Warren	Court	in	policy	during	the	height	of	the	civil	rights	movement.	Racial	segregation	was	an	evil	being	fought	on	several	fronts	and	the	Court	pushed	itself	into	the	forefront	of	that	issue	in	several	decisions	by	extending	what	could	be	identified	as	state	action.	That	push	would	falter	after	the	racial	discrimination	cases	subsided.		
The	broader	context	was	also	applied	when	civilians	acted	in	concert	with	law	enforcement	officers	to	murder	African	American	men	who	had	been	arrested	and	then	let	go	in	the	country	at	night.299	The	law	enforcement	officers	were	clearly	state	actors	
																																								 																				
298	Id.	at	301.	
299	United	States	v.	Price,	383	U.S.	787	(1966).	
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and	found	guilty	of	violating	the	civil	rights	of	the	decedents	under	the	Screws300	holding.	The	civilians	who	engaged	in	the	ambush	and	murders	were	private	citizens	and	could	not	be	charged	under	the	Civil	Rights	Act	unless	they	were	acting	under	color	of	state	law.	Had	the	Court	kept	its	focus	on	their	status	as	private	citizens	it	might	have	deferred	to	the	state	to	enforce	its	criminal	statutes	and	declined	to	act	under	the	Federal	law.	By	opening	the	context	to	see	that	the	civilians	were	working	willfully	in	concert	with	state	officials	the	Court	could	apply	the	Civil	Rights	Act	to	their	activities	as	if	they	were	state	officers	themselves.	This	holding	maintained	the	Screws	requirement	that	the	action	be	a	willful	deprivation	of	rights	and	not	a	negligent	one.	
The	Court	continued	to	examine	the	wider	context	in	Reitman	v.	Mulkey301,	a	5-4	decision	that	confounds	the	traditional	methods	of	looking	at	state	action	categories	as	a	logical	whole.	The	case	arose	from	two	California	cases	in	which	race	was	used	to	deny	a	lease	in	one	and	to	evict	a	tenant	in	another.	In	the	refusal	to	rent	case	the	trial	court	granted	the	landlord	summary	judgement	based	on	Proposition	14,	a	constitutional	amendment	in	California	that	prohibited	the	adoption	of	any	law	or	action	of	the	state	or	any	level	of	government	to	abridge	the	right	of	an	individual	to	sell	or	lease	property	to	anyone	he	chose	without	limitation.	The	eviction	case	was	presented	to	the	trial	court	on	the	same	basis	but	resulted	in	the	opposite	ruling	by	the	court	holding	that	it	could	not	enforce	a	racially	based	eviction	in	compliance	with	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	of	the	U.S.	Constitution.	The	California	Supreme	Court	reversed	
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the	first	and	affirmed	the	second	trial	court	based	on	the	equal	protection	clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	The	Supreme	Court	took	the	case	on	certiorari,	the	first	indicator	that	it	was	seeking	this	opportunity	to	make	a	statement	about	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	it	affirmed	the	California	Supreme	Court	in	both	cases.	Had	it	refused	certiorari	the	result	would	not	have	been	different	except	the	Court	would	not	have	provided	an	opinion	on	the	issues.	
The	cases	offered	a	very	narrow	context	as	one	possible	basis	for	decision:	the	private	landlord	had	decided	not	to	lease	property	to	another	individual.	State	action	came	into	the	picture	only	with	the	move	to	the	courts	by	the	aggrieved	tenants.	Had	the	Court	used	the	scope	of	the	context	that	only	included	the	private	transaction	there	would	be	no	state	action.	Even	with	the	addition	of	the	court	enforcing	the	private	action	there	could	be	a	decision	that	such	involvement	does	not	make	the	original	act	state	action	and	that	all	disputed	interactions	between	individuals	can	be	taken	to	a	court	for	a	decision	making	nearly	all	action	state	action.	
Rather	than	follow	the	narrowest	of	paths	to	deciding	the	case	the	Court	opened	its	inquiry	to	include	the	full	text	of	Proposition	14	and	how	it	might	change	the	ability	of	local	governments	or	the	legislature	to	enact	laws	barring	racial	discrimination	in	housing.	The	Court	reasoned	that	instead	of	merely	repealing	previous	legislative	action	barring	discrimination	in	housing	the	proposition	also	amended	the	California	Constitution	to	bar	any	unit	of	government	from	adopting	any	such	law.	Doing	so	meant	that	to	adopt	anti-discrimination	laws	would	first	require	constitutional	amendment	and	putting	discrimination	on	a	protected	footing	as	compared	to	any	other	legislation.	
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Taking	that	broader	view	of	the	action	allowed	the	Court	to	consider	the	wider	implications	for	the	future	of	housing	throughout	the	state	of	California	rather	than	just	the	decision	of	the	dispute	at	hand.		
Justice	Harlan	wrote	for	the	four-justice	dissent	and	characterized	the	action	as	a	simple	repeal	of	the	statute	dismissing	any	impact	the	constitutional	ban	on	anti-discrimination	might	have.	By	reducing	the	focus	of	the	inquiry	to	just	what	has	happened	and	not	what	the	result	of	that	would	be	on	discrimination	in	housing	Justice	Harlan	argued	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	does	not	require	anti-discrimination	laws	but	only	requires	that	the	state	not	adopt	discriminatory	laws.	Couching	the	issue	in	terms	of	action	versus	inaction	allowed	the	dissenters	to	call	for	a	reversal	of	the	California	Supreme	Court’s	decision	to	strike	Proposition	14	as	contrary	to	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
	 Traditional	downtown	shopping	districts	way	to	malls	and	shopping	centers	and	as	privately	owned	spaces	that	invited	public	use	they	created	a	new	category	of	free	speech	cases	for	the	Court	to	address.	The	new	settings	functioned	much	like	the	company-owned	town	of	Chickasaw	but	lacked	the	presence	of	housing,	separate	post	offices	and	other	accoutrements	of	Chickasaw.	These	new	institutions	also	appeared	as	the	Court	was	undergoing	some	changes	that	began	to	favor	private	property	rights	over	other	rights.	That	shift	has	generally	continued	and	will	prove	to	be	a	major	consideration	when	applying	the	state	action	doctrine	to	charter	schools.		 The	first	private	shopping	center	case	held	true	to	the	Marsh	ruling.	When	union	members	wanted	to	peacefully	picket	a	non-union	business	located	in	a	shopping	
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center	the	Court	had	to	balance	the	rights	of	the	union	members	to	assemble	and	freely	express	their	views	against	the	right	of	the	landowner	of	the	center	to	control	the	property	and	who	enters	upon	it302.	The	target	of	the	picketers	was	a	store	that	had	recently	opened	with	all	nonunion	workers.	The	Amalgamated	Food	Employees	Union	sent	picketers,	none	of	whom	were	employees	of	the	target	store,	to	carry	signs	in	the	parking	area	outside	the	store	to	inform	the	public	that	the	employees	of	the	store	“were	not	‘receiving	union	wages	or	other	union	benefits.’”303	Justice	Marshall,	writing	for	the	five	justice	majority	that	included	Chief	Justice	Warren,	extensively	described	the	layout	of	the	shopping	center	essentially	highlighting	that	the	nearest	public	way	was	not	only	quite	busy	but	also	quite	a	distance	from	the	targeted	employer’s	place	of	business.	Further,	he	noted	that	there	was	minimal,	if	any,	disruption	in	the	operation	of	the	store	or	the	shopping	center.		 After	noting	that	the	general	rule	is	that	peaceful	picketing	in	an	area	that	is	open	to	the	public	is	protected	under	the	First	Amendment304	and	acknowledging	that	there	are	some	restrictions	placed	on	picketing	to	avoid	undue	hardship	on	the	public	or	the	property	owner	the	Court	found	no	such	argument	that	this	picketing	was	carried	out	in	an	improper	manner.	The	sole	issue	was	whether	the	picketing	could	be	treated	as	a	trespass	on	the	private	property	of	the	shopping	center	that	admittedly	
																																								 																				
302	Amalgamated	Food	Employees	Union	v.	Logan	Valley	Plaza,	391	U.S.	308	(1968).	
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invited	the	public	to	enter	for	shopping.	The	Court	found	the	similarities	to	the	Marsh305	case	“striking”306	based	on	several	factors	including	the	general	public	invitation	onto	the	premises	for	shopping.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	picketers	could	canvas	the	neighborhoods	surrounding	the	shopping	center	the	Court	maintained	the	comparison	to	the	company	town	and	held	that	the	state	could	not	“delegate	the	power,	through	the	use	of	its	trespass	laws,	wholly	to	exclude	those	members	of	the	public	wishing	to	exercise	their	First	Amendment	rights	on	the	premises	and	in	a	manner	and	for	a	purpose	generally	consonant	with	the	use	to	which	the	property	is	actually	put.”307	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	case	and	its	successor	cases	address	only	the	location	of	claimed	free	speech	and	neither	the	content	nor	the	identity	of	the	one	exercising	that	right.	 	The	Amalgamated	Food	Employees	Union	case	was	decided	near	the	end	of	the	Warren	Court	and	before	the	next	decision	could	reach	the	Court	Chief	Justice	Warren	had	been	replaced	by	the	more	minimalist	government	jurist	in	Chief	Justice	Burger	and	three	additional	Justices,	Blackmun,	Powell,	and	Rehnquist,	joined	the	Court,	all	appointed	by	President	Nixon	and	all	sharing	a	similar	minimalist	government	stance.	The	Warren	Court	extended	constitutional	rights	in	several	categories,	most	notably	in	criminal	law,	but	also	took	a	broader	view	of	state	action	cases	than	had	been	previously	taken	by	the	Court.	In	many	ways,	the	concept	of	state	action	was	most	
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widely	defined	by	the	Warren	Court	and	the	period	since	has	seen	a	contraction	of	how	these	cases	are	decided.		
The	Burger/Rehnquist	Court	
	 The	era	following	the	Warren	Court	begins	with	the	election	of	President	Nixon	who	ran,	in	part,	on	a	platform	opposing	what	he	had	labeled	“judicial	activism”	of	the	Warren	Court.	This	position	led	him	to	appoint	justices	he	believed	would	do	less	to	support	individual	rights	and	would	avoid	any	extension	of	existing	rights	into	new	area.	Within	his	first	term	Nixon	appointed	four	Justices	to	the	Supreme	Court,	changing	the	direction	of	the	Court	for	many	years.	His	appointments	of	Chief	Justice	Warren	Burger	and	Associate	Justices	Blackmun,	Powell,	and	Rehnquist	shifted	the	Court	away	from	its	expansion	of	individual	rights	to	a	much	narrower	degree	of	judicial	involvement	and	reading	of	the	Constitution.	As	Chief	Justice,	Burger	was	an	exceptional	administrator	but	was	unable	to	pull	the	Court	fully	from	its	more	activist	past	under	Warren.	It	was	Justice	Rehnquist,	upon	becoming	Chief	Justice,	along	with	a	few	other	changes	that	moved	the	Court	to	a	more	limited	reading	of	the	Constitution308,	who	truly	lead	the	Court	on	a	full-scale	retreat,	even	if	not	overruling,	of	the	state	action	decisions	of	the	previous	Courts.	Rehnquist	served	as	an	Associate	Justice	for	14	years	during	the	Burger	Court	before	becoming	Chief	Justice	and	thus	was	building	his	consensus	long	before	taking	the	center	position	on	the	bench.	He	served	19	years	as	Chief	Justice	and	upon	his	death	the	Court	was	very	different	from	the	Warren	Court	
																																								 																				
308	Justice	Antonin	Scalia	was	appointed	as	Rehnquist	moved	to	the	Chief	Justice	position	substantially	
strengthening	the	“textualist”	portion	of	the	Court.	
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that	preceded	it.	State	action	had	been	narrowed	substantially	and	it	appears	likely	that	it	will	remain	so	for	some	time.	
	 Although	race	continues	to	be	a	societal	issue	even	today	the	pace	of	litigation	around	state	action	began	to	fall	off	during	this	period.	Two	cases	early	in	the	Burger	Court	pre-dated	the	arrival	of	William	Rehnquist	as	a	Justice	and	continued	the	previous	Court’s	tendency	to	find	state	action	in	racial	discrimination	cases.	Adickes	v.	
S.H.	Kress	&	Co.309	was	the	last	of	the	lunch	counter	demonstration	cases	and	state	action	was	found	in	the	presence	of	a	police	officer	and	the	custom	of	the	area	to	prohibit	the	races	eating	at	the	same	counter.	Griffin	v.	Breckenridge310	involved	the	federal	statute	referred	to	as	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	Act311	prohibiting	conspiracies	among	private	citizens	to	deny	the	rights	of	others.	The	statute	was	upheld	based	on	a	finding	of	a	right	of	interstate	travel	combined	with	a	holding	that	a	conspiracy	can	be	so	widespread	as	to	replace	state	power.	Those	combined	with	the	assertion	of	the	Thirteenth	Amendment	supporting	Congressional	power	to	enact	legislation	creating	a	private	right	of	action	for	African	Americans	who	had	been	denied	basic	rights	of	all	free	men.	Those	two	cases	marked	the	end	of	the	arc	of	decisions	rising	and	the	peak	of	the	extension	of	the	state	action	beyond	official	state	action.	
	 Justice	William	Rehnquist	authored	his	first	state	action	opinion	in	a	case	that	marked	a	distinct	change	from	earlier	cases	when	he	addressed	how	a	Moose	Lodge	
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treated	an	African	American	guest	to	the	club.312	The	Moose	Lodge	was	a	part	of	a	national	social	club	that	by	its	own	constitution	and	bylaws	allowed	only	white	members	and	their	guests	to	enter.	The	club	owned	its	own	building	and	received	no	tax	dollars.	It	held	a	liquor	license	from	the	state	of	Pennsylvania	where	the	liquor	business	is	completely	controlled	by	the	state.	A	limit	was	set	by	statute	on	the	total	licenses	available	to	a	given	municipality	and	that	limit	had	long	been	reached	so	the	only	way	to	obtain	a	license	was	to	purchase	one	from	another	holder	of	a	license	at	monopoly	prices.	The	Pennsylvania	Liquor	Control	Board	had	extensive	regulatory	powers	and	a	long	list	of	physical	requirements	for	licensees.	Included	in	the	Pennsylvania	statute	was	a	provision	designed	to	prevent	groups	from	fraudulently	identifying	themselves	as	private	clubs	that	required	the	groups	to	comply	with	their	own	bylaws	and	constitution.	In	this	case	that	meant	that	the	statute	required	the	Moose	Lodge	to	prohibit	its	use	by	African	Americans	as	members.	There	was	no	similar	policy	for	guests	until	the	case	was	decided	at	the	lower	court.	
	 Newly	seated	Justice	Rehnquist	started	by	narrowing	the	scope	of	the	context	he	would	consider.	Rather	than	consider	all	discriminatory	practices	and	policies	he	limits	the	inquiry	to	only	guest	practices	holding	that	the	plaintiff	had	no	standing	to	challenge	membership	practices	since	he	had	not	been	denied	membership.	Had	the	Moose	Lodge	not	amended	its	bylaws	during	the	litigation	to	include	a	limit	on	guests	to	
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white	people	it	is	entirely	possible	that	this	case	would	have	gone	no	further.	He	moves	on	to	the	state	action	question	with	an	equally	restrictive	perspective.	
	 In	a	laundry	list	of	characteristics	of	a	private	club	the	decision	recognizes	each	in	the	Moose	Lodge	and	declares	that	the	liquor	license	involvement	of	the	state	did	not	amount	to	state	action	making	the	discrimination	illegal.	Distinguishing	the	case	from	the	restaurant	in	Burton	he	focusses	on	the	fact	that	the	property	was	not	leased	from	the	state.	Ignoring	the	value	as	property	that	existed	in	the	liquor	license,	a	rare	commodity,	the	Court	simply	aside	the	argument	that	the	license	scheme	insinuated	the	state	into	the	discriminatory	scheme.		Holding	that	“there	is	no	suggestion	in	this	record	that	the	Pennsylvania	statutes	and	regulations	governing	the	sale	of	liquor	are	intended	either	overtly	or	covertly	to	encourage	discrimination”313	the	Court	recognized	the	“one	exception”314	to	that	finding	in	the	existence	of	the	state	regulation	that	requires	the	private	club	to	comply	with	its	own	constitution	and	bylaws,	including	racially	discriminatory	provisions.	That	was	pushed	aside	for	later	handling	so	the	Court	could	hold	that	there	is	no	state	action	making	the	discrimination	beyond	the	reach	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	It	justifies	ignoring	that	provision	by	declaring	that	the	law	does	not,	with	the	single	exception,	limit	minority	groups	from	applying	for	club	licenses	or	being	served	in	places	of	public	accommodation.	
	 The	one	exception	referred	to	by	the	Court	was	handled	by	declaring	that	provision	to	be	state	action	and	contrary	to	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	barring	the	
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state	from	enforcing	the	provision	designed	to	prevent	groups	from	falsely	claiming	to	be	private	when	formed	merely	to	maintain	a	discriminatory	policy.	Enjoining	the	state	from	enforcing	the	policy	allowed	the	Moose	Lodge	to	continue	to	operate	as	a	racially	discriminatory	club	holding	one	of	the	highly	valued	liquor	licenses	not	available	to	other	racial	groups.	
	 Justice	Douglas	and	Justice	Brennan,	each	joined	by	Justice	Marshall,	wrote	in	dissent	but	the	three	holdovers	from	the	former	Warren	Court	majority	were	unable	to	sway	the	new	majority.	Their	position	stressed	the	strict	limitations	on	licenses	in	Pennsylvania	and	the	monopoly	granted	by	the	Liquor	Commission	to	the	Moose	Lodge	based	on	those	limitations.	They	also	saw	no	reason	to	limit	the	holding	to	the	guest	policy	when	the	state	regulation	required	the	club	to	enforce	a	discriminatory	policy	as	to	members	and	eventually	guests.	They	cited	Justice	Harlan’s	eloquent	dissent	in	the	
Civil	Rights	Cases315	which	argued	that	anyone	“wielding	power	under	State	authority	for	the	public	benefit	or	the	public	convenience”316	could	not	be	allowed	to	discriminate	against	others	based	on	race.	Justice	Brennan	went	further	to	argue	that	the	deep	involvement	in	regulating	the	operation	of	the	liquor	business	at	the	Moose	Lodge	made	the	club	a	state	actor.	It	is	in	this	decision	that	the	wall	of	protection	around	discrimination	begins	to	rise	after	years	of	being	torn	down	by	the	Warren	Court.	
	 A	lengthy	battle	over	use	of	public	park	facilities	by	private	segregated	schools	and	other	groups	served	as	the	background	for	the	next	race	discrimination	case	for	the	
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Court.317	The	City	of	Montgomery,	Alabama,	had	an	ordinance	barring	use	of	parks	not	designated	for	their	race	that	was	stricken	more	than	15	years	before	the	present	case.	Following	that	ruling	the	city	entered	into	an	agreement	with	the	YMCA	to	operate	certain	programs	using	public	facilities	where	the	practice	of	segregation	was	continued	by	the	private	YMCA	organization.	That	was	held	to	be	state	action	in	violation	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	since	the	city	had	merely	assigned	its	operation	of	the	facilities	to	the	YMCA	to	maintain	segregated	use.	That	litigation	ended	in	an	agreed	order	in	which	the	city	agreed	to	operate	the	facilities	on	an	equal	basis	with	a	requirement	that	progress	reports	be	provided	to	the	court	every	six	months.	This	case	arises	out	of	an	exception	to	the	first	progress	report	claiming	that	the	city	was	allowing	segregated	schools	and	other	segregated	groups	to	use	the	facilities.	The	District	Court	granted	an	injunction	barring	the	city	from	allowing	use	of	the	parks	and	facilities	to	segregated	schools	and	groups	based	on	the	requirements	of	the	city	to	maintain	a	desegregated	school	system	and	by	allowing	the	private	schools	to	use	the	facilities	without	cost	placed	the	city	in	a	position	of	supporting	segregated	schools	and	groups.	
	 The	Court	of	Appeals	upheld	the	part	of	the	injunction	that	prohibited	exclusive	use	of	facilities	by	segregated	private	schools	but	held	that	non-exclusive	use	did	not	violate	the	Constitution	or	the	previous	desegregation	orders.	In	ruling	that	private	non-school	groups	could	not	be	barred	from	use	of	the	parks	the	Court	of	Appeals	found	no	relationship	to	sustain	state	action	(citing	Burton)	and	that	barring	those	groups	from	park	use	violated	their	right	to	freedom	of	association	based	on	Moose	Lodge.	That	
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holding	places	the	right	of	private	groups	to	discriminate	beyond	the	reach	of	state	action	and	court	intervention.	Based	on	that	ruling	the	District	Court	amended	its	order	to	remove	the	provision	prohibiting	the	City	from	allowing	non-exclusive	use	of	the	parks	by	private	schools	or	school	affiliated	groups.	
	 Justice	Blackmun	wrote	for	the	majority	which	consisted	of	the	5	most	recently	named	members	of	the	Court	by	Republican	Presidents.	He	begins	with	the	reminder	that	the	Civil	Rights	Cases	holding	was	that	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	did	not	reach	individual	action	but	reached	any	sort	of	state	action,	whether	in	law	or	in	practice.	The	issues	included	whether	the	desegregation	order	had	been	violated	and	whether	the	city	allowing	segregated	private	schools	and	other	private	groups	to	use	its	facilities	was	state	action	in	support	of	discrimination.	
	 	The	Court	had	little	difficulty	holding	that	the	grant	of	exclusive	use	of	facilities	by	segregated	groups	created	a	“separate	but	equal”	situation	and	also	supported	segregated	schools	in	violation	of	the	local	school	desegregation	order.	What	was	not	so	evident	to	the	Court	was	that	non-exclusive	use,	allowed	by	the	Circuit	Court’s	ruling,	was	a	violation	of	equal	protection.	That	decision	was	not	possible	with	a	record	that	failed	to	provide	what	sort	of	non-exclusive	uses	might	be	possible.	The	Court	distinguished	Moose	Lodge	because	it	was	an	action	against	the	private	group	as	opposed	to	the	city.	The	key	determination	would	be	whether	the	city’s	actions	allowing	use	by	private	groups	by	being	involved	in	determining	who	uses	what	facilities	and	providing	a	scheme	that	puts	the	city	in	the	position	of	making	that	decision	rather	than	simply	allowing	all	groups	to	use	the	facilities.	
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	 Important	in	the	Court’s	discussion	of	the	issue	was	the	position	that	mere	provision	of	generalized	government	services	does	not	implicate	the	state	in	the	discrimination	of	those	to	whom	services	are	provided.	Utilities	and	public	safety	were	held	in	the	same	light	as	municipal	recreational	facilities	that	did	not	engage	the	state	in	discrimination	in	a	way	that	meets	the	state	action	requirement.	If	the	city	uses	its	position	to	select	groups	and	provide	facilities	to	certain	groups	over	other	groups	that	might	be	adequate	to	involve	the	state	in	the	discrimination	of	those	private	groups.	
	 Again,	the	Court	refused	to	adopt	a	clear	definition	and	opts	instead	to	hold	that	each	case	is	different	and	requires	a	careful	examination	of	its	facts	to	determine	if	state	action	exists.	Leaving	that	open	to	interpretation	the	Court	remands	the	case	to	gather	the	evidence	to	support	the	perusal	of	facts	that	is	required	to	find	or	rule	out	state	action.	The	constant	reference	to	the	need	to	parse	the	facts	in	each	case	is	a	major	factor	in	the	difficulty	making	sense	of	the	language	of	the	decisions	and	creating	categories	that	work	well	together.	The	inconsistency	in	language	can	only	be	overcome	by	looking	at	the	surrounding	political	context	and	the	scope	of	the	inquiry	by	the	Court.	
	 Cases	based	on	racial	discrimination	took	a	turn	away	from	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	during	this	era	as	statutes	based	on	the	Thirteenth	Amendment	which	has	no	state	action	limitation	were	used	to	support	claims.	One	interesting	case	when	looking	at	charter	schools	involved	private	schools	in	Virginia	that	refused	admission	to	
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African	American	students.318	Using	Section	1981,	a	civil	rights	act	from	1866	that	bars	discrimination	in	private	contracts,	the	parents	sued	for	admission	for	their	children.	The	Court	agreed	for	these	non-sectarian	private	schools	that	they	could	not	discriminate	based	on	race.	Strangely,	the	Court	left	open	the	question	of	whether	a	religious	school	could	maintain	racially	discriminatory	admission	policies.	In	a	footnote,	the	Court	distinguished	these	private	schools	from	private	social	clubs	based	on	their	advertisements	for	students	quoting	the	Circuit	Court	to	say	the	schools	were	“managed	by	private	persons	and	not	direct	recipients	of	public	funds”	but	“their	actual	and	potential	constituency,	however,	is	more	public	than	private.”319	
	 The	other	group	of	race	based	cases	during	this	period	was	the	peremptory	challenge	cases.	Previously,	the	Court	had	rejected	the	chance	to	extend	the	reach	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	into	peremptory	challenges320	but	in	these	additional	cases	racially	discriminatory	use	of	peremptory	challenges	was	disallowed	to	private	litigants	in	a	civil	case321,	racially	discriminatory	peremptory	use	by	the	defense	counsel	in	a	criminal	case322,	and	discriminatory	peremptory	challenges	in	a	civil	paternity	suit	striking	all	males	from	the	panel.323	The	previous	holding	that	required	a	showing	of	a	
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practice	of	excluding	blacks	by	the	prosecutor324	was	overruled	in	favor	of	a	holding	that	merely	excluding	blacks	from	a	particular	jury	solely	based	on	race	was	not	permissible.325	Although	the	final	example	is	not	a	racial	discrimination	case	it	establishes	the	significance	of	the	administration	of	a	trial	and	reinforces	the	principle	that	the	judge	is	a	state	actor	and	in	control	of	jury	trial	proceedings	requiring	them	to	be	conducted	in	compliance	with	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	Each	of	those	cases	drew	dissents	claiming	that	the	holding	would	mark	the	end	of	peremptory	challenges	in	jury	trials	–	an	eventuality	that	has	not	come	to	pass.	
	 Given	the	history	of	the	ratification	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	the	racial	impetus	for	its	inclusion	in	the	Post-Civil	War	flurry	of	legislation	to	address	the	end	of	slavery	and	the	uncertain	status	of	the	former	slaves,	the	race	cases	have	invoked	more	expansive	Court	action	to	find	state	action	to	alleviate	outright	and	covert	discrimination.	It	is	in	the	cases	with	no	racial	issues	involved	where	the	state	action	doctrine	and	the	reach	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	face	the	most	difficult	issues.	The	series	of	cases	extending	beyond	racial	issues	in	this	era	has	erected	a	significant	wall	in	the	form	of	state	action	to	privilege	those	in	superior	positions	of	power	over	those	not	so	privileged.	
	 A	clear	retreat	in	state	action	by	this	Court	is	evidenced	by	holding	that	Viet	Nam	War	protestors	could	be	prevented	from	picketing	in	a	privately	owned	but	shopping	
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center	open	to	the	public.326	Marsh	was	rejected	by	the	Court	as	“an	economic	anomaly	of	the	past”327	and	in	no	way	applicable	to	current	economic	reality	isolating	it	as	a	singular	case	with	little	precedential	value.	The	language	in	Amalgamated	Food	that	referred	to	that	shopping	center	as	a	business	district	and	the	equivalent	of	Marsh	were	dismissed	as	“unnecessary	to	the	decision”328	thus	eliminating	that	holding	as	applicable	to	the	present	case.	The	Court	then	distinguished	Logan	Valley329		by	noting	that	the	subject	of	the	picketing	in	that	case	was	directly	related	to	the	business	and	the	war	protestors	were	raising	an	issue	not	related	to	the	businesses	in	the	center	the	Court	opened	the	door	for	consideration	of	the	subject	matter	of	speech	in	a	First	Amendment	case.	Although	the	Court	did	not	expressly	reverse	Logan	Valley,	it	eviscerated	its	holding	with	this	first	attempt	to	rely	upon	it.	
	Later,	in	Hudgens	v.	NLRB330	the	Court	upheld	a	ban	on	union	picketing	on	shopping	center	land	declaring	that	labor	law	would	take	precedence	over	the	First	Amendment	because	the	acts	of	the	shopping	center	owner	could	not	be	fairly	attributed	to	the	state.	Vigorous	dissents	were	filed	in	both	Lloyd	Corp.	and	Hudgens	and	in	the	latter	case	the	dissent	argued	that	the	distinguishing	factor	in	Lloyd	Corp.	was	not	present	in	Hudgens	and	therefore	the	First	Amendment	should	apply	to	be	consistent	
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329	Amalgamated	Food	Employees	Union	v.	Logan	Valley	Plaza,	391	U.S.	308	(1968).	
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with	the	Logan	Valley	holding.	Stare	decisis	did	not	carry	the	day	and	the	law	remains	that	shopping	centers	are	not	state	actors	for	purposes	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	
	 	In	what	was	a	similar	situation	involving	protestors	in	a	shopping	center	the	Court	deferred	to	a	more	expansive	California	constitutional	provision	and	rejected	the	arguments	of	the	shopping	center	owners	that	to	allow	protestors	on	their	private	property	infringed	their	property	rights	and	their	own	free	speech	rights.331	The	Court	held	the	property	intrusion	was	minimal	and	the	owners	could	post	signs	making	clear	that	they	did	not	agree	with	the	positions	of	the	protestors.	The	Court	will	uphold	state	laws	and	constitutional	provisions	that	exceed	the	protections	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	and	will	defer	to	a	state	court’s	interpretation	of	its	own	laws	in	such	cases.	Even	when	state	provisions	bar	any	action	not	required	by	Equal	Protection	in	school	busing	the	Court	has	deferred	to	the	state	finding	no	federal	constitutional	violation	in	that	limitation.332	
	 Cases	involving	utilities	and	their	action	in	terminating	service	to	customers	began	to	create	more	of	a	wall	against	a	state	action	finding	in	this	era.	The	cases	are	based	on	claims	of	a	loss	of	property	without	due	process	and	two	cases	demonstrate	the	importance	of	a	state	action	finding.	The	Associate	Justice	Rehnquist	wrote	for	a	divided	Court	in	the	first	case	involving	a	private	utility	that	terminated	service	with	no	hearing,	no	notice,	and	no	opportunity	to	pay	following	those	safeguards.333	The	
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customer	alleged	that	the	extensive	regulation	scheme	and	partial	monopoly	afforded	the	utility	by	the	state	implicated	the	state	in	the	acts	of	the	utility.	The	procedure	used	for	termination	was	included	in	the	utility’s	tariff	filed	with	the	state	but	the	Court	held	the	state	had	not	mandated	that	procedure	nor	explicitly	approved	it.	The	benign	neglect	of	the	state	in	the	situation	was	not	adequate	to	attribute	the	procedure	to	the	state	and	thus	state	action	was	not	found	to	be	present.	Without	such	a	finding,	the	Court	did	not	need	to	reach	the	question	of	whether	the	right	was	a	property	interest	subject	to	due	process	requirements.	
In	a	later	decision,	a	municipal	utility	faced	the	same	claim	under	a	statute	which	allowed	termination	for	cause.334	There	the	Court	found	a	property	right	that	required	due	process	with	the	question	of	state	action	based	on	the	municipal	ownership	of	the	utility.	This	difference	highlights	how	the	question	of	state	action	determines	whether	the	Constitution	applies	and	how	the	same	activity	operated	by	the	public	is	required	to	provide	due	process	while	a	private	operator	is	not.	Three	Justices	in	dissent	argued	that	the	constitutional	question	should	not	arise	and	that	the	state	law	was	sufficient	to	protect	the	rights	of	the	customer.	Rehnquist	and	Burger	agreed	with	that	viewpoint	seeking	to	further	limit	the	reach	of	the	Constitution.	
Creditor	remedies	raised	issue	of	how	much	involvement	is	attributable	to	the	state	under	commercial	statutes	including	private	remedies	for	creditors	that	would	previously	have	been	handled	in	the	courts.	Again,	with	Rehnquist	writing	for	the	
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majority,	the	Court	took	a	very	limited	view	of	the	reach	of	the	state.335	In	the	case	a	warehouseman	sold	property	of	a	customer	under	provisions	of	the	Uniform	Commercial	Code	as	adopted	by	the	state.	By	the	provisions	of	that	code	the	warehouseman	could	sell	property	found	within	a	storage	space	when	payments	were	behind	to	apply	to	the	amount	owed.	The	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	found	that	the	state	had	delegated	part	of	its	power	to	allow	the	public	sale	without	any	resort	to	the	courts	and	thus	was	implicated	in	the	process.	The	Court	disagreed	and	limited	the	public	function	argument	to	situations	involving	matters	previously	exclusively	a	state	activity.	Noting	that	there	were	other	remedies	for	settling	disputes	the	Court	limited	its	inquiry	into	whether	the	state	had	been	involved	in	this	specific	sale	finding	that	it	had	not.	Again,	as	a	passive	participant	acquiescing	in	the	sale	the	state	could	not	be	held	responsible	for	it.	The	dissenters	argued	that	the	sale	took	place	only	because	it	was	authorized	by	the	state	and	thus	implicated	the	state	in	the	way	the	sale	took	place.	The	limitation	of	the	Court	in	looking	only	to	this	sale	and	whether	the	state	was	involved	in	it	points	to	the	future	of	state	action	cases	in	this	era.	
When	a	creditor	involved	law	enforcement	to	sequester	the	property	of	a	debtor	the	Court	did	find	state	action	with	Justices	Brennan	and	Blackmun	switching	sides	with	Justice	White	writing	for	the	majority.336	The	original	prejudgment	attachment	was	dissolved	after	finding	that	it	failed	to	meet	statutory	grounds	for	such	a	seizure	and	the	debtor	claimed	a	deprival	of	his	property	without	due	process	by	the	creditor,	a	private	
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party.	Based	on	the	involvement	by	the	sheriff	in	the	sequestering	of	the	property	the	majority	found	that	the	state	acted	in	concert	with	the	creditor	in	depriving	the	debtor	of	property	making	the	action	of	the	creditor	attributable	to	the	state.	Justice	Rehnquist	penned	a	dissent	arguing	that	the	state	was	not	implicated	when	a	private	party	invokes	a	valid	legal	process	but	failed	to	garner	a	majority	for	that	view.	
The	same	principle	resulted	when	a	landlord	acted	to	remove	a	trailer	from	his	trailer	park	before	a	hearing	on	the	pending	eviction	case	and	without	a	court	order.337	The	landlord	asked	the	sheriff	to	be	present	when	he	forcibly	removed	the	trailer	and	the	sheriff	complied	with	that	request.	Over	the	objections	of	the	trailer	owner	and	under	the	supervision	of	the	sheriff	the	landlord	unhooked	utilities	and	anchors	and	pulled	the	trailer	from	the	park,	taking	it	to	another	property	and	damaging	it	in	the	process.	Both	the	landlord	and	the	sheriff	were	found	by	the	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	to	be	engaged	in	state	action	but	held	it	was	not	a	seizure	under	the	Fourth	Amendment.	A	unanimous	Court	found	the	involvement	of	the	sheriff	was	not	simply	assisting	in	a	legal	procedure	but	made	law	enforcement	a	full	participant	in	a	process	the	sheriff	knew	to	be	occurring	without	a	court	order	of	eviction.	Because	the	sheriff	and	landlord	worked	in	concert	both	were	found	to	be	state	actors	and	the	seizure	was	found	to	be	unreasonable	under	the	Fourth	Amendment	made	applicable	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	the	state.	
																																								 																				
337	Soldal	v.	Cook	County,	506	U.S.	56	(1992).	
	 146	
The	probate	of	an	estate	in	Oklahoma	gave	rise	to	a	similar	claim	that	state	involvement	with	a	private	individual	could	equate	to	state	action	on	the	part	of	the	private	individual.338	Notice	of	the	beginning	of	a	claim	period	was	simply	published	in	a	local	newspaper	as	allowed	by	statute.	Creditors	whose	actual	address	was	known	were	not	sent	notice	by	mail	or	any	other	means	individually.	When	creditors	discovered	that	their	claims	were	barred	they	sued	claiming	a	taking	of	their	property	interest	without	due	process.	The	central	question	for	this	study	was	whether	the	act	of	the	estate	following	a	state	statutory	procedure	could	be	considered	state	action.	Based	on	the	probate	court’s	intimate	involvement	in	the	administration	of	the	estate,	including	the	beginning	of	the	claim	period,	the	Court	held	that	such	substantial	involvement	must	be	considered	state	action.	With	that	finding	the	statutory	process	was	found	lacking	in	due	process	for	failing	to	provide	adequate	notice	where	possible.	Only	Chief	Justice	Rehnquist	dissented	claiming	no	distinction	between	an	Indiana	statute	that	allowed	ownership	of	mineral	rights	to	devolve	to	the	surface	owner	if	not	active	for	20	years	and	the	2	month	claim	period	of	the	estate	claim	statute	in	a	pending	estate.	He	argued	that	there	could	be	no	state	action	based	solely	on	the	court’s	“perfunctory	administrative	involvement”339	in	the	estate.	
Judicial	immunity	enjoyed	by	a	judge	issuing	a	wrongful	injunction	does	not	shield	the	private	parties	that	conspired	with	the	judge	to	gain	issuance	of	that	writ	even	though	his	status	as	a	state	actor	does	extend	to	those	private	parties	to	make	
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them	liable	for	constitutional	deprivations.340	The	involvement	of	the	judge	did	not	work	to	extend	the	immunity	enjoyed	by	the	jurist	to	those	private	parties	who	worked	with	the	judge	to	deprive	the	claimants	of	their	property	without	due	process.		
A	public	defender	representing	a	defendant	in	a	criminal	case	is	not	a	state	actor	because	his	duty	is	not	to	the	state	but	to	the	defendant.341	That	rule	is	changed	if	the	public	defender	is	not	merely	providing	representation	to	the	defendant	but	is	engaged	in	a	conspiracy	with	prosecutors	and	judges	to	deprive	a	criminal	defendant	of	his	constitutional	rights.342	Like	the	judge	working	with	private	parties	in	the	illegal	injunction	the	difference	in	result	for	public	defenders	comes	with	the	conspiracy	with	state	actors	in	depriving	someone	of	rights	and	not	arising	out	of	normal	representation	of	a	criminal	defendant.	
Not	all	professional	relationships	mirror	the	situation	with	a	lawyer	acting	as	a	public	defender	while	being	paid	by	the	state.	A	prison	physician,	an	employee	of	the	state,	while	acting	as	a	professional	in	treating	a	prisoner	remains	a	state	actor	because	his	duty	aligns	with	that	of	the	state.343	He	had	the	responsibility	of	a	physician	to	heal	his	patient	and	the	state	was	responsible	for	the	safety	and	welfare	of	those	in	its	custody	while	imprisoned.	Because	those	duties	aligned	there	was	no	reason	to	treat	
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the	physician	as	anything	but	a	state	actor	liable	under	the	Eighth	Amendment	for	mistreating	a	prisoner	in	his	capacity	as	the	prison	physician.	
First	Amendment	rights	have	always	enjoyed	broad	support	in	the	Court	and	even	the	Justices	less	willing	to	extend	individual	rights	are	able	to	find	state	action	to	support	a	claim	of	violation	of	that	right.	Justice	Scalia,	who	has	been	classified	as	a	singular	proponent	of	his	own	textualism,344	found	state	action	in	what	is	commonly	known	as	Amtrak,	a	private	entity.345	The	issue	before	the	Court	was	whether	Amtrak	was	truly	a	private	entity	or	a	government	one.	Secondarily	the	issue	was	whether	Amtrak	was	so	related	to	the	government	as	to	be	acting	on	behalf	of	the	government	thus	making	a	private	entity	a	state	actor.	Several	features	of	the	analysis	are	relevant	to	the	possible	status	of	charter	schools.	
Amtrak’s	charter	expressly	denied	it	status	as	a	government	agency	but	the	Court	looked	beyond	that	label	and	held	it	to	apply	to	issues	like	immunity	or	other	matters	within	the	control	of	Congress	but	not	as	to	constitutional	status.	Following	a	long	description	of	the	history	of	the	creation	and	operation	of	Amtrak	the	Court	held	it	to	be	an	agency	of	the	United	States	Government	constrained	by	the	Constitution	because	it	was	“government-created	and	-controlled.”346	It	was	created	“explicitly	for	the	furtherance	of	federal	governmental	goals”347	and	was	governed	by	a	board	largely	
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appointed	by	the	government.	Although	dictum	suggests	that	the	corporation	would	also	be	considered	acting	as	an	agent	of	the	government	even	if	not	a	true	government	agency,	the	holding	is	limited	to	the	finding	that	Amtrak	was	a	government	agency	limited	by	the	Constitution.	
In	dissent,	Justice	O’Connor	suggested	that	the	argument	that	Amtrak	was	a	government	agency	was	precluded	by	failure	of	the	petition	for	certiorari	to	directly	raise	that	question	and	she	posits	that	the	only	issue	before	the	Court	was	whether	as	a	private	entity	Amtrak’s	actions	could	be	attributed	to	the	government.	As	to	that	issue	she	adopted	a	very	narrow	test	finding	that	the	government	was	not	involved	in	the	decision	to	limit	the	advertising	appearing	on	Amtrak	trains	and	thus	the	prohibition	of	the	display	was	not	subject	to	constitutional	scrutiny.	
The	employees	of	two	separate	privately	owned	correctional	facility	operators	were	claimed	to	have	deprived	prisoners	of	their	rights	in	cases	that	arrived	at	the	Court	on	separate	issues.	The	cases	share	significant	parallels	to	charter	school	cases	in	that	each	involves	the	privatization	of	a	governmental	function	that	lacks	exclusivity.	The	details	of	these	decisions,	both	made	by	the	Court	in	the	later	years	of	the	Burger/Rehnquist	Court,	demonstrate	the	limitations	that	the	path	of	decisions	has	put	into	place	during	the	era.		
In	the	first	the	employees	sought	qualified	immunity,	a	privilege	enjoyed	by	public	employees	working	in	publicly	run	prisons	when	charged	with	a	§1983	claim	for	
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deprivation	of	rights	under	color	of	state	law.348	The	Court	based	its	decision	on	a	recently	decided	claim	against	private	parties	involved	in	a	Lugar349	attachment	situation.350	Wyatt	detailed	the	basis	for	immunity	for	government	officials	and	rejected	its	application	to	the	private	citizens	in	that	case.	What	is	unusual	about	the	facts	was	raised	in	the	dissent	as	“passing	strange”351	that	a	party	can	be	held	acting	as	a	state	actor	under	color	of	state	law	while	denied	the	immunity	of	the	public	employee	for	the	sole	reason	that	they	are	not	in	fact	public	employees.	The	result	of	this	reasoning	is	that	the	private	person	is	held	liable	as	a	state	actor	without	the	immunity.	Defenses	remain	viable	but	those	require	determinations	of	fact	that	may	require	trial	while	immunities	serve	to	terminate	litigation	at	the	start.	
The	dissent	argued	that	the	immunity	question	should	be	consistent	with	the	“under	color	of	state	law”	determination.	If	the	actor	was	acting	with	state	authority	then	immunity	should	be	granted	in	the	same	way	as	if	the	actor	were	a	government	employee.		
The	second	case	occurred	in	a	privately	operated	halfway	house	where	the	inmate	alleged	that	employees	injured	him	negligently.352	Asserting	a	claim	based	on	a	case	that	created	a	right	to	sue	federal	employees	for	damages	while	in	prison	
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custody353	the	injured	prisoner	sought	compensation	from	the	corporate	operator	of	the	halfway	house	after	the	dismissal	of	the	corporate	employees	on	statute	of	limitations	grounds.	The	majority	framed	the	issue	as	one	of	extending	the	Bivens	rule	to	allow	prisoners	in	private	prisons	to	sue	corporate	operators	while	those	in	government	facilities	would	not	be	able	to	sue	the	agency	and	would	be	limited	to	the	individual	officers.	The	dissent	written	by	Justice	Stevens	and	joined	by	three	Justices	argues	that	preventing	suit	against	the	corporate	operator	made	the	rights	of	prisoners	in	the	two	types	of	facilities	asymmetrical.	They	argued	that	allowing	suit	against	the	corporate	operator	but	barring	suit	against	the	federal	government	would	balance	the	rights	since	the	corporate	operator	was	the	agent	of	the	government	like	the	prison	officer	in	the	government	operated	facility.	In	the	discussions,	there	was	no	question	about	the	acts	of	the	operator	being	anything	but	state	action	since	the	entire	case	is	built	on	the	Fourth	Amendment.	That	assumption	of	state	action	is	tacit	but	present	in	the	ruling.	
One	argument	often	made	during	this	period	is	that	the	state	is	so	deeply	involved	in	regulating	or	directing	a	private	enterprise	as	to	become	responsible	for	its	decisions	and	actions.	That	argument	was	a	part	of	what	was	involved	in	Burton354	but	that	case	was	so	limited	to	the	specific	facts	of	a	private	lessee	of	state	property	that	is	weak	authority	for	much	else.	Moose	Lodge355	provided	then	Justice	Rehnquist	with	his	
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355	Moose	Lodge	No.	107	v.	Irvis,	407	U.S.	163	(1972).	
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first	opportunity	to	shape	state	action	and	that	was	followed	by	the	two	collection	cases356	in	which	Rehnquist	continued	to	whittle	away	the	state	action	expansion	of	earlier	years.	Three	decisions	issued	the	same	day	further	shaped	the	concept	of	state	regulatory	involvement	of	private	entities	and	how	that	might	involve	state	action.	Two	of	those	cases	found	no	state	action	and	the	majority	spoke	through	the	pen	of	Chief	Justice	Burger	on	one	and	Justice	Rehnquist	on	the	other.	The	third	case,	finding	state	action,	drew	a	dissent	from	Chief	Justice	Burger	and	Justice	Powell,	joined	by	Justices	Rehnquist	and	O’Connor.	That	dissent	reveals	as	much	about	the	issue	as	do	the	opinions	in	the	other	two	cases.	
The	first	of	the	cases	considered	here	involved	private	school	teachers	who	complained	that	their	dismissal	was	a	violation	of	their	First	Amendment	speech	rights.357	Ordinarily	there	would	be	little	question	that	a	private	school	was	not	subject	to	constitutional	limitations	but	this	school	presented	a	unique	private	school	arrangement.	What	made	it	most	private	is	that	the	school	was	operated	by	a	private	board	of	directors	without	any	public	officials	as	members	and	with	no	part	of	the	selection	being	carried	out	by	public	officials.	Looking	only	at	that	issue	it	is	a	simple	case	with	no	state	action	but	the	state	is	much	more	involved	that	such	a	cursory	look	reveals	and	that	raises	difficult	questions	of	the	publicity	of	the	school.	
By	a	contractual	arrangement	with	a	public	school	district,	the	students	graduating	from	the	school	received	diplomas	from	that	district.	A	contract	was	also	in	
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place	with	a	state	mental	health	agency	to	provide	services	to	students.	Tuition	from	these	arrangements	amounted	to	more	than	90%	of	the	revenue	for	the	school	and	virtually	all	students	in	attendance	were	able	to	attend	because	a	public	agency	paid	their	tuition.	The	state	law	required	schools	receiving	tuition	payments	to	meet	detailed	and	extensive	regulations	to	which	the	school	had	to	conform.	Some	of	those	regulations	related	to	personnel	standards	and	procedures	and	a	requirement	to	maintain	those	on	file	along	with	job	descriptions.	The	complainant	was	a	counselor	at	the	school	hired	under	a	federal	grant	distributed	through	a	state	agency.	One	condition	of	the	grant	was	that	the	agency	approve	initial	hiring	decisions	of	those	hired	using	grant	funds	to	assure	the	agency	that	the	person	hired	was	qualified	for	the	position.	The	trial	court	ruled	that	the	school	provided	a	public	function	and	was	therefore	a	state	actor.	The	Court	of	Appeals	reversed	that	finding	and	dismissed	the	claim	holding	that	the	state	had	not	exercised	any	control	over	the	school’s	personnel	decisions.	
The	second	case	involved	a	nursing	home	facility	that	made	decisions	as	to	necessity	of	a	level	of	care	to	satisfy	Medicaid	eligibility	requirements.358	The	privately	owned	and	operated	nursing	home	was	subject	to	extensive	regulation	including	a	requirement	to	review	facility	utilization	by	patients	on	a	periodic	basis	to	assess	justification	for	the	level	of	care	provided	by	Medicaid	funds.	Upon	determining	that	the	patient	needs	a	different	level	of	care	the	facility	notifies	a	state	agency	that	then	changes	the	level	of	funding	for	that	patient	to	match	the	recommended	level	of	care.	The	decision	by	the	facility	to	lower	the	level	of	care	was	communicated	to	the	state	
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agency	and	following	administrative	hearings	the	agency	affirmed	the	action	and	notified	the	patients	that	their	funding	would	be	discontinued	unless	they	moved	to	a	lower	level	of	care	in	accord	with	the	facility’s	determination.	The	patients	challenged	the	decision	made	without	notice	of	a	hearing	and	an	opportunity	to	be	heard	on	the	issue	in	a	claimed	violation	of	due	process	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	In	order	to	sustain	the	claim,	they	needed	to	establish	that	the	reduction	of	their	benefit	levels	was	the	result	of	state	action.	The	lower	courts	found	state	action	based	on	Jackson	v.	
Metropolitan	Edison	Co.	and	ordered	a	hearing	be	held	for	all	such	care	decisions	with	participation	by	the	patients.		
The	third	case	from	the	same	day	was	the	Lugar359	decision	in	which	the	majority	found	that	invoking	that	power	of	the	sheriff	to	carry	out	what	proved	to	be	an	erroneous	attachment	of	property	in	a	collection	action	was	sufficient	to	create	state	action	making	the	private	party	pursuing	the	collection	liable	for	a	due	process	violation.	The	dissent	is	the	focus	of	this	analysis	as	a	companion	to	the	other	two	cases	and	was	based	on	a	belief	that	the	private	citizen	should	not	be	held	to	a	constitutional	standard	by	merely	seeking	law	enforcement	to	carry	out	an	attachment.	The	collection	cases	will	not	follow	the	dissent	and	the	dissenters	will	join	in	later	decisions	in	such	cases	finding	state	action	in	the	inclusion	of	law	enforcement	in	pursuing	collection	cases.		
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The	two	cases	finding	state	action	present	a	similar	issue	of	how	much	regulation	is	required	to	make	a	private	institution	into	a	state	actor.	Neither	involved	direct	action	by	a	state	official	but	each	presented	a	level	of	involvement	in	the	larger	process	that	could	be	taken	to	make	the	state	a	partner	in	the	acts	complained	of.	A	wide	scope	of	inquiry	would	look	to	the	full	situation	to	include	consideration	of	reactive	state	action.	A	narrow	scope	of	inquiry	would	end	at	the	point	of	the	single	action	that	caused	the	alleged	deprivation	of	rights.	By	limiting	the	scope	the	Court	did	much	to	eliminate	the	argument	that	the	state	extensively	regulating	the	acts	of	a	private	party	becomes	a	joint	actor	invoking	the	Constitution	in	those	acts.	What	is	inconsistent	with	that	limitation	is	the	commonly	quoted	language	that	a	determination	of	state	action	
As	noted	above,	the	first	case	directly	addressing	this	issue	was	Moose	
Lodge360and	the	newly	appointed	Justice	Rehnquist	deftly	avoided	the	regulatory	issue	as	a	characteristic	of	state	action	while	granting	some	small	relief	in	that	racially	based	case.	State	action	was	not	the	basis	for	the	decision,	however,	and	the	relief	granted	rested	on	the	direct	regulatory	language	issued	by	the	state	rather	than	the	behavior	of	the	private	club.	More	directly	presenting	the	issue	two	years	later	was	a	claim	that	a	private	utility	terminated	service	without	adequate	notice	to	the	consumer.361	That	decision	focused	on	the	lack	of	involvement	of	the	state	directly	in	the	termination	of	service	despite	the	fact	that	the	company	was	heavily	regulated	by	the	state,	was	at	
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least	in	a	partial	monopoly	situation	providing	utility	services,	and	required	the	state’s	approval	of	its	general	tariff	although	not	specifically	for	its	termination	procedures.	The	narrowing	of	the	scope	of	inquiry	allowed	the	Court	to	look	only	to	this	termination	and	decide	that	the	state	did	not	participate	directly	in	it	to	allow	it	to	be	implicated	in	the	act.	
The	cases	decided	in	the	1982	term	then	raised	many	of	the	same	questions	in	a	different	circumstance.	Rather	than	collection	or	a	utility	the	private	parties	claimed	to	be	state	actors	are	a	nursing	home	and	a	private	school.	In	each	case	the	Court	found	them	to	be	free	of	the	onus	of	constitutional	limitation	despite	the	extensive	state	involvement	in	their	operations.	Each	claimant	also	argued	that	the	respondent	served	a	public	function	but	the	earlier	imposed	requirement	that	the	function	be	exclusively	the	realm	of	government	action	had	already	made	that	argument	unlikely	to	serve	again	as	the	basis	for	state	action.	For	that	reason,	this	analysis	will	not	address	that	position	in	these	cases.	
One	distinction	of	Blum	is	that	the	defendants	in	the	case	were	the	state	employees	who	affirmed	the	decision	of	the	nursing	care	facility	to	reduce	the	approved	level	of	service.	Thus,	the	claim	was	against	state	actors	claiming	that	they	were	responsible	for	the	acts	of	the	private	nursing	care	facility	operator	in	reducing	the	approved	level	of	care.	Despite	that	distinction	there	is	no	difference	in	how	the	acts	are	analyzed	by	the	Court.	The	Court	draws	an	analogy	between	the	decision	of	medical	staff	to	enact	a	lower	level	of	care	based	on	regulatory	language	requiring	them	to	place	patients	in	an	appropriate	level	of	care	and	the	decisions	made	they	a	public	defender	
	 157	
representing	a	client	in	Polk.362	Despite	the	absolute	duty	of	a	lawyer	to	act	in	the	interest	of	the	client	the	Court	holds	the	decision	by	a	nursing	facility	in	pursuit	of	the	regulatory	requirement	of	the	state	to	move	patients	to	certain	levels	of	care	based	on	their	condition	to	be	essentially	the	same.	It	is	enough	for	the	Court	that	there	are	“professional	standards	not	established	by	the	State”363	upon	which	the	facilities	may	act.		
Further	distinguishing	the	decision	to	reduce	the	level	of	service	from	the	decisions	of	a	lawyer	representing	a	client	is	the	threat	of	state	exclusion	of	participation	in	Medicaid	patient	care	of	any	facility	that	over-serves	Medicaid	patients.	The	Court	dismisses	the	threat	of	those	penalties	as	any	sort	of	coercive	action	by	the	state	that	might	make	it	a	partner	in	reducing	levels	of	care	for	Medicaid	patients.	Even	a	regulatory	requirement	that	the	state	officials	review	the	assessments	of	recommended	levels	of	care	is	held	not	to	involve	state	involvement	based	on	the	lack	of	any	requirement	for	the	state	to	approve	or	disapprove	those	decisions	as	to	specific	patients.	
A	vigorous	dissent	by	Justice	Brennan	accompanied	by	Justice	Marshall	argues	that	with	increasing	regulation	by	the	government	comes	increasing	scrutiny	of	the	acts	of	those	required	to	meet	those	regulations.	Noting	the	reach	of	power	by	government	inherent	in	a	regulatory	scheme	as	comprehensive	as	Medicaid	the	dissenters	argue	that	it	extends	state	action	beyond	the	majority	opinion’s	narrow	scope	of	inquiry.	It	
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refers	to	the	majority	opinion	as	taking	a	“pigeonhole	approach”364	rather	than	a	complete	examination	of	the	regulatory	scheme	and	the	power	exercised	by	the	government	within	the	scheme	to	avoid	a	finding	of	state	action.	It	is	a	criticism	well	taken	and	will	apply	to	many	of	the	state	action	decisions	during	this	era	of	the	Court.	
The	other	state	action	case	handed	down	the	same	day	is	facially	more	related	to	the	question	of	charter	schools	because	the	actor	in	question	is	a	private	school.	It	lacks	the	charter	arrangement	but	certainly	maintains	a	strong	contractual	tie	to	the	state	in	many	ways.	Chief	Justice	Burger	wrote	for	the	majority	and	again	rejected	the	argument	that	the	extensive	regulatory	involvement	by	the	state	in	the	operation	of	the	school	was	inadequate	to	implicate	the	state	in	its	personnel	decision	to	terminate	certain	teachers.	The	Court	narrowed	its	inquiry	in	this	case	to	the	decision	to	terminate	a	teacher	ignoring	the	extensive	regulatory	and	financial	involvement	of	the	state	in	the	school’s	operation.	Citing	its	decision	of	the	same	day	in	Blum	the	majority	refuses	to	find	state	action	based	on	the	termination	because	the	decision	was	that	of	a	private	entity,	like	the	nursing	facility	in	Blum.	It	also	summarily	rejects	the	argument	that	the	extensive	funding	by	the	state	was	not	a	factor	and	compared	it	to	the	Medicaid	funding	received	by	the	nursing	care	facility.	
The	draws	an	analogy	to	Polk	once	again	by	arguing	that	the	public	defender	in	that	case	was	paid	by	the	state	just	as	the	school	relied	on	state	funds	to	exist	ignoring	the	special	duty	that	served	as	the	basis	for	Polk.	A	second	analogy	suggested	by	the	
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Court	between	the	school	relying	on	contractual	payments	from	the	state	and	companies	that	build	roads,	ships	and	other	public	structures	for	the	government	suggesting	that	their	acts	are	not	the	acts	of	the	government	based	on	that	revenue	stream.	Finally,	the	Court	rejects	a	state	action	finding	based	on	the	fact	that	the	government	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	personnel	decision	and	compares	it	to	Blum	in	which	the	actions	were	at	least	related	to	a	regulatory	scheme	of	the	government.	As	with	many	of	these	cases	the	public	function	argument	was	quickly	dispatched	claiming	that	even	schools	were	not	exclusively	the	province	of	the	state.	It	also	rejects	the	argument	that	the	relationship	of	the	school	to	the	state	was	a	“symbiotic”365	one	like	that	found	in	Burton	saying	repeating	the	comparison	to	any	government	contractor	providing	services	to	the	state.	
The	dissent	by	Justice	Marshall,	joined	by	Justice	Brennan,	cites	the	statutory	requirement	of	the	state	of	Massachusetts	to	provide	an	education	to	the	problem	students	served	by	the	school	in	this	case.	It	is	suggested	that	placement	of	the	students	in	the	school	and	relying	on	its	services	to	meet	that	statutory	obligation	made	the	school	a	proxy	for	the	state	and	thus	a	state	actor.	It	goes	on	to	argue	that	it	even	meets	the	“symbiotic	relationship”	test	of	Burton	based	on	heavy	regulation	of	the	school	serving	special	needs	students	and	the	complete	reliance	on	state	funds	for	its	existence.	The	dissenters	also	cite	the	vital	role	of	public	education	and	suggest	that	a	private	school	used	to	provide	that	essential	service	brings	it	within	the	range	of	state	actors	for	constitutional	purposes.	Finally,	it	distinguishes	the	role	of	contractors	
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building	roads	and	equipment	for	the	state	by	noting	that	this	contractor	is	performing	a	statutory	obligation	of	the	state	in	providing	educational	services.	The	dissent	characterizes	the	majority	opinion	as	“empty	formalism”366	and	suggests	a	“more	sensitive	and	flexible	interpretation”367	of	state	action	to	fit	the	realities	of	the	time.	
The	remaining	state	action	cases	of	the	era	raised	a	variety	of	arguments	for	state	action	but	little	new	law	was	developed.	The	United	States	Olympic	Committee	was	held	not	to	be	a	state	actor	based	on	its	exclusive	government	charter368	and	an	extensive	workers’	compensation	regulatory	scheme	did	not	convert	insurance	carriers	for	that	coverage	into	state	actors	making	decisions	about	payment	of	medical	bills.369	Both	of	those	cases	drew	dissents	from	the	members	of	the	Court	who	sought	a	broader	interpretation	of	state	action.	In	a	unanimous	decision	union	members	who	assaulted	and	drove	away	non-union	workers	were	not	state	actors	because	the	state	was	not	a	co-conspirator	in	that	activity.370	None	of	those	cases	extended	the	previous	law	of	state	action	significantly.	
Two	cases	presented	related	issues	with	the	earlier	case	authored	by	Justice	Stevens	drawing	a	dissent	by	four	Justices	and	the	latter	case	by	Justice	Souter	with	a	four	Justice	dissent	including	the	Chief	Justice.	The	first	involved	sanctions	by	the	
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368	San	Francisco	Arts	&	Athletics	v.	United	States	Olympic	Committee,	483	U.S.	522	(1987).	
369	American	Manufacturers	v.	Sullivan,	526	U.S.	40	(1999).	
370	United	Brotherhood	v.	Scott,	463	U.S.	825	(1983).	
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National	Collegiate	Athletic	Association	(NCAA)	imposed	on	the	University	of	Nevada	at	Las	Vegas	(UNLV)	for	irregularities	in	the	operation	of	its	basketball	program.371	The	sanctions	required	the	school	to	sever	its	ties	with	the	coach	during	a	period	of	probation	and	the	coach	filed	suit	in	Nevada	state	court	seeking	an	injunction	claiming	a	deprivation	of	property	without	due	process.	The	school	was	a	state	institution	and	the	NCAA	was	an	association	of	colleges	and	universities	both	private	and	public.	The	NCAA	was	governed	by	the	membership	meeting	in	annual	conventions	and	its	Council	and	several	committees.	It	maintained	as	a	policy	to	prevent	a	blurring	of	the	line	between	collegiate	and	professional	athletics	and	pursuant	to	that	duty	it	enacted	various	rules	and	enforced	them	against	violation	by	the	member	institutions.	It	did	not	have	the	power	to	sanction	individuals	but	did,	as	in	this	case,	require	an	institution	to	sever	ties	with	individuals	found	to	have	violated	rules	or	suffer	additional	consequences	as	an	institution.	The	Nevada	state	courts	held	that	the	NCAA	was	engaged	in	state	action	based	on	a	delegated	power	from	UNLV	and	ruled	in	favor	of	the	coach	on	all	counts.	
On	appeal	the	Court,	Chief	Justice	Rehnquist	writing	for	the	majority,	reversed	the	finding	of	state	action	by	the	NCAA.	The	majority	observes	that	this	is	an	unusual	case	because	the	state	had	not	“provided	a	mantle	of	authority	that	enhanced	the	power	of	the	harm-causing”372	private	entity.	The	actual	act	of	damage	was	committed	by	UNLV,	plainly	a	state	actor	subject	to	the	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	The	Court	noted	that	most	of	the	members	of	the	NCAA	are	outside	the	
																																								 																				
371	National	Collegiate	Athletic	Association	v.	Tarkanian,	488	U.S.	179	(1988).	
372	Id.	at	192.	
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State	of	Nevada	and	independent	of	any	state	law,	adding	dictum	to	note	that	the	result	might	be	different	if	its	activities	and	participants	were	all	confined	to	a	single	state.373	By	merely	accepting	the	NCAA’s	bylaws	and	standards	UNLV	had	not	become	responsible	for	their	content	but	could	only	withdraw	or	act	to	amend	those	bylaws	in	the	NCAA	process.	The	Court	noted	that	UNLV,	rather	than	assisting	the	NCAA	in	its	investigation	stood	in	opposition	to	it	throughout	the	process	and	thus	had	not	delegated	its	power	to	the	NCAA.	Acts	of	the	NCAA	were	based	on	its	policies	and	not	the	laws	of	the	State	of	Nevada	and	thus	it	could	not	be	held	to	be	a	state	actor.	
The	dissent	argued	that	a	private	party,	invoking	state	action	to	carry	out	a	decisive	act	could	become	a	state	actor	citing	Adickes374	and	Dennis.375	What	began	as	a	decision	of	the	NCAA	was	then	enacted	by	the	state	university	and	that	joint	action	was	deemed	by	the	dissent	to	be	state	action.	Had	UNLV	refused	to	enact	the	recommendations	of	the	NCAA	it	would	have	severed	that	connection	and	the	NCAA	could	not	be	considered	a	state	actor.	Without	the	power	of	the	state	institution	to	remove	the	coach,	the	NCAA	would	have	been	powerless	to	do	so.	This	line	of	argument	is	referred	to	in	a	footnote	in	the	majority	opinion	where	it	is	claimed	that	the	state	officials	in	the	two	cases	were	bad	actors	themselves	contrasted	with	the	asserted	innocence	of	UNLV	in	accepting	the	discipline	of	the	NCAA	and	terminating	the	coach.	Once	again,	the	scope	of	the	inquiry	was	limited	to	the	NCAA	without	truly	examining	
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374	Adickes	v.	S.H.Kress	&	Co,	398	U.S.	144	(1970).	
375	Dennis	v.	Sparks,	449	U.S.	24	(1980).	
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the	state	university	and	its	part	in	the	action	and	an	additional	layer	of	wrongdoing	was	assigned	to	the	two	cases	relied	upon	in	the	dissent.	
Thirteen	years	after	Tarkanian	the	Court	took	a	case	with	several	parallels	to	it	but	on	the	high	school	level.	In	Brentwood	Academy	v.	Tennessee	Secondary	School	
Athletic	Association376	the	Court	was	asked	to	review	the	imposition	of	sanctions	on	a	high	school	claiming	the	Association	was	a	state	actor	subject	to	constitutional	restraints.	The	Association	consisted	of	member	schools,	public	and	private,	and	was	governed	by	boards	and	councils	elected	by	members.	It	had	a	set	of	bylaws	and	regulations	that	set	out	various	aspects	of	how	high	school	athletics	must	be	operated	to	comply	with	the	association’s	standards	and	to	maintain	good	standing	in	the	association.	84	percent	of	the	schools	in	the	association	were	public	high	schools	and	the	membership	was	confined	to	schools	in	Tennessee.	The	individuals	who	served	on	the	various	boards	and	councils	governing	the	association	were	administrators	from	the	schools	who	conducted	the	business	of	the	association	during	school	hours.	Most	of	the	financial	support	for	the	association	came	from	public	schools.	Although	the	state	had	eliminated	a	requirement	that	the	state	board	of	education	serve	on	the	governing	board	of	the	association	that	practice	continued	and	the	employees	of	the	association	employees	were	eligible	to	participate	in	the	state	retirement	system.	
When	a	school	sued	the	association	for	imposing	sanctions	claiming	a	deprivation	of	constitutional	rights	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	the	issue	of	the	
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association’s	status	as	a	state	actor	was	the	central	issue	in	the	case.	The	trial	court	ruled	that	it	was	a	state	actor	and	the	Court	of	Appeals	reversed	that	finding.	The	Supreme	Court	took	the	case	on	certiorari	and	in	a	5-4	decision	held	that	the	TSSAA	was	a	state	actor.	This	time	Justice	Souter	penned	the	majority	opinion	and	Justice	Thomas	wrote	for	the	dissent	that	included	the	Chief	Justice.	Three	of	the	four	dissenters	had	voted	with	the	majority	in	Tarkanian377	while	only	a	single	Justice	from	that	decision	joined	the	majority	in	Brentwood	Academy.378		
The	extensive	involvement	of	the	state	in	the	operation	of	the	TSSAA	served	as	too	close	a	nexus	to	separate	the	state	from	the	private	association.	The	governance	by	public	employees	as	a	part	of	their	jobs,	the	treatment	of	its	employees	as	state	employees	and	the	observation	that	the	association	could	not	exist	without	the	overwhelming	participation	of	public	schools	all	added	to	a	clear	relationship	with	the	state.	The	fact	that	the	association	operated	within	a	single	state	was	also	cited	referring	to	the	dictum	in	Tarkanian.	By	considering	the	entire	relationship	the	Court	could	see	a	unity	of	interest	and	action	that	required	the	finding	that	the	TSSAA	was	a	state	actor	subject	to	constitutional	limitation.	
The	dissent	by	Justice	Thomas	asserts	that	the	majority	extends	state	action	beyond	any	previous	decision	and	cites	“common	sense”379	to	say	there	could	not	be	
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not	yet	on	the	Court.	
378	Justice	Stevens,	the	author	of	the	Tarkanian	majority	opinion	also	joined	the	majority	here	with	
Justices	Souter,	O’Connor	and	Ginsberg	were	not	on	the	Court	for	the	earlier	decision.	
379	Brentwood	Academy	v.	Tennessee	Secondary	School	Athletic	Association,	531	U.S.	at	306.	
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state	action	in	this	case	and	states	the	finding	“encroaches	upon	the	realm	of	individual	freedom	that	the	doctrine	was	meant	to	protect.”380	The	limitation	on	the	view	taken	by	the	dissent	is	that	it	looks	only	at	the	State	as	meaning	the	State	of	Tennessee	without	truly	considering	the	public	school	officials	that	govern	the	association	as	state	actors.	It	chastises	the	majority	for	not	defining	“entwinement”381	despite	the	long	history	of	the	Court	using	terms	not	well	defined	to	discuss	state	action.	Finally,	as	a	warning	of	what	might	happen	as	a	result	of	the	majority	ruling	the	dissent	suggests	that	the	entwinement	concept	might	extend	to	any	group	with	public	officials	controlling	it	–	a	suggestion	that	it	appears	the	majority	would	agree	with.		The	dissent’s	concept	that	the	association	is	a	“private	citizen”382	seems	to	ignore	the	substantial	state	involvement	to	deny	the	relationship	of	the	state	to	the	association.	
The	result	of	the	Burger/Rehnquist	era	is	that	much	more	limitation	exists	on	state	action	than	was	previously	developing.	Despite	Justice	Thomas’s	warnings	that	the	concept	has	become	uncontrolled	and	ill-defined	it	has	become	far	more	confined	and	never	was	well	defined.	Again,	it	pays	to	consider	the	words	of	Professor	Black	when	describing	the	state	action	concept	at	the	beginning	of	this	era	as	a	quagmire	and	a	dark	cave	because	it	was	not	well	defined	at	that	point.	The	era	did	little	or	nothing	to	add	definition	but	did	much	to	reverse	the	growth	of	the	concept	that	occurred	during	the	Warren	Court.	
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The	Roberts	Court	
The	issue	of	state	action	has	not	appeared	in	the	dozen	years	of	the	Roberts	Court	and	that	may	signal	how	weakened	the	concept	has	become	through	previous	decisions.	It	is	also	likely	a	result	of	litigants	seeking	other	alternatives	as	causes	of	action	such	as	reliance	on	state	provisions	to	seek	redress.	The	Brentwood	case	was	revisited	on	the	question	of	the	First	Amendment	which	the	Court	found	was	not	violated	by	a	rule	prohibiting	schools	from	recruiting	student	athletes	but	the	state	action	finding	was	not	changed.383	Justice	Thomas	concurred	but	again	argued	that	the	original	case	should	be	reversed	to	find	the	Association	was	not	a	state	actor.	He	was	not	joined	in	that	opinion	by	any	other	Justice.384		
Present	status	of	the	state	action	doctrine	The	review	of	decisions	and	how	they	have	changed	through	the	years	since	the	ratification	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	reveals	first	that	the	Court	has	not	constructed	a	clear	definition	of	a	state	actor	under	that	amendment.	There	is,	however,	a	definite	arc	followed	by	the	decisions	that	is	not	based	on	a	syllogistic	construction	but	shows	an	expression	by	the	Court	of	the	prevailing	political	climate	that	brought	the	Justices	to	serve	on	that	body.	When	the	different	eras	of	the	Court	are	examined	they	show	definite	changes	in	how	the	issue	of	state	action	has	been	used	to	allow	or	deny	constitutional	claims.	The	early	years	were	cautious	as	would	be	expected	for	such	a	change	in	the	federalist	concept.	The	following	years	began	to	expand	the	concept	as	the	
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Court	pushed	somewhat	beyond	the	initial	caution.	The	Warren	Court	took	the	Constitution	beyond	any	previous	Court	as	it	faced	substantial	issues	of	racial	discrimination	and	extended	individual	rights	in	new	ways.	The	backlash	against	the	expansion	of	the	Warren	Court	came	in	the	form	of	the	election	of	a	president	on	a	pledge	to	stop	“judicial	activism”	and	the	appointment	of	two	Chief	Justices	who	reined	in	the	state	action	doctrine	almost	to	elimination.	That	withdrawal	of	the	previous	expansion	has	been	followed	by	near	silence	in	the	Court	on	state	action	perhaps	signaling	that	it	lacks	any	application	beyond	direct	state	involvement	in	a	denial	of	constitutional	rights.	 	
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Chapter	5	
Implications	for	Charter	School	Teachers	
	 Charter	schools	have	developed	and	proliferated	in	the	United	States	following	most	of	the	development	of	the	state	action	doctrine	in	the	Supreme	Court.	In	2001	when	the	last	substantive	state	action	case	was	decided	there	were	fewer	than	2,000	charter	schools.	Today	there	are	more	than	three	times	that	many.	Just	how	they	should	be	treated	on	issues	of	constitutional	law	has	yet	to	be	decided	definitively	but	those	issues	are	of	great	significance	to	teachers	who	serve	charter	school	students.	Public	employees	do	enjoy	certain	constitutional	protections	that	are	not	afforded	to	employees	of	private	institutions.	
	 	Teachers	in	charter	schools	have	largely	been	excluded	from	state	tenure	laws	but	even	without	those	laws	there	can	be	situations	in	which	a	de	facto	tenure	is	earned	requiring	some	due	process	before	termination	of	employment.385	Free	speech	for	public	school	teachers	has	been	supported	by	several	decisions	of	the	Court	with	certain	limitations	as	to	subject	matter.386	Publicly	employed	teachers	may	not	be	required	to	submit	an	affidavit	of	the	organizations	to	which	they	have	belonged387,	sign	
																																								 																				
385	Perry	v.	Sindermann,	408	U.S.	593	(1972).	
386	See,	e.g.,	Wieman	v.	Updegraff,	344	U.S.	183	(1952);Shelton	v.	Tucker,	364	U.S.	479	
(1960);Keyishian	v.	Board	of	Regents,	385	U.S.	589	(1967);Tinker	v.	Des	Moines,	393	U.S.	503	
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387	Shelton	v.	Tucker,	364	U.S.	479	(1960).	
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a	loyalty	oath388,	or	certify	that	they	are	not	members	of	the	Communist	Party389	to	gain	or	maintain	employment.	They	may	speak	out	on	public	issues	as	any	citizen	may	when	it	is	not	specific	to	their	job.390	The	Fourth	Amendment	protects	them	from	searches	that	are	not	reasonable	where	they	have	some	expectation	of	privacy	even	in	their	workplace.391	If	charter	school	teachers	are	held	to	be	employed	by	private	employers	those	constitutional	provisions	are	inapplicable	allowing	the	employer	to	ignore	those	protections.	If	charter	schools	are	public,	the	teachers	have	rights	like	any	other	public	school	teacher.	That	is	why	it	is	essential	to	examine	how	charter	schools	might	be	categorized	by	the	Court	as	state	actors	subject	to	constitutional	limitations.	
	 With	the	limitations	placed	on	the	application	of	the	state	action	doctrine’s	inclusion	of	private	citizens	and	entities	in	the	recent	past	it	cannot	be	said	that	charter	schools	are	likely	to	be	considered	state	actors	in	their	relationship	to	their	teachers.	For	reasons	explained	below	it	appears	to	be	a	very	difficult	argument	to	with	state	actor	status	for	charter	schools	despite	their	identity	as	“public”	schools.	What	is	required	is	to	explore	what	might	be	argued	and	how	the	cases	might	be	framed	to	maximize	the	possibility	that	charter	school	teachers	will	be	granted	the	same	constitutional	protections	as	their	traditional	public	school	counterparts.	
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	 At	the	outset,	it	must	be	noted	that	charter	schools	are	creations	of	state	law	and	as	such	there	are	variations	in	how	they	are	structured	and	administered.	For	purposes	of	this	analysis	no	single	state	will	be	used	but	the	characteristics	of	many	charter	arrangements	will	be	used	to	analyze	the	arguments.	For	any	given	state,	the	situation	might	present	a	better	or	worse	argument	for	any	issue	presented	to	the	Court.	This	analysis	will	assume	that	private	companies,	administered	wholly	by	private	individuals	may	operate	a	charter	and	that	in	many	cases	a	private	company	not	the	holder	of	the	charter	may	administer	a	charter	school	and	operate	as	the	employer	of	the	teachers	in	the	school.	It	will	also	be	assumed	that	the	sole	tie	to	either	the	local	school	board	or	the	state	education	authority	will	be	the	charter	for	that	school.	It	will	also	be	assumed	that	the	state	has	statutorily	allowed	charter	schools	to	operate	outside	the	existing	tenure	laws	that	are	part	of	traditional	public	school	teachers’	contracts	and	that	the	only	state	directives	imposed	on	the	charter	schools	are	those	for	health	and	safety	of	the	students	and	little	else.	Because	the	Court	has	consistently	recited	that	any	state	action	case	requires	a	careful	examination	of	the	unique	facts	and	has	refused	to	create	any	true	rules	for	deciding	the	cases	any	fact	situation	can	result	in	a	singular	decision.	
How	can	charter	schools	be	state	actors?	
	 The	Court	has	discussed	several	factors	in	the	long	history	of	state	action	cases	with	little	consistency.	The	factors	have	remained	the	same	but	how	they	apply	to	any	given	case	has	changed	through	the	approximately	150	years	since	the	ratification	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	Understanding	the	path	of	those	changes	in	the	application	
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of	the	factors	serves	as	the	basis	for	this	analysis	so	this	chapter	will	look	at	how	those	factors	might	be	argued	for	charter	schools	and	how	the	path	of	decisions	points	to	a	result	of	that	argument.	
Public	Function	
	 What	seems	most	logical	to	argue	to	support	a	finding	that	a	charter	school	is	a	state	actor	is	that	it	is	identified	as	a	public	school	and	therefore	serves	a	public	function.	The	cases	from	the	middle	portion	of	the	twentieth	century	might	have	supported	that	argument	and	there	is	a	remote	possibility	that	the	argument	might	be	successful	even	now.	More	likely,	however,	is	the	assertion	of	the	Court	that	the	public	function	argument	fails	because	school	has	not	“traditionally	the	exclusive	prerogative	of	the	State.”392	Originally	applied	to	a	privately	owned	electrically	utility	the	exclusivity	requirement	has	been	cited	as	support	for	the	proposition	that	education	is	not	such	a	prerogative.393	That	holding	does	not	plainly	preclude	charter	schools	from	being	held	to	be	a	public	function	and	leaves	a	small	opening	for	argument.	
	 Rendell-Baker	involves	a	private	school	providing	only	services	to	“maladjusted	high	school	students”,394	a	service	that	the	State	of	Massachusetts	had	not	previously	provided	itself.	Because	there	was	not	an	issue	of	other	students	being	educated	that	might	serve	as	a	small	opening	to	argue	that	the	education	of	most	students	in	public	
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schools	has	been	a	public	function	for	several	decades.	It	cannot	be	argued	to	have	been	exclusive	for	the	entire	period	of	the	existence	of	the	United	States	because	early	education	efforts	were	almost	all	privately	run	in	some	manner.	Until	the	1830’s	there	were	many	suppliers	of	education	and	the	concept	of	universal	education	was	just	becoming	a	reality.	Following	the	Civil	War	there	was	a	strong	movement	to	indoctrinate	the	South	with	schools	carrying	the	Northern	message	of	abolition	and	stressing	the	values	of	the	North.	Increased	industrialization	and	urbanization	pushed	public	schools	well	into	the	majority	during	the	19th	Century	and	since	then	the	public	common	school	has	been	a	fixture	in	all	states.395		
	 The	Court	began	its	analysis	of	the	state	action	issue	in	the	case	by	comparing	the	private	school	to	“not	fundamentally	different	from	many	private	corporations	whose	business	depends	primarily	on	contracts	to	build	roads,	bridges,	dams,	ships,	or	submarines	for	the	government.”396	That	analysis	opens	at	least	two	possible	avenues	for	argument	that	distinguishes	the	case	and	supports	a	different	result.	Simply	the	fact	that	the	private	corporations	in	the	case	exist	for	something	other	than	public	business	and	exist	outside	of	the	public	realm	creates	a	difference	large	enough	for	the	Court	to	opt	for	a	different	result.	Charter	schools	are	created	by	the	state	and	exist	only	because	the	state	or	an	agency	of	the	state	gives	it	life	through	the	charter.	It	is	not	one	contract	among	many	but	the	sole	reason	the	charter	school	may	operate.	In	addition,	to	lump	
																																								 																				
395	For	a	full	history	of	education	in	the	United	States	through	this	era	see,	LAWRENCE	A.	CREMIN,	
AMERICAN	EDUCATION:	THE	METROPOLITAN	EXPERIENCE	1876-1980			(Harper	&	Row		1988);LAWRENCE	A.	
CREMIN,	AMERICAN	EDUCATION:	THE	COLONIAL	EXPERIENCE	1607-1783			(Harper	&	Row		1970).	
396	Rendell-Baker	v.	Kohn,	457	U.S.	at	840-841.	
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the	education	of	children	in	with	ships,	dams	and	bridges	seems	to	be	a	stretch	for	a	school	created	by	the	state	to	meet	its	obligation	to	educate	young	people.	Although	the	current	Court	might	reject	those	arguments	they	are	worthy	of	presenting	as	a	way	to	distinguish	the	case	and	allow	for	a	holding	that	charter	schools	are	state	actors.	
If	the	Court	should	decide	to	consider	the	full	history	of	school	in	the	United	States	that	might	be	a	factor	but	the	more	recent	trend	to	limit	the	scope	of	the	inquiry	may	work	to	keep	the	focus	on	the	past	century	of	public	schools	as	a	public	function.	Private	schools	are	still	a	major	factor	but	the	state	has	provided	its	education	through	the	traditional	public	school	and	having	now	adopted	the	public	charter	school	that	may	be	considered	a	part	of	that	public	function.	Little	of	what	is	taking	the	political	center	stage	today	points	to	any	expansion	of	the	public	function	argument	for	charter	schools.	Based	on	the	prevailing	political	winds	the	Court	is	unlikely	to	impose	constitutional	duties	on	the	charter	school	movement	based	on	this	argument.	
The	symbiotic	relationship	
	 The	Burton397decision	created	a	unique	avenue	of	argument	that	is	built	around	the	concept	that	the	state	benefits	from	its	engagement	with	a	private	entity	and	when	the	private	entity	acts	within	that	arrangement	it	implicates	the	state.	Declared	to	be	a	unique	fact	situation,	the	holding	in	that	case	could	support	a	finding	that	a	charter	school	is	involved	in	such	a	relationship	with	the	local	school	district.	The	restaurant	in	
Burton	was	placed	in	a	public	position	by	municipal	action	and	that	allowed	it	to	
																																								 																				
397	Burton	v.	Wilmington	Parking	Authority,	365	U.S.	715	(1961).	
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publicly	discriminate	against	a	certain	group	of	people	unconstitutionally.	One	unique	aspect	of	that	case	is	that	the	restaurant	was	a	lessor	of	public	space	where	it	operated.	In	some	situations,	charter	schools	are	using	buildings	owned	by	a	local	school	district	in	which	a	charter	school	is	placed.	Subject	to	charter	requirements	and	local	school	board	oversight	of	those	requirements	the	charter	is	engaged	to	education	some	portion	of	the	public	district’s	students.	The	district	benefits	by	having	students	educated	and	the	charter	benefits	by	having	a	location	and	students	to	operate	a	school.	Based	on	that	mutually	beneficial	arrangement	it	could	be	argued	that	a	symbiotic	relationship	exists	making	the	charter	a	public	actor	just	as	the	restaurant	was	in	
Burton.	Again,	based	on	limitations	in	the	holding	to	the	specific	facts	that	case	is	not	strong	support	for	any	argument	that	is	not	squarely	aligned	with	the	facts	upon	which	the	decision	relied.	
Entwinement,	insinuation	and	regulation	
	 These	three	terms	are	combined	for	the	purposes	of	this	argument	because	there	is	little	to	distinguish	their	use	by	the	Court.	The	argument	is	often	made	and	seldom	successful	that	the	private	party	alleged	to	have	violated	the	rights	of	a	claimant	was	so	heavily	regulated	that	its	acts	were	attributable	to	the	state.	It	has	been	rejected	by	the	Court	in	cases	involving	utilities398,	nursing	homes399,	workers’	compensation	
																																								 																				
398	Jackson	v.	Metropolitan	Edison,	419	U.S.	345	(1974).	
399	Blum	v.	Yaretsky,	457	U.S.	991	(1982).	
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insurers400,	liquor	license	holders401,	and	a	private	school	serving	special	needs	students402.	It	is	difficult	to	make	an	argument	that	schools,	especially	charter	schools,	are	more	regulated	that	those	listed	institutions.	The	Court	has	not	since	Burton	looked	at	the	totality	of	the	circumstances	to	decide	a	state	action	case	but	addresses	each	separate	category	of	argument	as	standing	alone	making	a	cumulative	effect	argument	unsuccessful.	
	 A	single	case	of	more	recent	date	does	support	an	argument	that	might	prove	successful	in	some	settings.	Amtrak	was	created	by	special	charter	by	the	federal	government	to	support	governmental	objectives	and	when	its	practices	came	under	scrutiny	the	Court	did	find	it	a	state	actor	for	First	Amendment	purposes.403	Two	factors	were	found	to	exist	in	that	case	and	one	of	them	is	less	likely	to	be	the	case	in	the	charter	school	setting.	The	first	factor	was	simply	that	Amtrak	was	created	by	a	special	charter	and	the	second	was	that	the	government	retained	power	to	appoint	six	of	nine	members	of	the	governing	board	of	Amtrak	directly	and	two	more	by	virtue	of	remaining	the	holder	of	all	of	the	preferred	stock	of	the	company.	The	remaining	member	is	the	president	of	the	company.	That	level	of	control	is	not	commonly	found	in	charter	schools	and	would	seem	to	be	key	to	the	holding.		
																																								 																				
400	American	Manufacturers	v.	Sullivan,	526	U.S.	40	(1999).	
401	Moose	Lodge	No.	107	v.	Irvis,	407	U.S.	163	(1972).	
402	Rendell-Baker	v.	Kohn,	457	U.S.	830	(1982).	
403	Lebron	v.	National	Railroad	Passenger	Corporation,	513	U.S.	374	(1995).	
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	 Another	aspect	of	Lebron	is	that	the	argument	that	the	government	was	responsible	for	Amtrak’s	actions	was	changed	to	seek	a	finding	that	Amtrak	was	actually	a	government	agency.	Although	that	is	also	based	on	the	two	factors	listed	above	there	is	an	avenue	to	argue	that	a	public	charter	school	as	identified	in	statute	should,	by	its	very	nature,	be	considered	an	arm	of	the	school	district	or	the	state	depending	on	the	chartering	authority	that	grants	it	the	right	to	receive	public	funds	for	educating	students.	This	remains	a	weak	position,	however,	unless	some	degree	of	control	beyond	the	charter	and	some	review	of	objectives	in	the	charter	exists.	
	 The	ill-defined	nature	of	the	words	used	to	constitute	this	avenue	of	argument	makes	it	very	difficult	to	claim	that	the	Court	will	decide	in	one	way	or	another	but	given	the	whole	arc	of	decisions	and	the	severe	limitations	on	the	state	action	doctrine	in	the	recent	past	there	is	little	to	suggest	that	any	form	of	entwinement	or	insinuation	will	succeed	short	of	the	sort	of	control	in	Lebron.	
Joint	participation	with	state	
	 The	cases	do	support	state	action	when	the	state	is	involved	in	the	action	that	causes	a	constitutional	violation.	When	law	enforcement	assists	in	an	illegal	seizure	of	property	state	action	has	been	found	to	be	present.404	Where	that	involvement	is	more	peripheral	to	the	process	the	Court	has	rejected	the	notion	that	it	is	adequate	to	find	state	action.405	The	concept	that	the	state	must	be	directly	involved	in	the	act	of	
																																								 																				
404	Lugar	v.	Edmondson	Oil	Co.,	Inc.,	457	U.S.	922	(1982);Soldal	v.	Cook	County,	506	U.S.	56	(1992).	
405	Flagg	Brothers	v.	Brooks,	436	U.S.	149	(1978).	
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depriving	one	of	constitutional	rights	is	another	difficult	barrier	to	finding	state	action	in	charter	school	employment	settings.406	State	inaction	in	the	face	of	private	action	depriving	another	of	constitutional	rights	is	a	logical	argument	where	the	state	has	set	up	a	system	to	address	the	very	wrong	being	committed	but	even	when	a	minor	child	is	being	physically	abused	to	the	point	of	brain	damage	the	Court	would	not	find	that	child	welfare	authorities	had	a	duty	to	act.407	That	seems	to	preclude	any	finding	that	the	state	would	be	responsible	for	failing	to	act	even	in	the	face	of	a	wrongful	termination	of	a	charter	school	teacher.	Short	of	a	finding	that	a	statute	required	a	charter	school	to	act	in	a	manner	that	deprived	a	teacher	of	constitutional	rights	there	is	little	suggestion	in	the	cases	that	charter	schools	would	be	found	to	be	state	actors	when	taking	personnel	action.	
Other	options	for	charter	school	teachers	
	 State	constitutions	and	statutes	are	subject	to	state	interpretation	and	in	some	cases	provide	greater	levels	of	protection	of	individual	rights	that	the	U.S.	Constitution.	Many	state	constitutions	contain	due	process	and	equal	protection	clauses	and	those	are	not	all	conditioned	on	state	action	to	support	a	claim.	A	charter	school	teacher	faced	with	a	possible	violation	of	rights	should	include	any	possible	state	claim	to	access	relief.	Those	constitutional	provisions	are	many	and	varied	and	beyond	the	scope	of	this	
																																								 																				
406	See,	Rendell-Baker	v.	Kohn,	457	U.S.	at	841.	Personnel	decisions	were	not	“compelled	or	even	
influenced	by	any	state	regulation.”	Blum	v.	Yaretsky,	457	U.S.	at	1004.	“Mere	approval	of	or	
acquiescence	in”	“the	specific	conduct	complained	of”	will	not	support	state	action	finding.	American	
Manufacturers	v.	Sullivan,	526	U.S.	at	54.	State	inaction	following	permitted	action	is	not	adequate	
for	state	action	finding.	
407	DeShaney	v.	Winnebago	County,	489	U.S.	189	(1988).	
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study	but	may	serve	to	sustain	claims	not	supportable	in	federal	courts.	State	statutory	schemes	are	also	quite	varied	and	there	may	be	relief	found	in	those	schemes	also.	They,	too,	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study	but	could	serve	to	provide	relief	in	some	situations.		
Finally,	what	has	become	a	popular	avenue	of	action	for	charter	school	teachers	is	the	formation	of	unions.	Although	many	states	have	barred	access	to	state	public	employee	unions	for	charter	school	teachers	there	is	a	federal	scheme	of	labor	law	that	has	now	on	more	than	one	occasion	accepted	charter	school	teachers	as	unions	with	private	employers.	The	original	case	was	that	of	Chicago	Mathematics	&	Science	
Academy408	which	fought	a	lengthy	battle	first	rejected	by	the	state	educational	labor	authority	and	then	initially	rejected	as	a	private	employer	union	by	the	National	Labor	Relations	Board	(NLRB)	but	the	final	holding	was	that	the	state	did	not	create	the	not-for-profit	entity	that	obtained	a	charter	to	operate	a	school	so	it	was	considered	a	private	employer.	That	decision	was	heavily	based	on	Illinois	law	and	has	been	called	into	question	based	on	the	appointment	of	NLRB	members	as	recess	appointments.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	NLRB	has	a	strong	bias	to	finding	that	it	has	jurisdiction	over	unions	not	otherwise	covered	but	unpublished	decisions	since	that	have	relied	upon	the	reasoning	of	Chicago	Mathematics.	Unions	serve	to	negotiate	in	the	employment	contracts	many	of	the	rights	that	might	otherwise	be	found	in	the	
																																								 																				
408	Chicago	Mathematics	&	Science	Academy,	359	NLRB	No.	41	(2012).	
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Constitution	and	by	that	avenue	could	protect	teachers	in	charter	schools	despite	their	lack	of	standing	as	state	actors	for	Fourteenth	Amendment	purposes.	
Conclusion	
	 The	questions	this	study	set	out	to	answer	bear	repeating	at	this	point.	They	are:	
	 Are	charter	schools	state	actors	for	Fourteenth	Amendment	purposes?	
	 Are	charter	schools	public	employers	as	are	traditional	public	schools?	
Do	teachers	working	for	charter	schools	enjoy	the	same	constitutional	employment	rights	as	public	school	teachers?	
	 Examining	the	arc	of	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	since	the	ratification	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	it	seems	that	the	questions	may	all	be	answered	in	the	same	way.	The	long	history	of	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	has	expanded	and	then	contracted	the	reach	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	there	is	no	sign	that	a	renewed	expansion	is	on	the	horizon.	Although	charter	schools	differ	in	ways	from	state	to	state	the	charter	system	that	has	no	public	employee	involved	in	operation	of	the	schools	and	lead	by	a	privately	selected	board	of	directors	or	trustees	is	not	likely	to	be	found	to	be	acting	as	a	state	actor	when	employing	and	ending	employment	of	teachers.	Traditional	public	schools	will	continue	to	operate	within	the	Constitution	but	public	charter	schools	are	likely	to	be	held	to	a	much	lower	standard	of	conduct	as	it	relates	to	teachers.		
	 State	constitutions	and	state	laws	can	be	drafted	to	replace	the	rights	taken	from	teachers	but	those	are	also	subject	to	changes	in	the	legislatures	from	time	to	time	and	
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are	not	as	durable	as	constitutional	protection.	To	build	in	constitutional	protection	would	require	charter	laws	that	include	a	public	employee	or	elected	official	in	the	governance	of	the	charter	school	or	that	include	teacher	rights	drawn	from	the	U.S.	Constitution.	Greater	the	involvement	of	public	officials	in	the	operation	of	charter	schools	raises	the	likelihood	of	a	finding	that	they	are	state	actors.	
	 Without	those	protections	in	place,	charter	school	teachers	will	continue	to	be	in	a	precarious	position	of	employment	and	will	be	subject	to	control	by	charter	school	operators	that	could	limit	their	ability	to	teach	their	students	to	think	critically,	question	the	world	around	them	and	speak	for	issues	that	matter	to	them.	It	creates	a	corporate	culture	into	what	should	be	an	open	learning	environment.	Only	by	working	to	restore	those	rights	to	teachers	can	charter	schools	be	considered	truly	public	schools	working	in	the	best	interests	of	students	according	to	community	standards	set	by	democratic	means.	
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